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1 Introduction
Expressing one’s opinions and findings is important for social decisions, managing organization and
so on. If the players’ preferences are not aligned or expressing ones’ opinions and findings are costly,
there are distortions in incentive to express a certain message (i.e., player has an incentive not to
tell the true information) and it becomes an issue to achieve a socially optimal decision. Eliciting
the true information from the players is a central problem in the studies of mechanism design and
organizational economics.
In this paper, we study how incentives of telling the truth are distorted in some organizations and
mechanisms that often used in real world.
First, consider a situation that a person complains about some issue. If he makes a complaint about
the issue, it may be improved, whereas making a complaint is costly for him while overlooking is
costless. In the context of this study, improving the issue is considered as a public good and making
a complaint is considered as a contribution to the public good. Chapter 2 considers such situation as
a problem of private provision of a discrete public good with a binary contribution. That is, when a
certain number of persons (threshold) contributes a public good, it is provided, otherwise not. This
chapter examines the property of equilibria in a large population. We show that the limit probability
that the public good is provided is irrelevant to the preferences distribution, which shows that such
system is meaningless.
In chapter 2, since sending a message is costly, only most zealous players to provide a public good
send messages and thus, the outcome is irrelevant to the citizens’ preferences. However, if there is a
surrogate who sends a message on behalf of the citizens, the tragic result may change.
In chapter 3, we consider an initiative process based on a signature collection where there is a
campaigner who gathers signatures. In this setting, the campaigner is a surrogate of citizens. If signing
and not signing are costless, unlikely in the previous model, the number of collected signatures is
increasing in the ratio of supporters of the campaign. In this case, however, the campaigner’s incentive
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to campaign becomes an issue since the campaigner can gather many signatures by askingmany people
to sign even when the campaign is supported by only a small ratio of people. Thus, if the signature
requirement is too low, too many campaigns can meet the requirement. On the other hand, since
campaigning is costly, with a too high requirement, almost all campaigners give up campaigning.
Chapter 3 examines the optimal requirement to balance the tradeoﬀ. This is the minimum require-
ment to the campaigner gathers the required signatures for popular laws while give up gathering the
required signatures for unpopular law. We show that when the diﬀerence between popular and unpop-
ular laws is large in the number of collected signatures, a low requirement is needed for the purpose.
We also show that the diﬀerence is large if either uncertainty in citizens’ preference distribution is
high or, citizens have a keen interest on whether the law is enacted (the importance of the law is high).
Therefore, in such case, the optimal requirement is low.
To summarize, chapter 2 and 3 study systems dealing with citizens’ request for improvement and
examine an optimal system to elicit the true information about their preferences from the people. This
type of question is also seen in another situation. In an organization, managers cannot always find
problems about the organization, so they delegate their subordinates to find the problems and ask
him to report the problem if he finds it. Here the subordinate’s information is whether he knows the
problem. However, in the real world, the subordinates may not report the problems that they find
even when they may be punished for not reporting. There should be incentives of not reporting the
problem.
In chapter 4, we study workers’ incentives for reporting problems within an OLG organization
consisting of a subordinate and amanager. In this paper, we assume that in each period, the subordinate
proceeds to be a manager and the manager retires in the next period. Subordinates have responsibility
to report the problem and managers have responsibility to solve the reported problem. We also assume
that the manager’s responsibility is heavier when the problem is reported than the case of being not
reported. Then, if the subordinate reports and the manager does not solve the reported problem,
the subordinate will have a responsibility for solving the reported problem in the next period. On
the other hand, if the subordinate conceals the problem and, so does the next subordinate, since the
problem has not reported, the responsibility of the subordinate will be reduced. This mechanism
creates subordinates’ incentive of not reporting. We study the properties of equilibria and show that
this incentive has a strategic complementarity, which implies that not reporting of the problem is
realized as a firm’s culture (Kreps, 1990).
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We also see that the timing when the problem is reported. To consider this, we assume that the size
of the problem, which determines the size of punishment and the cost of solving the problem, evolves
as time proceeds. We show that when the growth rate of the size decreases as time proceeds, there
exists a period such that before the period, no player reports, and thus the report is delayed. On the
contrary, if the growth rate of the size increases, there exist a period such that after the period, no
player reports. In the latter case, if the size of the problem increases, after a period, the problem will
be ignored until accidents occur even when the managers could solve if it is reported.
3
2 Binary contribution to a discrete public
good in a large population1
2.1 Introduction
This study examines the private provision of a discrete public good problem with non-refunded binary
contribution developed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984).2 We investigate the asymptotic properties
of this model when the population is finite but suﬃciently large.
This model can apply to the following situations. Consider the situation that a citizen complains
about, say, a TV program, a collection of books in a library, or a government’s policy implementation.
For example, the BBC receives about 250,000 complaints every year,3 while the American Library
Association reports lists of books that are frequently requested to be removed from libraries.4 If a
suﬃciently large number of citizens complain about such issues, the parties concerned would make
a response and may modify the issues. In the context of this study, the modification of the issue is
considered to be a discrete public good, while the act of complaining is a binary contribution.5
Similarly, in some countries, if the required number of signatures to a petition are gathered, citizens
can request that a law be enacted. Signing or not signing is again a binary choice and enacting the
law is a public good. For example, US government has a online platform,“We the People” to citizens
make a petition and if the petition collects 100,000 signatures, US government reviews and responds
1 The author is deeply grateful to Eiichi Miyagawa and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, who provided carefully considered
feedback and valuable comments. The author is also indebted to the many people who commented on this work. Their
comments significantly contributed to improving this manuscript. Any errors in this paper are the author’s own. This
work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI grant number 14J05350.
2 This game is also called a threshold game.
3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/complaints/handle-complaint/.
4 http://www.ala.org/bbooks/frequentlychallengedbooks/top10.
5 Liang (2013) considers consumer complaints and analyzes information transmission when the number of consumers
is 2. Prendergast (2002) also considers consumer complaints as a tool of resolving agency problem.
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the petition.6
In either case, the population is considered to be large. Therefore, considering an infinite population
approximates the real world. Moreover, the costs of complaining and signing cannot be recovered.
This is the reason why we consider non-refunded contribution.
In this setting, we consider the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium (symmetric BNE) to investi-
gate the probability that the discrete public good is provided when the population goes to infinity. We
provide the necessary and suﬃcient condition that there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which each
player contributes a positive probability with a suﬃciently large population. Let h be the threshold
level, V be the maximum valuation, and C be the minimum cost of contribution among citizens. We
call a player whose value and contribution cost are respectively V and C the most zealous player.
If h > 1, the act of no player contributing is a trivial equilibrium. In the non-trivial equilibrium,
we show that as the population goes to infinity, only the most zealous players contribute and the
distribution of the number of contributors converges to a Poisson distribution with parameter x, which
solves Ve xx (h 1)=(h   1)! = C. The intuition is as follows. Note that the probability that a given
player contributes converges to zero as the population goes to infinity. In this case, the number
of contributors follows a Poisson distribution. Then, e xx (h 1)=(h   1)! is the probability that the
number of contributors is h   1. Hence, e xx (h 1)=(h   1)! is the probability that a given player is
pivotal. Therefore, Ve xx (h 1)=(h   1)! and C are respectively the expected utility and cost of the
most zealous player’s contribution. In the non-trivial equilibrium, these values coincide. If the most
zealous player’s cost exceeds his expected utility, no player wishes to contribute. This is a trivial
equilibrium (i.e., a contradiction). If the most zealous player’s expected utility exceeds his cost, since
the population goes to infinity, an infinite number of players contribute. This fact implies that the
probability that the number of contributors is h   1 goes to zero and, in turn, the expected utility of
the most zealous player’s contribution goes to zero, which, again, is a contradiction. Thus, we have
Ve xx (h 1)=(h   1)! = C.
If the threshold is one, the symmetric BNE is unique. If the minimum cost is suﬃciently small,
the act of no player contributing is not an equilibrium. In particular, if the maximum valuation is
infinity or the minimum cost is 0, in any symmetric equilibrium, the probability that the public good
is provided goes to 1 as the population goes to infinity. When the threshold is more than one, if the
minimum cost is suﬃciently small, there are exactly two equilibria in which each player contributes
6 https://petitions.whitehouse.gov.
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a positive probability. These equilibria diﬀer in the expected number of contributors. We call the
equilibrium with the smaller expected number of contributors the low contributing equilibrium and
that with the larger expected number of contributors the high contributing equilibrium.
We show that with a large population, in low contributing equilibria, the probability that a given
player contributes is decreasing inV=C. On the contrary, in high contributing equilibria, the probability
that a given player contributes is increasing inV=C. We also consider the threshold eﬀect. We show that
in both high contributing and low contributing equilibria, the probability that a given player contributes
is increasing at the threshold. On the contrary, in high contributing equilibria, the probability that the
public good is provided is decreasing at the threshold.
These comparative static results can be applied to design optimal complaint management systems.
Consider a public organization. Some citizens are dissatisfied with its decisions, systems, and in-
stitutions. However, the people currently working in the organization may be unable to grasp all its
decisions, as some were made a long time ago for example. In another case, such decisions are made
by a decentralized party. Such decisions cause complaints and are requested to be modified. However,
how should the organization handle such complaints?
For example, consider a collection of books in a public library. Typically, these books are collected
by librarians. Some citizens may complain that the library’s collection includes unsuitable books and
request their removal.
We consider a system such that if an issue causes complaints and the number of complaining citizens
is larger than h, the decision is modified. Since the government cannot grasp the issue, setting h = 0
may be impossible. In the case that setting h = 0 is impossible, if the modification is socially desirable,
h = 1 is optimal in the following two senses. First, since setting h = 1 implies the highest probability
of a suﬃcient number of citizens complaining. Problematic issues are thus easily exposed. Second,
setting h = 1 also implies the lowest number of complaining citizens since this number is increasing
at the threshold. Typically, handling a large number of complaints is costly. Thus, fewer complaining
citizens is more desirable. On the contrary, if the modification is socially undesirable, rejecting all
complaints is optimal. In summary, the optimal policy is either h = 1 or rejecting all complaints. That
is, the number of complaining citizens does not matter. Indeed, as a real-world example, the BBC has
previously stated that the number of complaints does not make a diﬀerence.7 Our result may explain
this policy.
7 http://www.bbc.co.uk/complaints/handle-complaint/.
6
2.1 Introduction
Previous studies have assumed that players simultaneously decide whether to contribute. However,
each player may also observe the behavior of others before deciding whether to contribute. For
example, consider an anti-governmental demonstration. A group of campaigners are campaigning to
repeal a policy. They count the number of citizens who have already participated in the demonstration
and announce this figure publicly, which inevitably aﬀects the future decisions of other possible
participants. As another example, at the website of US government’s platform to citizen make a
petition, we can view on-going status of collected signatures of each petition. This also creates a
dynamic situation.
We consider the case. Let h be the threshold. In the static model, if h > 1, the act of no player
contributing is necessarily an equilibrium. Indeed, if h is more than the entire number of opportunities
to announce the number of contributors, the act of no player contributing is still a symmetric perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. However, we show that if h is less than the entire number of opportunities, as
the population goes to infinity, there is a positive infimum in the probability that at least h players
contribute in any symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, if the minimum cost among
players goes to zero, the probability that at least h players contribute converges to 1 in any symmetric
perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Recall that when h = 1, even in the static model, the act of no player contributing is not an
equilibrium with suﬃciently low cost. Suppose that there are two chances to contribute and h = 2.
Suppose also that one player contributed in the first stage. Then, in the second stage, it is the same
situation as h = 1. One player’s contribution is suﬃcient to provide the public good. Therefore, in the
second stage, the act of no player contributing is not an equilibrium. Then, in turn, in the first stage,
since at least one player contributes, at least one player contributes in the second stage and thus the
public good is provided. This situation is the same as the case for h = 1. Thus, the act of no player
contributing is not an equilibrium. This discussion can be generalized for the case of a finite number
of chances to contribute.
The remainder of this paper consists of the following sections. Section 3.2 reviews the related
literature. Section 2.2 describes our model. The results of the equilibrium analysis are presented
in Section 2.3, where we calculate the probability that the public good is provided in an infinitely
large population. Section 2.4 addresses the dynamic provision model. Section 2.5 considers threshold
uncertainty before our conclusions are finally drawn. Omitted proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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2.1.1 Related Literature
This section reviews the literature on the private provision of discrete public goods. To the best of the
author’s knowledge, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) was the first study to analyze this problem, showing
both eﬃcient and ineﬃcient equilibria. Harrington (2001), Xu (2001), and Bergstrom (2012b) all
find that when the threshold level is one, as the population goes to infinity, the probability of the
provision of public goods converges to a constant positive number. Xu (2002) analyzes how an
increase at the threshold level influences the probability of the provision of a public good by dividing
the eﬀects into the threshold eﬀect (direct eﬀect) and strategic eﬀect (indirect eﬀect), showing that
the eﬀect of a threshold increase is not necessarily negative. That is, increasing at the threshold can
raise the probability of the provision of a public good. In contrast to these authors, who deal with
identical preferences for public goods, Menezes, Monteiro and Temimi (2001) analyze the case that
preferences are private information and continuous contribution. They show that if the provision cost
is suﬃciently high, the unique equilibrium is non-contributing. Barbieri and Malueg (2008) also
consider the continuous contribution case and study the eﬃciency of equilibria.
The present study examines the case that both players’ preferences and the contribution cost are
private information. In addition, we consider the decision to be binary (i.e., contribute to public goods
or not (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1984)) rather than continuous contribution (Menezes, Monteiro and
Temimi, 2001). Binary contribution model is similar to voting model. Related to this paper, as in
our analysis, Taylor and Yildirim (2010,b) show that the limiting distribution of the number of votes
converges to a Poission distribution.
Many studies have examined the dynamic contribution of discrete public goods. Bliss and Nalebuﬀ
(1984) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) consider the case that public goods are provided in a
single provision. Marx and Matthews (2000) consider a general case with continuous contribution
in a repeated game setting, showing that an eﬃcient allocation is achieved. However, Marx and
Matthews (2000)’s model, in contrast to that presented in our study, needs the belief that a punishment
ensues if one does not contribute. Gradstein (1992) considers the dynamic provision of public goods
with a binary contribution in a large population, finding that although a contribution delay occurs
in a finite population, such a delay disappears for an infinite population, although the equilibrium
remains ineﬃcient. Yildirim (2006) also considers the dynamic provision of public goods with a
binary contribution. In Yildirim’s setting, diﬀerent from our setting, each player decides whether to
contribute a public good in each period and if a suﬃcient number of public goods are provided, players
8
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are rewarded. In contrast to our result, in that setting, an equilibrium in which no one contributes is
not excluded. Bag and Roy (2008) consider the dynamic provision of public goods with a continuous
contribution under incomplete information and verify the eﬀect of announcement.
While the above studies consider repeated forms of simultaneous games, Bergstrom (2012a) con-
siders provision by randomly arriving players, while Admati and Perry (1991) deal with continuous
alternative contributions in the two-person case, showing that a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation is not com-
pleted without commitment under certain conditions. Bag and Roy (2011) consider the world of
incomplete information in the setting that the order of contribution is exogenously given.
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) consider a dynamic mechanism to provide multiple discrete public
goods where in each stage, players contribute to a public good and if a threshold level is achieved, a
public good is provided. They show that the mechanism implements core allocations.
In a recent study, Iijima and Kasahara (2016) consider a general model of a continuous time dynamic
contribution game with complete information and stochastic noise that allows a gradual adjustment to
the contribution and show the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium. This study relates to ours by showing
that multiple equilibria in a static game disappear in a dynamic extension.
We also study threshold uncertainty in line with Nitzan and Romano (1990), McBride (2006), and
Barbieri and Malueg (2010), who analyze the problem of providing discrete public goods under such
uncertainty. Nitzan and Romano (1990) and McBride (2006) assume a common value and cost for
public goods, while Barbieri and Malueg (2010) consider a private-value model of a subscription
game (contribution is refunded) and show the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
2.2 Model
There are n 2 N players who consider whether to contribute a public good. If h 2 f0; ; : : : ; ng players
contribute, the public good is provided.
Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be the set of players. Player i 2 N chooses whether to contribute; if he
contributes, he incurs contribution cost ci. Costs have a continuous distribution. We assume that each
player’s cost is private information and i.i.d. The cost distribution function has density g such that
g(ci) > 0; 8ci 2 (C;C);C > 0;C 2 (0;1).
The utility of player i from the provided public good is vi, where vi is the valuation of the policy
and density is f (vi) > 0;8vi 2 (V;V ), where V 6 0 and V > 0. The distribution of each player’s
9
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valuation is i.i.d. The valuation and cost of each player are allowed to be correlated. For each cost c,
let the conditional density function of valuation v be f (v j c) and f (v j c) > 0 for all v; c.
2.3 Static Model
This section considers only the symmetric BNE. First, we assume C < V since if C > V , no one
contributes. For each v; c, interim expected utility is
q(v; c)v	(h   1) + (1   q(v; c))v	(h)   cq(v; c) = q(v; c)[f	(h   1)   	(h)gv   c] + v	(h);
where q(v; c) is an ex-ante strategy that if the citizen observes his type v; c, he complains with a
probability of q(v; c). 	(h) is the probability that the number of contributions by others is no more
than h and is defined as8
	(h) =
n 1X
k=h
" 
n   1
k
!  
Pr(q(v; c) = 1)
 k  Pr(q(v; c) = 0)n 1 k # :
Then, his best response is
q(v; c) = 1 if
v
c
[	(h   1)   	(h)] > 1;
q(v; c) = 0 if
v
c
[	(h   1)   	(h)] 6 1:
This strategy is called the cutoﬀ strategy. We show that this strategy profile is an equilibrium. We set
yn;h to satisfy yn;h = 1=[	(h   1)   	(h)]. This value is called the cutoﬀ point. If v=c < yn;h, then
q(v; c) = 0, and if v=c > yn;h, then q(v; c) = 1. Firstly, we assume the existence of the cutoﬀ point.
Then,
	(h   1)   	(h) =
2666664
 
n   1
h   1
! *,
Z
yn;h<v=c
f (v j c)g(c) dv dc+-
h 1 *,
Z
yn;h>v=c
f (v j c)g(c) dv dc+-
n h3777775 :
8 The term

n
r

denotes the binomial coeﬃcient, that is

n
r

= n!=[(n   r)!r!].
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By putting P(yn;h) =
R
yn;h<v=c
f (v j c)g(c) dv dc, the above equation becomes
	(h   1)   	(h) = (n   1)!
(h   1)!(n   h)![P(yn;h)]
h 1[1   P(yn;h)]n h:
Therefore, the best response is
q(v; c) = 1 if
v
c
>
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)!
1
[P(yn;h)]h 1[1   P(yn;h)]n h ;
q(v; c) = 0 if
v
c
<
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)!
1
[P(yn;h)]h 1[1   P(yn;h)]n h :
That is, yn;h is a solution for yn;h (n 1)!(h 1)!(n h)! [P(yn;h)]
h 1[1   P(yn;h)]n h = 1: Define function  n;h as
 n;h(y) :=
1
[P(y)]h 1[1   P(y)]n h
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! : (2.1)
Then, cutoﬀ point yn;h is a fixed point of  n;h. If a fixed point exists, a cutoﬀ point that satisfies the
equilibrium condition exists. Therefore, the cutoﬀ strategy is an equilibrium.
2.3.1 Large Population
If h > 1, the act of no player contributing is a trivial symmetric equilibrium. Consider the case of no
fixed point of  n;h. Then,  n;h(y0) > y;8y0 2 [W;V=C], whereW = minf0;V=Cg. Hence, when there
is no fixed point of  n;h, no one contributes. The following lemma proves the suﬃcient condition that
the act of no player contributing is the unique equilibrium.
Lemma 2.1. If the following inequality is established, the act of no player contributing in any
symmetric BNE:
V
C
<
(n   1)n 1
(h   1)h 1(n   h)n h
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! : (2.2)
We consider the case that C > 0 and V < 1.
Firstly, we characterize the condition that  n;h has a fixed point. At the threshold, (2.2) is almost a
necessary and suﬃcient condition that ensures that  n;h has no fixed point.
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Lemma 2.2. Suppose that h 2 N. Then,  n;h has a fixed point with suﬃciently large n if
V
C
> eh 1
(h   2)!
(h   1)h 2 :
On the contrary, if
V
C
< eh 1
(h   2)!
(h   1)h 2 ;
there exists n¯ 2 N such that for each n > n¯,  n;h has no fixed point.
If a fixed point of  n;h, namely yn;h exists,
yn;h =
1
[P(yn;h)]h 1[1   P(yn;h)]n h
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! : (2.3)
This equation characterizes the probability that a given player contributes. In any equilibrium, we
can show that supn nP(yn;h) < 1. Then, we have P(yn;h) ! 0 and yn;h ! V=C. We also find that
there exists a subsequence that nP(yn;h) converges to a real number. Suppose that nP(yn;h) ! x, then
[1   P(yn;h)]n ! 1=ex . Therefore, the equilibrium condition becomes
V
C
=
(h   1)!ex
xh 1
: (2.4)
Therefore, the solution of (2.4) characterizes the convergence of nP(yn;h). We now have
Proposition 2.1. Suppose that h is fixed, V < 1 and C > 0.
(i) Suppose that
V
C
> eh 1
(h   2)!
(h   1)h 2 :
Then, in a sequence of symmetric BNEs where a given player contributes with a positive probability,
an x solves (2.4) such that the probability that a given player contributes converges to x. Moreover,
the distribution of the number of contributors converges to the Poisson distribution with parameter x.
Conversely, for each solution to (2.4), namely x, there exists a sequence of symmetric BNEs such
that the distribution of the number of contributors converges to a Poisson distribution with parameter
x. In particular, if h > 2, the number of solutions to (2.4) is two.
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(ii) Suppose that
V
C
< eh 1
(h   2)!
(h   1)h 2 :
The unique symmetric BNE is the act of no player contributing.
Since the number of contributors follows a Poisson distribution, the probability that a public good
is provided converges to 1  Ph 1`=0 x``! e x .
Note that if h is suﬃciently large,
Ph 1
`=0
x`
`! ! ex and the probability that the number of contributors
is less than h goes to one. In other words, the probability that the public good is provided goes to zero.
When h = 1, this problem reduces to the best-shot public good. In this case, in contrast to the case
of h > 2, the act of no player contributing is not an equilibrium when V > C.
Corollary 2.1 (Harrington (2001); Xu (2001); Bergstrom (2012b)). Suppose that h = 1, V < 1 and
C > 0.
(i) If V > C, in the symmetric BNE, the probability that the public good is provided converges to
1   C=V .
(ii) If V < C, the unique symmetric BNE is the act of no player contributing.
2.3.2 Unbounded Valuation
This section considers the case that V = 1 or C = 0. We show that the probability that the public
good is provided converges to 1 or 0. First, we consider the case that h = 1. In this case, we obtain
Corollary 2.2. Suppose that h = 1 and V = 1 or C = 0 hold. In the symmetric BNE, the probability
that the public good is provided converges to 1.
The probability that the public good is provided converges to 1 or 0.
Corollary 2.3. Suppose that V = 1 or C = 0 hold. In the symmetric BNE, the probability that the
public good is provided converges to 1 or 0.
If the valuation per unit cost is unbounded, the equilibrium in which a given player contributes with
a positive probability may be unique.
Example 2.1. Suppose that h = 2, g(c), and f (v j c) are uniformly distributed on (0; 1).
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Then, the probability that a given player contributes is
P(yn;2) =
Z 1=yn;2
0
Z 1
cyn;2
dv dc =
Z 1=yn;2
0
(1   cyn;2) dc = 12yn;2 :
From the equilibrium condition and the above equation, the probability that a given player does not
contribute is
1   P(yn;2) =
 
2
n   1
! 1
n 2
:
Thus, an equilibrium exists and yn;2 ! 1. Rearranging the equilibrium condition yields
[1   P(yn;2)]n = [1   P(yn;2)]
2
(n   1)P(yn;2) yn;2 =
[1   P(yn;2)]2
(n   1)=2 :
The LHS of the above equation is the probability that no one contributes. When the population
diverges to infinity, according to the above equation, we find that limn!1[1   P(yn;2)]n = 0.
On the contrary, rearranging the equilibrium condition also yields
(n   1)[1   P(yn;2)]n 2P(yn;2) = 1
yn;2
:
By rearranging the above equation, we obtain
n[1   P(yn;2)]n 1P(yn;2) = nn   1
1   P(yn;2)
yn;2
: (2.5)
The LHS of the above equation is the probability that only one player contributes, which, if the
population diverges to infinity, converges to 0.
Hence, the probability that at least two players contribute is one. Therefore, the probability that the
public good is provided converges to one when the population diverges to infinity. 4
Although this example shows that the probability that the public good is provided converges to
one, this is not the general case, even when h = 2. The following example shows the case that the
probability that the public good is provided converges to zero.
Example 2.2. Suppose that h = 2, g(c) = c on [0;
p
2], and f (v j c) is a uniform distribution on [0; 1].
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The probability that a given player contributes, that is, P(yn;2), is calculated as
P(yn;2) =
Z 1=yn;2
0
Z 1
cyn;2
dvc dc =
Z 1=yn;2
0
(c   c2 yn;2) dc = 16[yn;2]2 : (2.6)
From the equilibrium condition, we obtain
[1   P(yn;2)]n 2 = 6yn;2(n   1) : (2.7)
By using these equations, we obtain
 
1   1
6[yn;2]2
!n 2
=
6yn;2
(n   1) : (2.8)
Let yn;2 = "n(n   1)=6 for the positive real number "n. Then, by rearranging (2.8), we have
Tn("n) := "2n(1   "1=(n 2)n ) =
6
(n   1)2 : (2.9)
To show the existence of yn;2 that satisfies (2.8), it is suﬃcient to show that (2.9) has a solution. Note
that when Tn(1) = Tn(0) = 0. Moreover,
T 0n(") = 2"(1   "1=(n 2))  
1
n   2"
1+1=(n 2) :
Therefore, for " 2 (0; 1), according to the Taylor expansion, Tn(") =  (1   ")[2"0(1   ("0)1=(n 2))  
1
n 1"
1+1=(n 2)] for some "0 2 ("; 1). We now consider An(") := Tn(")(n   1)2. Then,
An(") =  (1   ")
"
2("0)(1   ("0)1=(n 2))(n   1)2   n   1
n   2 (n   1)("
0)1+1=(n 2)
#
:
From the Taylor expansion, ("0)1=(n 2) = 1   (1   "0)=(1   n)["00]1=(n 2) 1, where "00 2 ("0; 1).
An(")=(n   1) =  (1   ")"0
"
2["00]1=(n 2)
 
1   "
0
"00
!
  ("0)1=(n 2)
#
:
Since both ["0]1=(n 2) and ["00]1=(n 2) converge to 1 as n ! 1, An(")=(n   1) is positive with "
suﬃciently near 1. Thus, An=(n   1) does not converge to 0. Therefore, An(") > 6 for suﬃciently
large n. This finding implies that for suﬃciently large n, Tn(") > 6=(n   1)2 > Tn(1). Hence, a point
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in ("; 1) that satisfies (2.9) exists.
This finding also implies that there exists yn;2 that satisfies (2.8) and yn;2 = "6(n 1) for some
" 2 (0; 1). We now calculate limn!1[1 P(yn;2)]n. Since P(yn;2) = 6(n 1)2 , nP(yn;2) ! 0. Therefore,
limn!1[1   P(yn;2)]n = 1. That is, the probability that no one contributes converges to one. Hence,
we conclude that there is an equilibrium such that the probability that the public good is provided
converges to zero. 4
2.3.3 Comparative Statics
Based on the case of a finite number of players, Xu (2002) discusses the eﬀect of increases at the
threshold, stating that the threshold eﬀect can be either positive or negative. Indeed, Xu shows an
example that has two equilibria with the following properties. In one equilibrium, the probabilities that
both a public good is provided and a given player contributes decrease when the threshold increases.
In another equilibrium, however, the probabilities that both a public good is provided and a given
player contributes increase when the threshold increases. In Xu’s example, the number of players is
three. This section thus considers the threshold eﬀect with a large number of players.
If h > 2 and
V
C
> eh 1
(h   2)!
(h   1)h 2
holds, as shown in Proposition 2.1, there exist three equilibria with suﬃciently large n. Let y¯ = V=C.
By taking the logarithm of (2.4), we have
(h   1) ln xh   xh = ln(h   1)!   ln y¯ (2.10)
for some h. Let Th(x) = (h  1) ln x   x and S(h) = ln(h  1)!  ln y¯ . Note that Th is a concave single
peaked function of x and is maximized when x = h   1. If h > 2, according to Proposition 2.1, the
number of xh that satisfies (2.10) is two. Let xLh and x
H
h be the two solutions and x
L
h < x
H
h . Then, we
find that xLh < h   1 < xHh . Note that x is the expected number of contributors in the equilibrium. We
call the equilibrium in which the expected number of contributors converges to xHh (resp. x
L
h ) the high
contributing equilibrium (resp. low contributing equilibrium). When h = 1, since x1 > 0 = h   1,
there is no low contributing equilibrium.
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Increases at the threshold
Note that S(h)   S(h   1) = ln(h   1) and Th(x)   Th 1(x) = ln x. Therefore, S(h)   S(h   1) >
Th(x)   Th 1(x) if and only if h   1 > x. Since Th(xLh ) = S(h) and xLh < h   1, Th 1(xLh ) > S(h   1).
In the same way, we have Th 1(xHh ) < S(h   1). Since Th 1(x) is decreasing when x > h   1 and
xHh 1 is the greatest solution of Th 1(x) = S(h   1), xHh 1 < xHh . Since xLh < xHh , Th 1(xLh ) > S(h   1)
and Th 1(x) is increasing when x < h   1, we have xLh 1 < xLh . Therefore, for each i 2 f1; 2g, xih is
increasing in h.
Proposition 2.2. In each equilibrium, the expected number of contributors is increasing at the thresh-
old level.
Consider the probability that the public good is provided. We focus on the high contributing
equilibrium, in which the expected number of contributors is xHh .
Proposition 2.3. Consider the high contributing equilibrium. Then, the probability that the public
good is provided is decreasing at the threshold level.
Increasing in the maximum valuation
This section considers the case of increasing in y¯ . Let Sh( y¯) = ln(h   1)!   ln y¯ . Note that Sh( y¯) is
decreasing in y¯ . Let xLh ( y¯) and x
H
h ( y¯) be the numbers that satisfy Th(x
L
h ( y¯)) = Sh( y¯) = Th(x
H
h ( y¯))
and xLh ( y¯) < x
H
h ( y¯). Since Th is concave, Th(x) is increasing when x 6 h   1 and decreasing when
x > h   1. Let y > y¯ . Note that Th(xLh ( y¯)) > Sh(y). Since x1h( y¯) 6 h   1 and Th(x) is increasing,
xLh (y) < x
L
h ( y¯). In the same way, we find that x
H
h (y) > x
H
h ( y¯).
2.4 Dynamic Provision Model
This section considers the case that campaigners provoke players to contribute by announcing the
number of players who have already contributed. First, we consider a two-stage game. In the first
stage, players decide whether to contribute. In the second stage, with this knowledge about the
number of previous contributors, the players who did not contribute in the first stage decide whether to
contribute. If the threshold number of players contribute, the public good is provided, otherwise not.
In the previous section, if h > 2, the act of no player contributing was a trivial equilibrium. However,
in the dynamic model, the act of no player contributing is no longer an equilibrium.
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Consider the case that h = 2 and a two-stage game. We show that the strategy profile that no one
contributes in the equilibrium path is not an equilibrium. Suppose, by contradiction, that the act of
no player contributing in either stage of equilibrium path is an equilibrium. Consider the behavior of
players in the second stage. Suppose that a player contributes in the first stage. Then, in the second
stage, if at least one player contributes, the public good is provided. Therefore, this is the same
situation as the static version of our game analyzed in the previous section. According to Corollary
2.1, if V is suﬃciently large, the strategy profile that no one contributes is not an equilibrium. Thus, if
one player contributes in the first stage, the public good is provided with a positive probability. When
V is suﬃciently large, the probability approaches 1. That is, in the second stage, there is an incentive to
contribute. Thus, when V is suﬃciently large, in the first stage, one player’s contribution is suﬃcient
to provide the public good. This is also the same situation as in the static game when h = 1; thus, the
act of no player contributing is not an equilibrium.
The above discussion does not apply when h = 3 in our two-stage game, however. Consider the
behavior in the second stage. If two players contribute in the first stage, as in the above discussion,
the act of no player contributing is not an equilibrium. However, if the number of contributors in the
first stage is less than one, the act of no player contributing is still an equilibrium. Therefore, even if
a player contributes in the first stage, the probability that the public good is provided is 0. Thus, no
player has an incentive to deviate from the strategy profile that no one contributes in the first stage.
Therefore, the number of contributors in the first stage is 0; thus, the act of no player contributing in
the second stage is still an equilibrium.
This observation predicts that a player contributes with a positive probability in any equilibrium
path if and only if the number of stages is greater than or equal to the threshold, h.
We now formalize the above discussion for a finite stage game. Our T-stage game is described as
follows. Each player decides whether to contribute in each stage. If the number of contributors is no
less than h in stage T , the public good is provided in stage T . In each stage, each player is informed
of the number of contributors in the previous stages. Each player’s contribution is permanent and he
can contribute only once. Let  2 (0; 1) be a discount factor common to all players. Suppose T and
h are finite numbers such that T > h. We first note that there exists a symmetric perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE).
Proposition 2.4. Consider the T-stage model. Then, there exists a symmetric PBE.
We calculate the probability that the public good is provided. We prove the following proposition
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by using mathematical induction.
Proposition 2.5. Consider the T-stage game. When T > h, in any symmetric PBE, the limiting
probability that the public good is provided is greater than 1   h C
T 1V
.
Note that in the low contributing equilibrium of the static case, the probability that the public good is
provided is 1 Ph 1`=0 (x)``! e x , and x < h 1. Therefore, regardless of the value ofC=V , the probability
that the public good is provided is strictly less than 1. Indeed, Example 4.2 shows an equilibrium
where C = 0 and the probability that the public good is provided converges to 0. However, in the
dynamic case, if C=V falls, the probability that the public good is provided arbitrarily approaches 1.
On the contrary, when T < h, the act of no player contributing in either stage is still an equilibrium.
Proposition 2.6. Consider the T-stage game. When T < h, there is a symmetric PBE where no one
contributes on the equilibrium path.
2.5 Threshold Uncertainty
The previous sections considered the case that if the threshold number of players contribute, the public
good is necessarily provided. However, in the real world, this is not always true. In this section,
we consider the case of an uncertain threshold. In this regard, we slightly generalize our model of
simultaneous moves. For each ` 2 N, let 
(`) be the probability that the public good is provided
when the number of contributors is `. We suppose that 
 is nondecreasing in the number of players
who contribute and there exists n¯ such that for each n 2 N, 
(n) 6 
(n¯). Let  n(`) be the probability
that only ` players contribute. Then, the best response is
q(v; c) = 1 if
v
c
>
1Pn¯
`=1  (`   1)[
(`)  
(`   1)]
;
q(v; c) = 0 if
v
c
6
1Pn¯
`=1  (`   1)[
(`)  
(`   1)]
:
As in the basic model, as the population goes to infinity, the proportion of players who contribute
converges to 0. Then, as the population goes to infinity, from the Poisson law of small numbers, there
exists x such that
C
V
ex =
n¯X
`=1
x` 1
(`   1)! [
(`)  
(`   1)]
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and x is the expected number of contributors at the limit.
Proposition 2.7. There is an equilibrium in which no one contributes for suﬃciently large population
if and only if
1

(1)  
(0) >
V
C
:
There is an equilibrium in which a given player contributes with a positive probability if and only if
there is an x such that
V
C
=
1Pn¯
`=1
x` 1
(` 1)!e x[
(`)  
(`   1)]
:
Moreover, the distribution of the number of contributors converges to a Poisson distribution with
parameter x.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This study analyzes a private provision of a discrete public good model and calculates the asymptotic
probability that the public good is provided, which depends on the threshold, maximum valuation of
the public good, and minimum contribution cost among players. We show the monotonicity of the
expected number of contributors at the threshold. We also find that the probability that the public good
is provided decreases as the threshold increases. When the threshold number is above two, there is
an equilibrium in which no one contributes. However, if several opportunities to make a contribution
exist, and the number of opportunities is above the threshold level, we can calculate a lower bound of
the probability that the public good is provided that larger than zero.
In our model, we assume that each player knows preferences distribution, whereas it may not be
adequate since if there are suﬃciently many population, by the law of large number, the government
knows players’ preferences. In this case, without using such systems, the government can deal with
the issue. Considering uncertainty in players’ preference distribution is left for the future works.
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2.A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1. To consider the case of h , 1, we verify whether the equilibrium in which
a player contributes exists by using the shape of function  n;h. Since P(V=C) = 0, we find that
limy!V=C  n;h(y) = 1. Diﬀerentiating  n;h(y) by y yields
d n;h(y)
dy
=
[P(y)]h 2[1   P(y)]n h 1P0(y)[(n   1)P(y)]   (h   1)
([1   P(y)]n h[P(y)]h 1)2
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! :
Since P(y) is decreasing, if (n   1)P(y)   (h   1) is positive,  n;h(y) is increasing, while if it is
negative,  n;h(y) is decreasing. From P(V=C) = 0 and h > 1,  n;h(y) is single-dipped. The abscissa
of the vertex of graph  n;h is y , which satisfies (n  1)P(y)   (h  1) = 0. Then, the coordinate of the
vertex is
(y;  n;h(y)) =
 
P 1
 
n   h
n   1
!
;
[(h   1)!(n   h)!]=[(n   1)!]
[(h   1)=(n   1)]h 1[(n   h)=(n   1)]n h :
!
A larger h makes a larger abscissa P 1(h   1=n   1).9 We thus establish a suﬃcient condition that no
one contributes in the equilibrium.
If inequality (2.2) holds, for any y; y0,
y < V=C <  n;h(y0): (2.11)
According to the best response, q(v; c) = 0 is the dominant strategy. Therefore, no one contributes in
the equilibrium. 
9 Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) show this property under complete information with a mixed strategy.
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Proof of Lemma 2.2. Recall that for each y ,
 n;h(y) >
(n   1)n 1
(h   1)h 1(n   h)n h
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! :
Let
A(n; h) :=
(n   1)n 1
(h   1)h 1(n   h)n h
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! :
Computing the ratio between A(n; h) and A(n; h   1) yields
A(n; h)
A(n; h   1) =
(h   2)h 2(n   h + 1)n h+1
(h   1)h 1(n   h)n h
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(h   2)!(n   h + 1)! =
 
h   2
h   1
!h 2  n   h + 1
n   h
!n h
:
Then, taking a limit of it yields
lim
n!1
A(n; h)
A(n; h   1) =
 
h   2
h   1
!h 2
e:
Note that A(n; 1) = 1 for each n. Then, limn!1 A(n; 2) = e. By induction, for each h, A(n; h)
converges to eh 1 (h 2)!(h 1)h 2 . Let A(h) be the convergent.
Suppose that V=C < A(h); then, with suﬃciently large n,  n;h > A(h) and thus, there is no fixed
point with a suﬃciently large population.
Suppose that V=C > A(h). Recall that  n;h is minimized at P 1((n   h)=(n   1)). Note that
limn!1  n;h(P 1((n   h)=(n   1))) = A(h), and P 1((n   h)=(n   1)) ! V=C. Note also that
limn!1  n;h(0) = 1. Thus, the intermediate value theorem implies that a fixed point of  n;h exists
with suﬃciently large n. 
Proof of Proposition 2.1. (i) Rearranging the equilibrium condition yields
(1   P(yn;h))n h = 1
yn;h[P(yn;h)]h 1
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! :
Suppose that each  n;h has a fixed point. Without loss of generality, we assume that P(yn;h)(n  1) !
x 2 R+ [ f1g. Then, (1   P(yn;h))n h ! 1=ex and
1
yn;h[P(yn;h)]h 1
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)! !
(h   1)!
y
1
xh 1
:
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Thus, x satisfies
1
ex
=
(h   1)!
y
1
xh 1
:
By taking the logarithm, we have
(h   1) ln x   x = ln(h   1)!   ln y:
Suppose that x = 0. Then, the LHS diverges to  1, whereas the RHS is finite (i.e., a contradiction).
Suppose that x = 1. Then, the LHS diverges to  1, which, again, is a contradiction. Thus, x is a
positive real number, which implies that fP(yn)(n   1)gn is a bounded sequence. Therefore, it has a
convergent. Without loss of generality, we assume that fP(yn)(n   1)gn converges. Let T (x) := (h  
1) ln x x, which is concave andmaximized at x = h 1. Note that limx!0 T (x) = limx!1 T (x) =  1.
Therefore, if (h   1) ln(h   1)   (h   1) > ln(h   1)!   ln y , equation T (x) = ln(h   1)!   ln y has
exactly two solutions when h > 1 and has exactly one solution when h = 1. Rearranging the condition
yields
y > eh 1
(h   2)!
(h   1)h 2 :
This condition is always satisfied when  n;h has a fixed point with suﬃciently large n. We now
calculate the probability that the public good is provided. The probability that ` players contribute to
the public good is
n!
`!(n   `)! [P(yn;h)]
`[1   P(yn;h)]n ` :
Since (n   1)P(yn;h) ! x, the probability that the number of contributors is ` converges to
lim
n!1
n!
`!(n   `)! [P(yn;h)]
`[1   P(yn;h)]n ` = x
`
`!
1
ex
:
To show the latter part of (i), let x be the solution of (2.4). Take an " > 0 suﬃciently small such
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that
T (x + ") > ln(h   1)!   ln y > T (x   ") or
T (x + ") < ln(h   1)!   ln y < T (x   "):
Define yn and yn such that
nPr(yn 6 v=c) = x + "
nPr(y
n
6 v=c) = x   "
According to the definition of T and given that both yn and yn converge to y with suﬃciently large n,
we have either of the following:
 n;h(yn) > yn and  n;h(yn) < yn or
 n;h(yn) < yn and  n;h(yn) > yn:
Therefore, according to the intermediate theorem, fixed point yn 2 (yn; yn) exists. From this
definition, with suﬃciently large n, nP(yn ) 2 (x   "; x + "). Then, letting " ! 0 implies that
nP(yn ) ! x, which concludes the proof.
(ii) This case is a corollary of Lemma 2.2. 
Proof of Corollary 2.3. Since the case for h = 1 is shown in Corollary 2.2, consider the case for
h > 2. As in the case ofV < 1 orC > 0, the fixed point of  n;h characterizes the equilibria. If  n;h has
no fixed point, the probability that the public good is provided is 0. Let A = fn : 9y s.t.  n;h(y) = y g.
Suppose that jAj < 1. This implies that there exists n¯ such that for each n > n¯ and  n;h(y) , y for
each y .
Suppose that jAj = 1. Note that fnP(yn;h)gn2A has a convergent subsequence or subsequence
that diverges to infinity. Without loss of generality, we assume that fnP(yn;h)gn2A converges to
x 2 R+ [ f1g. If x = 1, the sequence diverges to infinity.
Suppose that x < (0;1). Since fnP(yn;h)gn2A converges, P(yn;h) ! 0. Therefore, according to the
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Poisson law of small numbers, (1   P(yn;h))n h ! 1=ex . Therefore, from the definition of yn;h,
lim
n!1 yn;h = limn!1
1
[P(yn;h)]h 1[1   P(yn;h)]n h
(h   1)!(n   h)!
(n   1)!
=
ex
xh 1
(h   1)!:
On the contrary, since P(yn;h) ! 0, yn;h ! V=C = 1; thus, x cannot in (0;1). Therefore, x = 0 or
x = 1. Note that the limit of the probability that the number of contributors is less than h isPh 1`=0 x``! 1ex .
If x = 0,
Ph 1
`=0
x`
`!
1
ex = 1, which implies that the probability that the public good is provided converges
to 0. If x = 1, Ph 1`=0 x``! 1ex = 0, which implies that the probability that the public good is provided
converges to 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Let h be the probability that the public good is providedwhen the threshold
is h, that is,
h = 1  
h 1X
`=0
(xHh )
`
`!
1
ex
H
h
:
Note that xHh satisfies
(h 1)!exHh
(xH
h
)h 1 = y¯ . Therefore,
h+1   h = 1
y¯

1 + (h   1)(xHh ) 1 + (h   1)(h   2)(xHh ) 2 +    + (h   1)!(xHh ) h+1
 1   h(xHh+1) 1   h(h   1)(xHh+1) 2        h!(xHh+1) h+1   h!(xHh+1) h

:
To prove h+1 < h, we prepare
Lemma 2.3. For each h > 1, (h   1)xHh+1 < hxHh .
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Note that when h = 1, this inequality is always satisfied. Consider the case of
h > 2. To show this, consider Th+1((h=(h   1))xHh )   S(h + 1). By using Th(xHh )   S(h) = 0, this is
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calculated as
Th+1((h=(h   1))xHh )   S(h + 1) = h ln(h=(h   1))xHh   (h=(h   1))xHh   ln h! + ln y¯
= h ln h   h ln(h   1) + h ln xHh   xHh  
1
h   1 x
H
h   ln h! + ln y¯
= (h   1) ln h   h ln(h   1) + ln xHh   ln(h   1)  
1
h   1 x
H
h
= (h   1) ln h   (h + 1) ln(h   1) + ln xHh  
1
h   1 x
H
h :
Since xHh > h   1, for each h > 2, ln xHh   1h 1 xHh < ln(h   1)   1h 1 (h   1). Thus,
Th+1((h=(h   1))xHh )   S(h + 1) < (h   1) ln h   h ln(h   1)   1:
Note that (h   1) ln h   h ln(h   1) is decreasing in h. This is because
(h   1) ln h   h ln(h   1)   [h ln(h + 1)   (h + 1) ln h] = h(2 ln h   ln(h + 1)   ln(h   1)] 6 0:
Note also that ln 2   2 ln 1   1 = ln 2   1 < 0. Thus, Th+1((h=(h   1))xHh )   S(h + 1). Note
that since xHh > h   1, (h=(h   1))xHh > h. Therefore, Th+1((h=(h   1))xHh ) is decreasing. Since
Th+1(xHh+1)   S(h + 1) = 0, xHh+1 < (h=(h   1))xHh . 
From Lemma 2.3, we have (h  1)xHh+1 < hxHh . This also implies that for each ` < h, (`   1)xHh+1 <
`xHh . This implies that h+1 < h. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Let ` = (0; `1; : : : ; ` 1) be the history of contributors in the previous
periods before stage . Let pn; (`) be the conditional probability that a given player contributes in
stage  when the history of contributors is `. Let  = (pn; (`))2f1;:::;T g;`t2f`t 1;:::;ng 2 [0; 1]M be
given, where M is some integer.
Consider player i’s behavior in stage . We consider the equilibrium such that if players are
indiﬀerent between contributing and not contributing, they do not contribute. Let Rn; (`) be the
probability that the public good is provided when ` players contributed at the beginning of stage .
Let  n;;` (`   ` 1) be the probability that `   ` 1 players contribute in stage  when the history of
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the number of contributors is `. Then, player i’s expected utility of contributing in stage  is
2666664
h 1X
`=` 1
 n;;` (`   ` 1)Rn;+1(` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`   ` 1)
3777775 T vi   ci :
Let S (`) be the set of available continuation strategies after stage  when the history of contributors
is `. Since the numbers of players and stages are finite, there exists M 2 N such that S (`) = [0; 1]M .
Let q(t; `0 j s) be the conditional probability that the player contributes after being induced by strategy
s 2 S (`) in period t when the number of contributors is `0 > `. Note that for each s 2 S (`),
s = (q(t; `0 j s))t>;`0>` 1 .
For each s 2 S (`), let P(s) be the probability that the public good is provided and Qt (s) be the
probability that player i contributes in stage t after being induced by strategy s and given . Note that
P(s) and Qt (s) are the sums and products of the elements of s and .
Then, the expected utility of employing strategy s is
P(s)T vi  
TX
t=+1
Qt (s)t ci :
Let
A =
2666664
h 1X
`=` 1
 n;;` (`   ` 1)Rn;+1(` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`   ` 1)
3777775 :
Then, player i contributes in stage  only if for each s 2 S (`),
(A   P(s))T  vici > 1  
TX
t=+1
Qt (s)t  > 0: (2.12)
The following set is the set of valuations at which player i who has not contributed contributes in stage
.
VC (`) :=
8><>: vici 2 Y : (A   P(s))T  vici > 1  
TX
t=+1
Qt (s)t  for all s 2 S (`)
9>=>; ;
where Y = [minfV=C;V=Cg;V=C]. We show that VC (`) is a closed interval or empty set.
Note that if jA   P(s) j is suﬃciently small, since vi=ci is bounded, no vi=ci satisfies (2.12).
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Therefore, there exists " > 0 such that for some s, if jA   P(s) j < ", each player does not contribute.
In this case, VC (`) = ?.
If A   P(s) > 0 for some s 2 S (`) and A   P(s) 6 0 for some s, each player does not contribute
and thus, VC (`) = ?.
If A   P(s) > " for each s 2 S (`), player i contributes in stage  if and only if
vi
ci
> sup
s2S (` )
1  PTt=+1Qt (s)t 
T  (A   P(s)) :
If A   P(s) 6  " for each s 2 S (`), player i contributes in stage  if and only if
vi
ci
6 inf
s2S (` )
1  PTt=+1Qt (s)t 
T  (A   P(s)) :
In each case, VC (`) is a closed interval.
Using, VC (`) the probability that a given remaining player contributes is
pn; (`) =
R R
v=c2VC (`)n[St< VCt (`t )] f (v j c)g(c) dv dcR R
v=c2Yn[St< VCt (`t )] f (v j c)g(c) dv dc
; (2.13)
and this is the equilibrium condition for the probability that a given player contributes in stage  when
the number of contributors is `. Note that since A < 1 and P(s) < 1, (   1; 1   ) 1 VCt (`t ) for
each t and `t . This implies that in any equilibrium path, there is a player who does not contribute with
a positive probability and thus, Y n [St< VCt (`t )] , ?. Therefore, the RHS of (2.13) is well defined.
This fact also implies that in any oﬀ equilibrium path, there is a player who contributes, however, this
player is now nonactive and thus, it brings no eﬀect on the belief to the remaining players.
Wenowshow that theRHSof (2.13) is continuous in . Note that sincemins2S (`) 1 
PT
t=+1Qt (s)
t  >
0, A   P(s) ! 0 for some s,
R R
VC (` )
f (v j c)g(c) dv dc ! 0. Thus, pn; (`) is continuous around
A   P(s) = 0 for some s. Suppose that there exists " > 0 such that A   P(s) > " for each s. Since
A, P(s) and Qt (s) are the sums and products of the elements of s, they are continuous in s. Since
S (`) is finite (and thus, compact),
sup
s2S (` )
1  PTt=+1Qt (s)t 
T  (A   P(s)) = maxs2S (` )
1  PTt=+1Qt (s)t 
T  (A   P(s)) : (2.14)
Then, according to the maximum theorem, the above equation is continuous in . In the same way, if
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there exists " > 0 such that A   P(s) 6  " for each s,
inf
s2S (` )
1  PTt=+1Qt (s)t 
T  (A   P(s)) = mins2S (` )
1  PTt=+1Qt (s)t 
T  (A   P(s))
is continuous in .
Since VC (`) is an interval and its endpoints are continuous in , pn; (`) is also continuous in .
Then, (pn; (`)) is a continuous function of  and  = (pn; (`)). Therefore, according to Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem, a fixed point exists. The fixed point (pn; (`))2f1;:::;T g;` is an equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2.5. First, when T = 1 > h = 1, according to Corollary 2.1, the probability
converges to 1   C=V . Second, we show the following.
Lemma 2.4. When T = m > 1 and h = 1, as population goes to infinity, the limit of the probability
that at least one player contributes is greater than 1   C=T 1V .
Proof. Consider player i’s behavior in the first stage, in which his expected utility of contributing is
T 1vi   ci, while that of not contributing in any stage is
[1   	n;1(0) + 	n;1(0)R in;2(0)]T 1vi;
where 	n;1(0) is the probability that no one contributes in the first stage and R in;2(0) is the probability
that another player contributes after the first stage when no one contributes in the first stage. Therefore,
player i contributes only if
T 1
vi
ci
>
1
	n;1(0)(1   R in;2(0))
:
Therefore, in the second stage, if no player contributes in the first stage, each player updates his
information such that for each j 2 N ,
T 1
v j
c j
6
1
	n;1(0)(1   R in;2(0))
:
Let pn; be the probability that a given player contributes in stage  in the equilibrium. Since pn; is a
bounded sequence and has a convergent subsequence, we assume that pn; ! x. If x > 0 for some
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, 	n; (0) ! 0; that is, at least one player contributes in stage  2 f1; : : : ;T g. Thus, the probability
that the public good is provided converges to 1.
Suppose that x = 0 for each . This implies that for each " > 0, for each player i such that
vi=ci < V=C   " prefers not contributing to contributing in each stage  for suﬃciently large n.
Therefore, at the limit,
T 1
V
C
6
1
limn!1 	n;1(0)(1   R in;2(0))
:
Rearranging the above inequality yields
lim
n!1 1   	n;1(0)(1   R
 i
n;2(0)) > 1  
C
T 1V
:
The RHS is the probability that at least one player contributes in this game, which concludes the
proof. 
We consider the case that T > h. To show this, as an induction assumption, we suppose that for
each T 0 and h such that h 6 m, T 0 < T and m 6 T , the probability that the public good is provided is
greater than 1   mC=[T 0 1V ]. We now consider the case that h = m + 1.
Consider player i’s behavior in the first stage. As in the proof of the case that h = 2, we consider a
contributor in the first stage. Let Rn; (`) be the probability that the public good is provided when `
players have contributed at the beginning of stage . Let R in; (`) also be the probability that the public
good is provided when ` players have contributed at the beginning of stage  but player i does not
contribute in either stage.
Since player i contributes in stage  only when his expected payoﬀ of contributing in stage  is
higher than that of not contributing in either stage, we have
2666664
h 1X
`=` 1
 n;;` (`)Rn;+1;` (` + ` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`)
3777775 T vi   ci
>
266664
h 1X
`=0
 n;;` (`)R in;+1;` (` + ` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`)
377775 T vi :
Lemma 2.5. For each  and `, pn; (`) ! 0.
Proof. Suppose that lim supn!1 pn; (`) > 0 for some  and `. Then, since h is finite, according the
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law of large numbers,
P
`>h  n;;` (`) ! 1. Therefore,
h 1X
`=` 1
 n;;` (`)Rn;+1;` (` + ` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`) ! 1
h 1X
`=0
 n;;` (`)R in;+1;` (` + ` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`) ! 1;
which implies that for each vi and ci,
lim
n!1
2666664
h 1X
`=` 1
 n;;` (`)Rn;+1;` (` + ` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`)
3777775 T vi   ci
< lim
n!1
266664
h 1X
`=0
 n;;` (`)R in;+1;` (` + ` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;;` (`)
377775 T vi :
Thus, pn; (`) = 0 for suﬃciently large n, which is a contradiction. 
This lemma implies that for each " > 0, for each player i such that vi=ci < V=C   " prefers not
contributing to contributing in each stage  for suﬃciently large n. This implies
266664
h 1X
`=0
 n;1(`)Rn;2(` + 1) +
X
`>h
 n;1(`)
377775   ciT 1vi 6
266664
h 1X
`=0
 n;1(`)R in;2(`) +
X
`>h
 n;1(`)
377775 ; (2.15)
for each v=c 6 V=C   ". Recall that for each " > 0, there exists n 2 N such that player i does not
contribute when vi=ci < V=C  ". Therefore, we can see the second stage as the first stage of the T  1-
stage game and the supremum of each player’s v=c is V=C when n ! 1. According to the induction
assumption, for each ` > 0, lim infn!1 Rn;2(`+1) > 1  (h ` 1)C=[T 2V ] > 1  (h 1)C=[T 1V ].
Thus, from (2.15), we have
1   h C
T 1V
6 lim
n!1
266664
h 1X
`=0
 n;1(`)R in;2(`) +
X
`>h
 n;1(`)
377775
Note that R in;1(0) = limn!1
Ph 1
`=0  n;1(`)R
 i
n;2(`) +
P
`>h  n;1(`). Further, Rn;1(0) is the ex-ante
probability that the public good is provided. Thus, it is suﬃcient to show that limn!1 Rn;1(0) = R in;1(0).
We now show that limn!1 R in; (`) = limn!1 Rn; (`) for each  and `.
Let pn; (`) be the probability that a given player contributes in stage  when ` players contribute
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before stage . Let  n;;` (`0   `) =

n ` 1
`0 `

[pn; (`)]`
0 `[1   pn; (`)]n 1 `0. This is the probability that
exactly `0   ` players contribute in stage . Now, Rn; (`) and R in; (`) are calculated as
Rn; (`) =
h 1X
`0=`
 n;;` (`0   `)[pn; (`)Rn;+1(`0 + 1) + (1   pn; (`))Rn;+1(`0)]
+
X
`0=h
(1   pn; (`)) n;;`0 (`0   `) + pn; (`) n;;`0 (`0   `   1)
Rn;T (`) =
X
`0=h
(1   pn;T (`)) n;T;`0 (`0   `) + pn;T (`) n;T;`0 (`0   `   1)
R in; (`) =
h 1X
`0=`
 n;;` (`0   `)R in;+1(`0) +
X
`0=h
 n;;`0 (`0   `)
R in;T (`) =
X
`0=h
 n;T;`0 (`0   `):
When  = T , since limn!1 pn;T (`) = 0. Then, R in;T (`) = Rn;T (`).
From the induction assumption, suppose that for each  > k, limn!1 R in; (`) = limn!1 Rn; (`).
Consider the case that  = k. Since limn!1 pn;k (`) = 0,
lim
n!1 Rn;k (`) = limn!1
h 1X
`0=`
 k;` (`0   `)[Rn;k+1(`0)] +
X
`0=h
 `0 (`0   `):
According to the induction assumption, we have limn!1 Rn;k+1(`0) = limn!1 R in;k+1(`
0). 
Proof of Proposition 2.6. Consider the following strategy: Let `t be the number of contributors at
period t. If ` < h   (T    + 1) for each  < t, then each player does not contribute at period t.
Otherwise, there exists t0 < t such that `t 0 > h   (T   t0 + 1). If `t 0 > h, each player has nothing to do.
Otherwise, each player plays a symmetric PBE of the game with period T   t0 with threshold being
h   (T   t0 + 1). The existence is guaranteed by Proposition 2.4. In this case we assume that each
player has the initial belief for other players.
Consider the path followed by this strategy profile. In the first period, sinceT > h, h (T 1+1) > 0.
Thus, no one contributes (i.e., the number of contributors is zero). Since h   (T   t + 1) is increasing
in t, in each period, no one contributes. Then, the public good is not provided on path.
We now check this strategy profile is a PBE. Consider a path such that ` < h   (T    + 1)
for each  < t. If a player deviates to contribute at this period, `t = `t 1 + 1. However, since
`t 1 < h  (T   (t   1) + 1), `t = `t 1 + 1 < h  (T   t + 1) is satisfied and thus, in period t + 1, no one
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contributes. This fact implies that after period t + 1, no one contributes. Then, the total number of
contributors failed to reach the threshold and thus, the public good is also not provided. This implies
that the contributing player’s payoﬀ is strictly worse oﬀ. Therefore, the strategy is an equilibrium.
Consider the other case: there exists t0 < t such that `t 0 > h   (T   t0 + 1). If t   1 = t0, since each
player has the initial belief, the strategy is a PBE by definition. After the period, the strategy is also a
PBE by the definition. 
Proof of Proposition 2.7. As in the basic model, let yn be the cutoﬀ point; hence, a given player
contributes if and only if vi=ci > yn. Let P(yn) =
R
yn<v=c
f (v j c)g(c) dv dc and then,
 n(`) =
 
n   1
`
!  
P(yn)
`  1   P(yn)n 1 ` :
Let H n(yn) satisfy
H n(yn) = 1Pn¯
`=1  (`   1)[
(`)  
(`   1)]
:
Then, the equilibrium cutoﬀ point is yn =  n(yn) := minfG(yn);V=Cg. Since  n(yn) is a continuous
function, according to Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, a yn satisfies the above condition.
We first show that lim infn yn > V=C. If not, since P(yn) > 0, for each `, lim supn  n(`) = 0.
Therefore, H n(yn) ! 1 and thus, with suﬃciently large n, yn > V=C, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, P(yn) ! 0. We next show that nP(yn) is bounded above. To show this, suppose, by
contradiction, that there is an equilibrium sequence that nP(yn) ! 1. Let xn = nP(yn). Then,
 n(`)  1`! (xn)`e xn and thus,  n(`) ! 0. This implies that with suﬃciently large n, yn > V=C and
thus P(yn) = 0, which contradicts to nP(yn) ! 1. Without loss of generality, nP(yn) ! x > 0.
Then, limn  n(`) = 1`! (x)
`e x . Thus, since limn yn = V=C, at the limit,
V
C
= min
8>><>>:
1Pn¯
`=1
x` 1
(` 1)!e x[
(`)  
(`   1)]
;
V
C
9>>=>>; :
Note that x is the expected number of contributors. Therefore, there is an equilibrium in which no one
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contributes at the limit if and only if
1

(1)  
(0) >
V
C
:
In the same way, there is an equilibrium in which a given player contributes with a positive probability
if and only if there is an x such that
V
C
=
1Pn¯
`=1
x` 1
(` 1)!e x[
(`)  
(`   1)]
:
Since nP(yn) ! x, the distribution of the number of contributors converges to a Poisson distribution
with parameter x. 
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3 Optimal signature requirements for
initiatives1
3.1 Introduction
In addition to traditional representative democracy as a means of social decision making, some
subnational regions and countries (e.g., many countries in Europe, several states in the United States,
and local governments in Japan) adopt forms of direct democracy such as initiatives and referendums.2
Under these systems, they can request new laws to be enacted or preexisting ones to be repealed if
campaigners gather signatures from a predetermined proportion of citizens. Typically, when the
required signatures are collected, a citizens’ referendum is held to decide whether to approve the
proposal.
The primary purpose of the signature requirement is to prevent citizens from overusing initiatives.3
With a too low requirement, many proposals gather the required number of signatures, although most
of them will be rejected in the referendum or legislature’s decision stage. Indeed, in Switzerland,
which needs 100,000 signatures for constitutional initiatives (about 2% of the registered voters), about
150 laws gathered the required signatures from 1893 to 2003, whereas only 15 laws were accepted
in citizens’ referenda.45 This observation suggests that many unpopular laws gather the required
1 The author is deeply grateful to Eiichi Miyagawa, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani, Takashi Shimizu and Masahiro Ashiya,
who provided carefully considered feedback and valuable comments that significantly contributed to improving the quality
of this work. Any errors in this paper are the author’s own. The author also thanks financial support from JSPS KAKENHI
Grant Number 14J05350.
2 Initiatives are requests by ordinary citizens to enact a new law, and referendums are requests to repeal a preexisting
law (Matsusaka, 2005).
3 Ellis (2003), p.44.
4Kaufmann and Waters (2004).
5As another example, in Japan, where the signature requirement is also 2% of the registered voters, only 10% of
petitions that gather the required signatures are approved (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communication of Japan,
2014).
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signatures, which may be a social cost as it requires holding a referendum on a law that will be
rejected. However, with a too high requirement, no campaigner can gather the required number of
signatures as it is too costly, and thus initiative will not used.6 The optimal requirement should balance
the tradeoﬀ.
By considering the tradeoﬀ, this study examines the optimal signature requirement and its properties.
We characterize the optimal signature requirement by citizens’ preference distribution and the social
cost of holding a referendum. The preference distribution and social costs are diﬀerent place to
place, and so is the optimal requirement that balances the tradeoﬀ. Indeed, in the real world, while
the requirement is about 2% in Switzerland and Japan,7, in US states, it ranges from 2% to 15%.
Moreover, diﬀerent requirements are also imposed on diﬀerent types of laws. In US states, signature
requirements for statutes are typically higher than those for constitutional amendments. We also study
which types of countries or laws need high signature requirements for initiatives.
In the present study, we construct a three-stage model of the initiative system based on signature
collection. There are n citizens and one campaigner. In stage 1, the campaigner chooses the size
of a campaign that determines the probability that a given citizen has a chance to sign. In stage 2,
each citizen meets the campaigner with a positive probability determined by the size of the campaign.
Citizens who meet a campaigner decide whether to sign. If n signatures are gathered (where
0 <  < 1), then the game moves to stage 3, where the citizens’ referendum decides whether to enact
the law.
Each citizen has a valuation for the law that is known to himself but not to others. The distribution
of citizens’ valuations for the law has several states that determine the number of supporters for the
law. We focus on a case in which there are only two states: good and bad. In the good state, more than
half of the citizens are favorable toward the law, while in the bad state, more than half of the voters
are opposed. The true state is assumed to be unknown to any citizen.
We assume that the campaigner profits from not only enacting the law but also gathering the
required signatures. As an example, it is a feeling of fulfillment. Interest groups may consider that
collecting suﬃcient signatures publicizes their activities, which also becomes the motivation. As
another example, if the campaigner employs a signature-gathering firm for the campaign, the profit of
6 Indeed, Arnold and Freier (2015) empirically show the negative relation between signature requirements and citizens’
initiative use.
7 In Japan, the requirement for requests of enacting new bylaws is 2%, whereas that for recalling heads of the local
government and members of municipal councils is 1=3 of the registered voters.
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gathering the required signatures is a reputation concern. This is because, if the firm fails to gather
required signature, even when the law is unpopular, since no one knows the true valuation distribution,
some potential campaigners see the firm as a bad firm, which loses a future profit. In reality, many
campaign employs signature-gathering firms.8 These stories justify our assumption.
Now we consider the campaigner’s and citizens’ behaviors. No matter which state of the law has
been realized, as each citizen knows his valuation, the citizen votes for the law if and only if he supports
the law. Therefore, if the required signatures are gathered, the law is enacted in the referendum stage
if and only if over half of the voters approve the law to be enacted.
In the signing stage, on the other hand, even though both signing and not signing are costless,
the condition that the required signatures are gathered is somewhat diﬀerent from the voting stage.
This is because the campaigner can control the number of citizens who meet the campaigner, which
may also partially control the number of gathered signatures. Therefore, if the signature requirement
is suﬃciently small, even when the law is opposed by most citizens, the campaign can collect the
required signatures.
Therefore, we need to find a signature requirement so that the campaigner gathers signatures only for
the law with the good state but gives up gathering signatures for the law with the bad state. If signing
and not signing are costless, the citizen signs if and only if he is favorable toward the law. Then, the
law of the bad state requires a large-scale campaign to gather the required signatures, which is more
costly for the campaigner. Therefore, with the requirement being in a certain range, the campaigner
gives up gathering the required signatures for the law with the bad state and tries to gather signatures
for the law with the good state, which is socially desirable. Thus, we can find the optimal requirement
in the range. Consider the minimum value of the range. Taking into account the campaigner’s cost,
the value is the optimal requirement.
Based on the above discussion, the gap in the number of gathered signatures is large when the gap
in the number of supporters between the good and bad states is large. Therefore, in this case, a lower
requirement is needed for the campaigner to give up gathering signatures for the law with the bad state.
This implies that the optimal requirement is low when the gap in the number of supporters between the
good and bad states is large. Such a situation is likely when the uncertainty in the distribution of the
citizens’ valuation is large. This result may suggest that the optimal requirement is high for the issues
where citizens have solid opinions. Our result may also suggest that the optimal requirement is low
8 Ellis (2002, 2003).
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for countries in which citizens’ preferences are diverse and high requirement is optimal for countries
with relatively homogeneous citizens.
Among US states, the requirement is low (less or equal to 8%) in California, Colorado, Idaho,
Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, etc. On the other hand,
the requirement is high (over or equal to 10%) in Alaska, Arizona, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada,
Utah, Wyoming, etc. From this observation, in relatively populous states (excluding Arizona), the
requirement is low, while in less populous states (excluding Idaho, North Dakota, and Oregon),
the requirement is high. The population is sometimes used as an index of uncertainty in citizens’
preferences.9 Our result may partly explain this fact.
We extend our basic model to allow continuous state case. We first show that the citizens’ welfare
is an inverted V shape of the requirements. Therefore, when the campaigner’s profit from the enacted
law is suﬃciently large, there exists a requirement where the campaigner makes campaign size the
socially optimal level. On the other hand, when the campaigner’s profit from the enacted law is low,
the requirement where campaigning and not campaigning is indiﬀerent for the campaigner is optimal.
We also show the similar results to our basic model. Under some condition, when the variance of the
popularity of the law increases, the optimal requirement declines.
As an application of characterization result, we consider a reform of signature-gathering process;
banning paid campaigners. Banning paid campaigners is an often suggested but rarely realized
reform.10 This reform is aimed at preventing well-financed campaigner gathering too much signatures
for their favorite law. Employing paid campaigners makes it easy to collect much signatures by
increasing eﬃciency of the campaign. Then, unpopular law may be more likely to get qualified. Our
question is whether banning paid petitioners improves the welfare when the requirement is optimally
chosen. When employing paid campaigners is banned, cost of campaigning increases and then,
campaigns are rarely conducted. Therefore, the optimal requirement declines, which may increases
the possibility that unpopular laws are qualified. We understand banning paid petitioners is a decline
in eﬃciency of campaign, that is an increase in campaigning cost. We show that an increase in the
campaigning cost reduces the citizens welfare.
As another interpretation of banning paid petitioner is a fall in the profit of gathering the required
signatures. This is a source of ineﬃciency of campaign since the campaigner has an incentive to
9 For example, see Matsusaka and McCarty (2001).
10 See for example Ellis (2002, 2003); Hoesly (2005).
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campaign for unpopular laws. Indeed, if there is no such profit, unpopular laws cannot qualified. On
the other hand, if the regulation is incomplete, such profits may remain. A small reduction of the
profit of gathering the required signatures has the same eﬀect of increases in the cost, which implies
that it reduces the welfare. We conclude that incomplete regulation reduces the citizens’ welfare.
The above discussion depends on the assumption that both signing and not signing are costless.
However, in reality, signing is costly. More importantly, as citizens are asked to sign in front of
campaigners, some citizens may incur a cost to refuse a signature. These costs may be small compared
to the importance of the law at issue, but so is the eﬀect of each citizen’s action.
In this case, with a suﬃciently large population, the signature-gathering stage may not work well.
As the population goes to infinity, the probability of a citizen’s action being pivotal converges to zero.
Thus, if the population is large enough, a citizen’s decision making is determined solely by the cost of
signing and that of refusing to sign. That is, a citizen signs if and only if refusing is more costly than
signing. Therefore, the required signatures are gathered if and only if  is less than the proportion of
citizens who meet the campaigner and for whom the refusal cost exceeds the signing cost. Therefore,
citizens’ valuation for the law has nothing to do with the outcome of the signing stage in the limit.
However, if the population is finite, citizens’ valuation for the law still has a relation with the
outcome of the signing stage.
As in the case of costless signing and not signing, we focus on the gap in the probability that a given
citizen signs for the law in either the good or the bad state. We show that this gap is large if either (1)
the diﬀerence of supporters among the realizable states is large, (2) the diﬀerence between the costs
of signing and refusing a signature is small, or (3) the absolute value of citizens’ valuation for the
law is large. Case (1) is the same result as obtained in the case of costless signing and not signing.
Cases (2) and (3) are specific to the costly interaction case. The reason for case (2) is as follows.
Note that if signing and not signing are costly, in addition to the valuation for the law, each citizen
also considers the diﬀerence between the costs of deciding whether to sign or not. If the diﬀerence
is small, each citizen can decide whether to sign more freely, which enlarges the gap in the gathered
signatures between popular and unpopular laws. Case (2) suggests another reform that prevents bad
laws from gathering the required signatures without raising the signature requirement, that is, reducing
the cost of signing and refusing a signature. The reason for case (3) is similar to that of case (2): If
the absolute value of citizens’ valuation for enacting the law is large, then citizens are likely to have
greater interest in whether to enact the law or not. Then, each citizen takes the decision of whether
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to or not sign more seriously, even when it is costly. This case is more likely for important laws such
as constitutions rather than ordinal policies, which are typically imposed higher requirements in US
states. Our study may suggest that lower requirement should be imposed for such laws.
3.2 Related Literature
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no existing literature studies signature-gathering campaigns
theoretically. As theoretical studies of initiatives, Gerber (1996) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001)
consider theoretical models of initiatives in which the law is determined in equilibrium in a dynamic
game between the legislature and an interest group. Many other studies such as Besley and Coate
(2008) and Gregor and Smith (2012) also consider theoretical models of initiatives. However, these
works do not describe the process of signature collection explicitly. They assume that the interest
group can always collect enough signatures by paying a fixed cost. The present paper introduces
the process of signature collection explicitly into the game, in which the cost of collecting suﬃcient
signatures is determined endogenously.
As empirical studies of signature requirements, Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) and Arnold and
Freier (2015) provide empirical evidence that higher requirement has a negative eﬀect on citizens’
initiative use.
Signing is similar to voting in majority voting (see Ledyard, 1981, 1984, Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1983, 1985, Bögers, 2004, and Krishna and Morgan, 2015 for reviews of this problem). If voting is
costless, then only the majority-supported law is enacted. Krishna and Morgan (2015) show that if
voting is costly, the result of majority voting maximizes a utilitarian social welfare. Related to their
results, this study also shows that under some assumptions, more signatures are gathered if enacting
the law improves a social welfare, whereas fewer signatures are gathered if the law reduces a social
welfare. This result also relates to that of probabilistic voting in which two candidates compete for an
oﬃce by setting their platform, and each voter has an ideological bias toward the candidates, which
is independent of the voter’s valuation for the platform.11 In this model, both candidates choose the
policy that maximizes a utilitarian social welfare, as both attempt to convince swing voters (i.e., voters
who have less bias) to vote for them. In our model, the costs of signing and refusing a signature are
similar to the ideological bias for candidates in the probabilistic voting model.12
11 For example, see Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Persson and Tabellini (1999), and so on.
12 It is also known that in a costly voting, there is an equivalent probabilistic voting model that presents similar results
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Our model is also similar to the private provision of a discrete public good (Palfrey and Rosenthal,
1984), as signing is considered a contribution to a discrete public good. The cost of signing is
considered as a contribution cost, and the cost of refusing a signature is considered as a warm-glow to
the campaign.13 The main diﬀerence between this model and ours is that we introduce a referendum
stage after the required signatures are gathered and the campaigner’s decision stage.
An initiative based on signature collection is similar to a referendum with a turnout threshold, in
which the voting outcome is valid only if the voter turnout exceeds a predetermined threshold. If the
turnout falls short of the threshold, the status quo is maintained (see Aguiar-Conraria and Magalhães,
2010; Hizen and Shinmyo, 2011).
3.3 Model
There are many citizens and one campaigner. Let N be the set of citizens. The game is described as
follows:
1. The campaigner decides the size of the campaign m 2 [0; 1). Setting m = 0 indicates that the
campaigner does not conduct a campaign.
2. A given citizen has a chance to sign (meet the campaigner) with probability m 2 (0; 1). This
probability is referred to as meeting probability. A citizen who meets a campaigner decides
whether to sign or not.
3. If over a fraction  [ 2 (0; 1)] of citizens sign, a petition goes to a citizens’ referendum. In the
referendum, all citizens decide to vote for or against the law. Voting is assumed to be costless.
The law is enacted if and only if a majority of citizens vote for the law.
Each citizen i has a valuation for the enacted law, which is denoted by vi 2 R. This value is distributed
by an absolutely continuous distribution function V. Here,  is the unknown parameter that describes
the popularity of the law, referred to as the state of the law. Let  be the set of realizable states and
p() be the probability that  2  is realized. Assume that R jv j dV (v) < 1 for each . We further
assume that each V has the same support (V;V ).
to those of the costly voting model (Kamada and Kojima, 2013).
13Hindriks and Pancs (2002) and Makris (2009) consider this problem of allowing warm-glow contributors and
investigate the group-size eﬀect and free-riding incentives.
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The campaigner has a valuation vC > 0 for enacting the law and  > 0 for gathering the required
signatures. An example of the utility of gathering the required signatures, , is the feeling of fulfillment.
As another example, if the campaigner employs a signature-gathering firm for the campaign,14 the firm
may care for its reputation. That is, if the firm fails to gather the required signatures, the firm may be
seen as a bad firm as the popularity of the law is not directly observable by others. This motivates the
firm to gather the required signatures even when the law is unpopular. The cost of campaigning with
the meeting probability being m is C(m), where C is strictly increasing, convex, and C(0) = 0. We
further assume thatC(m) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable at eachm > 0. Moreover, to simplify the
discussion, we avoid a corner solution m = 1 by assuming thatC0(1) is suﬃciently large.15 The cost of
the campaign is allowed to be discontinuous at zero, which may imply that campaigning needs a fixed
cost.16 For example, there may be a deposit for the campaign and a cost of looking for cooperators,
volunteers, paid petitioners, and so on.17 Lastly, we assume that holding a referendum costs K > 0.
3.4 Benchmark Case
As a benchmark case, we assume that both signing and not signing are costless. For simplicity, we
further assume that the set of citizens is a continuum on (V;V ). We consider the case that  = fg; bg,
where 1   Vg (0) > 1=2 > 1   Vb(0). Then, the law that gathers suﬃcient signatures is enacted if and
only if the realized state is g. In the signing stage, as both signing and not signing are costless, and
each citizen knows his valuation for the law, the citizen signs if and only if vi > 0. Then, m[1 V (0)]
is the ratio of citizens who sign. The expected utility of campaigner is given by
U (m; ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 C(m) if m < 1 Vg (0)
(vC + )p   C(m) if m 2


1 Vg (0);

1 Vb (0)

vCp +    C(m) if m > 1 Vb (0);
14 In the US, it is common for a special interest group to employ a firm to gather signatures (see, for example, Ellis,
2002, 2003).
15 For example, if C(m) = am=(1   m) + b; a > 0:b > 0, C 0(1) = 1.
16 Fixed cost is defined by limm!0 C(m).
17 For example, some states in the US require a deposit to conduct a campaign for initiatives (See http://www.
iandrinstitute.org/docs/A_Comparison_of_Statewide_IandR_Processes.pdf).
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where p = p(g). Therefore, the optimal campaign size for the campaigner is
m =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if
8>>><>>>:
0 > (vC + )p   C


1 Vg (0)

0 > vCp +    C


1 Vb (0)


1 Vg (0) if
8>>><>>>:
(vC + )p   C


1 Vg (0)

> 0
C


1 Vb (0)

  C


1 Vg (0)

> (1   p) 

1 Vb (0) if
8>>><>>>:
vCp +    C


1 Vb (0)

> 0
(1   p)  > C


1 Vb (0)

  C


1 Vg (0)

:
We now consider the optimal requirement to maximize social welfare. Let v¯ =
R
v dV (v ) be the
social welfare from the law. Assume that v¯g   K > 0 > v¯b. Then, it is socially optimal to enforce the
campaigner to choose m = =[1   Vg (0)]. To do so, the requirement  needs to satisfy
(vC + )p   C
 

1   Vg (0)
!
> 0; (3.1)
C
 

1   Vb(0)
!
  C
 

1   Vg (0)
!
> (1   p) : (3.2)
The constraint (3.1) is individual rationality and (3.2) is incentive compatibility. We consider the
minimum  that satisfies the above conditions as the optimal requirement. If we consider the cam-
paigner’s utility into social welfare and if the weight on the campaigner is suﬃciently small, such  is
optimal. Putting a small weight on the campaigner may be justified as the campaigner is only a small
portion of the citizens.
The first condition is satisfied when  is suﬃciently small since  1g () = =[1   Vg (K=p)].
Diﬀerentiating C


1 Vb (0)

  C


1 Vg (0)

by  yields the following:
C0


1 Vb (0)

1   Vb(0)  
C0


1 Vg (0)

1   Vg (0) :
Note that the above equation is positive since C is an increasing convex function and 1   Vg (0) >
1   Vb(0). Therefore, C


1 Vb (0)

  C


1 Vg (0)

is increasing in . Let  satisfy C


1 Vb (0)

 
C


1 Vg (0)

= (1   p) . Based on the above discussion, this value  is uniquely determined if it
exists. If  exists and (vC + )p C


1 Vg (0)

> 0, then, the first best action is enforceable. However,
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if  does not exist or (vC + )p   C


1 Vg (0)

< 0, the campaigner gives up gathering signatures. In
this case, we consider the second best action. We consider two cases: (1) pv¯g > K . Here, it is optimal
to hold the referendum at any time. Thus,  = 0 is the second best solution. (2) pv¯g < K . Here,
holding a referendum is too costly for the law. Therefore,  = 1 is the second best solution.
In each case, the signature-gathering campaign does not make any sense. In case (1), if the
government can hold a referendum by itself, such laws cannot be sent to the signing stage. Case
(2) presents the same situation in which initiatives are not allowed. The following summarizes this
discussion.
Result 3.1. Let  solve C


1 Vb (0)

  C


1 Vg (0)

= (1   p)  if it exists. Then, if  exists and
(vC + )p   C


1 Vg (0)

> 0, the optimal requirement is . Otherwise, (1) if pv¯g > K , it is optimal
to hold a referendum without a signature-gathering campaign, or (2) if pv¯g < K , not allowing a
signature-gathering campaign is optimal.
Now, we consider the question of which types of laws need high requirement. To answer this
question, we see the eﬀect of 1   Vg (0) and 1   Vb(0) on the optimal requirement. To simplify the
notation, let g = 1   Vg (0) and b = 1   Vb(0), which are the ratios of the supporters of the law for
each state. As Proposition 3.1 shows, if it is an interior solution, the optimal requirement satisfies
C((g; b)=b)   C((g; b)=g) = (1   p) . By diﬀerentiating both sides of this equation, we can
easily check the following results.
Result 3.2. For each g; b, such that v¯g > K > v¯b and g > 1=2 > b, @

@g < 0 and
@
@b > 0.
This result indicates that the optimal requirement  increases as jg   bj decreases. This is because,
as g and b approach each other, the number of gathered signatures in each state also approach each
other. Thus, higher requirement is needed for the campaigner to give up gathering the required
signatures for the bad state.
3.5 Continuum states of the law
In the previous section, we assume that the set of possible states of the law  contains only two
states. This section considers that  contains more elements;  is a continuum. We assume that
 = (0; 1) and p is the probability measure (cumulative distribution function) on.18 We also assume
18We can show the following results if  is an open interval (; )  (0; 1) that contains 1=2.
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that p is twice continuously diﬀerentiable at the support. To simplify the notation, we assume that
 = 1   V (0). Then, the expected utility of campaigner is given by
U (m; ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 C(m) if m 6 
(vC + )
R 1
=m dp()   C(m) if m 2 (; 2]
(vC + )P + 
R 1=2
=m dp()   C(m) if m > 2;
where P =
R
1=2 dp(). Note that for each  > 0, U (m; ) is continuous at each m > 0. Note also
that U (0; ) > U (m; ) for each m < . Therefore, the optimal meeting probability m is one of the
following: (i) m = 0 or (ii) m 2 [; 1] that maximizesU (m; ). Let m() be the global optimum and
m() be the solution to problem (ii). SinceU (m; ) is continuous in m, m() and m() exist for
each .
To determine the campaigner’s action uniquely, we assume the following.
Assumption 3.1. IfU (m; ) = U (m0; ) > U (m00; ) for each m00 2 [0; 1] and for some m;m0 2 [0; 1]
such that m > m0, the campaigner takes m.
The following assumption ensures that there is a requirement level under which the campaigner has
an incentive to conduct a campaign.
Assumption 3.2. limm!0C(m) < vCP + .
To see this, consider m =
p
. Note that lim!0U (
p
; ) = vCP +    lim!0C(
p
) > 0. Thus,
for some  > 0, campaigning is optimal for the campaigner.
To characterize how the chosen meeting probability varies as the requirement  increases, we show
the following.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2,
(1) there exists ¯ such that for each  > ¯, m() = 0 and each  6 ¯, m() = m().
(2) =m() is nondecreasing in .
By using Lemma 3.1, we can calculate the optimal signature requirement to maximize social
welfare. To simplify the discussion, unlike in the previous subsection, we ignore the campaigner’s
utility. Furthermore, we also assume the following.
Assumption 3.3. The social welfare from the law v¯ is continuous and increasing in  and v¯1 > K >
v¯1=2.
47
3 Optimal signature requirements for initiatives
Assumption 3.4. p00() + p0() > 0 for each  2 [0; 1].
Assumption 3.3 ensures the existence of the optimal threshold of the state. Calculating the expected
social welfare yields
SW() =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if m() = 0R
=m()[v¯   K] dp() if m() 6 2R
1=2 v¯ dp()  
R 1
=m() K dp() if m
() > 2:
Then, by Assumption 3.3, the first best is setting  so that v¯=m() = K . Let K satisfy v¯K = K .
Assumption 3.4 makes the characterization of the optimal requirement easy as seen later.19
We now characterize the optimal requirement. Consider the case that there exists  such that
=m() = K . Then, setting  that satisfies =m() = K is optimal. If not, we consider the
second best. Let K satisfy m
(K ) = K=

K if it exists. As setting =m
() = K is not feasible,
U (m(K ); 

K ) < 0 or there is no such 

K . The following lemma shows that the latter case is
impossible.
Lemma 3.2. Under Assumption 3.4, there exists K such that m(K ) = K=K .
Therefore, we consider the former case, that is,U (m(K ); 

K ) < 0. Since =m
() is increasing
in  and by Lemma 3.1, there exists ¯ such that U (m(¯); ¯) = 0 and K > ¯=m(¯). If  < ¯,
with larger , =m() is smaller, and therefore SW() is increasing in . If SW(¯) > 0, then  = ¯
is optimal. This is a standard way in the contract theory that extracts all profit from the campaigner.
If SW(¯) 6 0, not allowing the signature-gathering campaign is optimal.
3.5.1 Comparative statics
Now, we consider the question of when is the requirement  large. To answer this question, we
compare two probability measures on distribution p and Dp that satisfy the following conditions: (i) p
and Dp has the same mean and (ii) p0 crosses Dp0 exactly twice; that is, there exists 1; 2 2 (0; 1) such
that 1 < 2 for each  2 (0; 1) if  2 (1; 2), p0() > Dp0(), and p0() 6 Dp0() otherwise.
This condition implies that Dp puts heavier weight on the tails. Indeed, one can show that Dp is a mean
preserving spread of p, which implies that the variance of Dp is higher than that of p. One can also
19 For example, if the probability measure has nondecreasing density, Assumption 3.4 is satisfied.
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density

0
p^0
p0
1 2
Figure 3.1: Example of density functions satisfying conditions (i) and (ii).
show that Dp crosses p exactly once; that is, there exists D 2 (1; 2) such that if  < D, Dp() > p(),
and p() > Dp() otherwise. Figure 3.1 illustrates an example.
Let  and D be the optimal requirement for p and Dp, respectively, and let m and Dm be the best
response for p and Dp, respectively. In the case that  = fg; bg, we have shown that with more extreme
states of the law, less requirement is needed. We can show a similar result under some conditions.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 hold. Moreover, suppose that
allowing a signature-gathering campaign is optimal. Then,
(1) suppose that K 2 (1; 2), and =m() = D=Dm(D) = K . Then,  > D.
(2) assume D > 1=2, and suppose that =m() < D and D=Dm(D) < D. Then,  > D.
(3) assume D > 1=2, and suppose that =m() > D and D=Dm(D) > D. Then,  6 D.
The logic underlying this proposition is diﬀerent from the two states case. Consider the case that
the government can enforce the campaigner to set m that satisfies =m() = K . If K 2 (1; 2),
the law faces relatively moderate opinion. If the probability measure is p, the density around K is
higher than if the probability measure is Dp, and the campaigner makes much more eﬀort to meet the
citizens. Thus, for p, a higher requirement is needed.
Consider the case that the government set  to satisfy U (m; ) = 0. In this case, =m() <
K . If =m < D, the campaigner’s expected payoﬀ is higher when the probability measure is p.
Therefore, the government can reduce the campaigner’s payoﬀ by raising . By doing this, as shown
in Lemma 3.1, =m becomes higher, which improves citizens’ welfare. If =m > D, the converse
holds; the campaigner’s expected payoﬀ is higher when the probability measure is Dp. Therefore, in
this case, raising the requirement is optimal when p changes to Dp. However, if K 6 D, the latter case
is impossible since =m() 6 K for each optimal requirement . Even when K > D, if K is
suﬃciently close to D, the latter case hardly holds. Now, it is a question of when the above condition
is likely to hold. We say that Dp is a median preserving spread of p if Dx is a median of p and Dp.20
20 See Malamud and Torojani (2009) for the formal definition and properties.
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Assume that Dp is a median preserving spread of p. Then, if the median of p is greater than 1=2 and K
is suﬃciently small,21 D > K holds, and thus we can say that  > D.
On the contrary, as seen above, if the median of p is suﬃciently small,  is suﬃciently large, and
the diﬀerence, supx jp(x)   Dp(x) j, is so small that D < =m();D < D=Dm(D), and the converse
relation holds: D > .
3.5.2 Banning paid petitioners
In the literature, as a reform plan of the initiative process, banning of paid petitioners has been proposed
as paid petitioners enable wealthy interest groups to gather the required signatures easily.22 However,
banning paid petitioners would make an initiative campaign too costly, and, thus, few campaigns
would be conducted. To cope with this problem, there is a need for lowering the requirement, which
will increase initiative campaigns. The question is whether banning paid petitioners and setting the
requirement optimally improves the social welfare. To answer this, let the cost function be kC(m). The
parameter k represents the eﬃciency of the campaign; small k implies that the campaign is eﬃcient.
Banning paid petitioners implies a decline in the eﬃciency of the campaign, that is, in our term, an
increase in k. Thus, for this purpose, we see the eﬀect of k.
Letmk () be the best response of the campaigner to the requirementwhen the eﬃciency parameter of
the cost function is k. Let k be the socially optimal threshold. Consider the case that 

k=m
(k ) = K .
In this case, since the first best is achieved, the social welfare cannot be improved. Consider the case
that k=m
(k ) < K . Especially, focus on the case that 

k=m
(k ) , 1=2.23 In this case, we show
that an increase in k reduces the social welfare.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 hold, allowing the signature-
gathering campaign to be optimal, and k=m
(k ) < K .
(1) Suppose that U (m(k ); 

k ) > U (2

k; 

k ). Then,
d
k
=m
k
(
k
)
dk 6 0 if and only if
f
C 0(m)
C(m)=m
g0
> 0
at m = mk (

k ).
(2) Suppose that m(k ) = 2

k andU (m; 

k ) < U (2

k; 

k ) for each m , 2

k ,
d
k
=m
k
(
k
)
dk = 0.
Note that C
0(m)
C(m)=m is the ratio of the marginal cost to the average cost. An intuitive explanation of (1)
is the following. The requirement  is determined by zero profit condition, and  is decreasing in the
21 In many US states, the referendum cost K is considered small as referendums are held at the same time as elections.
22 See, for example, Ellis (2002) and Hoesly (2005).
23 If 
k
=m(
k
) = 1=2, as the second statement of the following proposition shows, d

k
=m
k
(
k
)
dk = 0.
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average cost. The campaign size m is determined by the first order condition, and m is decreasing in
the marginal cost. Therefore, =m is the fraction of decreasing functions of the average and marginal
cost. A decline in eﬃciency of the campaign decreases campaign size m, which decreases both of the
average and marginal cost. Therefore, if the fraction of the marginal and average costs is increasing
in m, a decline in eﬃciency of the campaign increases the fraction of the average and marginal costs.
Since =m is a decreasing relation of it, a decline in eﬃciency decreases =m.
We verify when C
0(m)
C(m)=m is increasing. At a glance, since C > 0 ;C
0 > 0 and C00 > 0, this inequality
is satisfied if C(m)=m > C0(m); that is, the average cost exceeds the marginal cost. If there is a fixed
cost to start a campaign, this condition is likely to be satisfied. As a concrete example, increasing
linear functions and increasing convex quadratic functions satisfy the condition. As another example,
C(m) = a m1 m + b, a > 0; b > 0 also satisfies the condition.
In each case, therefore, a decline in the eﬃciency of a campaign decreases the social welfare.
To conclude, we interpret the banning of paid petitioners to be a decline in the eﬃciency of the
campaign. We have examined two cases: When the first best is achieved, banning paid petitioners
cannot improve the social welfare. Moreover, if the campaigner gathers the required signatures over
the socially optimal level [i.e., k=m

k (

k ) < K ], banning paid petitioners may reduce the social
welfare (depending on the shape of the cost function).
On the other hand, as another interpretation, banning paid petitioner is also considered to be a
decline in the motivation of gathering the required signatures, namely . This is because,  can
be considered as a reputation concern for signature-gathering firms. However, this case is similar
to the decline in the eﬃciency of campaigns. If vC = 0, the profit function of the campaigner is
(vC + )P + 
R 1=2
=m dp()

 C(m), which is equivalent to

P +
R 1=2
=m dp()

  (1=)[C(m)   vC].
Therefore, a decline in  is equivalent to a decline in the eﬃciency of the campaign.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 hold, allowing the signature-gathering
campaign to be optimal, and k=m
(k ) < K .
Suppose that U (m(); ) > U (2; ). Then, d
=m()
d > 0 if and only if
f
C 0(m)
(C(m) vC )=m
g0
> 0
at m = m().
Therefore, if vC is suﬃciently small and fixed cost is suﬃciently high, a small decline in  reduces
the citizens’ welfare. The motivation of gathering required signature is a cause of ineﬃciency of
signature gathering campaign. However, when the requirement is optimally chosen, an incomplete
reduction of the motivation may reduce the citizens’ welfare.
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3.6 Costly Interaction with the Campaigner
In the previous section, we assume that both signing and not signing are costless. However, in the real
world, both signing and refusing a signature may be costly. This section considers the real-world case.
Precisely, we assume that when a given citizen meets the campaigner, the citizen incurs a cost csi if he
signs, whereas the citizen also incurs a cost cri if he refuses to sign. Let ci = c
s
i   cri . The value ci is
distributed by a diﬀerentiable distribution function, H (). Assume that the derivative of H is bounded.
Furthermore, while in the previous section, we assume that the set of citizens is a continuum, in this
section, we assume that the set of citizens is N = f1; : : : ; ng to consider the cost of signing and not
signing. Without loss of generality, we assume that n is an odd number.
3.6.1 Equilibrium in the signing stage
This section considers the equilibrium of the signing and referendum stages. Let m > 0 be fixed. We
first consider the referendum stage. Let Dn; (vi) be the belief of citizen i at the signing stage about
the probability that the given law is enacted in the referendum when the realized state is . As each
citizen’s valuation for the law is a private value and voting is costless, each citizen votes for the law if
and only if it is favorable for that citizen. Therefore,24
Dn; (vi) =
8>><>>:
D+n; :=
P
k>(n 1)=2

n 1
k

[1   V (0)]k[V (0)]n k 1 if vi > 0
D n; :=
P
k>(n 1)=2+1

n 1
k

[1   V (0)]k[V (0)]n k 1 if vi 6 0:
A given citizen signs if and only if25
X
2
p()[Dn; (vi)Pr(number of signatures by others > h   1)]vi   csi >X
2
p()[Dn; (vi)Pr(number of signatures by others > h)]vi   cri :
Equivalently, a given citizen signs if and only if
X
2
p()[Dn; (vi)Pr(number of signatures by others = h   1)]vi > (csi   cri ):
24Without loss of generality, we assume that the citizen whose valuation for the law is 0 votes against the law.
25Without loss of generality, we also assume that if signing and not signing are indiﬀerent, the citizen does not sign.
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Let the probability that a given citizen signs when state  is realized be . Then,
0 = F0 () := m
Z
H
 
E[Dn; (vi)
 
n   1
h   1
!
h 1 (1   )n h]vi
!
dV0 (vi);
where  summarizes the parameters. Since F := (F )2 is a continuous function of () 2 [0; 1]j j
and F : [0; 1]j j ! [0; 1]j j, it has a fixed point (), which constructs a symmetric perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (PBE).
The following proposition shows that if the population goes to infinity, the limiting probability that
a given citizen signs is irrelevant to the citizens’ valuation for the law.
Proposition 3.3. Consider a symmetric PBE. Let  (n) be the probability that a given citizen signs
when the population is n. Then, for each  2 , limn!1  (n) = mH (0).
Proposition 3.3 suggests that the citizens’ valuation for the law is irrelevant to the outcome of the
signature-gathering process. By this result, if the population is large enough, not allowing the initiative
to conduct the signature-gathering campaign is optimal. However, this result only holds in the limit.
The following section considers a finite population case.
3.6.2 Signature-gathering campaign in a finite population
This section considers a finite population and shows the relation between the realized preference
distribution and number of gathered signatures. To see detailed properties, we specify the set of
potential distributions of valuations, . We assume the following.
Assumption 3.5. For each  2 , there exists a continuously diﬀerentiable distribution that satisfies
(1) symmetric at 0 and (2) V 0 (v )=0(v ) is monotone in v .26
Under Assumption 3.5, as the likelihood ratio dominance implies first-order stochastic dominance,
1 V (0) > 1=2 and
R
v dV (v) > 0 ifV 0 (v )=0(v ) is nondecreasing and ifV 0 (v)=0(v) is nonincreas-
ing, the converses hold. Let + := f 2  : 1   V (0) > 1=2g and   := f 2  : 1   V (0) < 1=2g.
As discussed above, under Assumption 3.5,  = + [  .
To simplify the discussion, we assume that D+n; = D n; = 1 for each  2 + and D+n; = D n; =
0 for each  2  . This assumption is justified when the population is suﬃciently large as an
26 Formally, a distribution function F is symmetric at v0 if F 0(v0 + v) = F 0(v0   v ) for each v .
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approximation.27 Then, there exists  such that citizen i signs if and only if vi > ci, where  is
defined as
 = Gm() :=
X
2+
"
p()
 
n   1
h   1
!
h 10 (1   0)n h
#
:
Then, the probability that a given citizen signs is
 ( ) =   ( ;m) = m
Z
H
 
vi

dV0 (vi):
Note that
P
2+
f
p()

n 1
h 1

h 10 (1   0)n h
g
is bounded above by  :=

n 1
h 1

, G(()) : [0; ] !
[0; ] is a continuous selfmapping of . Therefore it has a fixed point, which constructs an equilibrium.
The following lemma shows the basic property of the equilibrium in the signing stage, which is used
for comparative statics.
Lemma 3.3. Assume Assumption 3.5 and D+n; = D n; = 1 for each  2 + and D+n; = D n; = 0 for
each  2  . Suppose that H has a probability density function that is symmetric at 0. Then, in any
symmetric PBE, @ @  ( ;m) > 0 for each ;m if  2 + and otherwise @ @  ( ;m) 6 0 for each ;m.
Moreover, for the probability that a given citizen signs,  ,  > mH (0) if and only if  2 +.
3.6.3 Gaps in gathered signatures
We now go back to the campaigner’s problem. To do this, we summarize the equilibrium of the signing
stage. Let  (m; h) be the probability that a given citizen signs in the equilibrium of the signing stage.
In the signing stage, the equilibrium may not be unique. In this case, we employ the equilibrium in
which the cutoﬀ point is maximized among the equilibrium cutoﬀ points. Let us call this equilibrium
the maximum equilibrium. The following lemma states that the maximum equilibrium exists.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that each citizen considers that D+n; = D n; = 1 for each  2 + and
D+n; = D
 
n; = 0 for each  2  . Then, the maximum equilibrium exists for each m.
27Note that even when n is suﬃciently large so that jD+n;   1j < " for each  2 + and jD+n; j < " for each  2  ,
j (m)   mH (0) j >  for some  > ". This is because while D+n; is suﬃciently close to its convergent if V (0) , 1=2,
j (m)   mH (0) j cannot be so small if jv¯ j is large enough.
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Now, we can define the expected payoﬀ of the campaigner as follows.
U (m; h) = E
266664[vCDn; + ]
X
k=h
 
n
k
!
[ (m; h)]k[1    (m; h)]n k
377775   Cn(m):
To ensure the existence of the maximizer ofU (m; h), we assume that the set of choosable m is finite.28
Then, if the population is suﬃciently large,
U (m; h) 
X
2+
266664[vCp() + ]
X
k=h
 
n
k
!
[ (m; h)]k[1    (m; h)]n k
377775   Cn(m):
As in section 3.4, we will show that if the gaps in the gathered signatures between the good states
and bad states is large, a less signature requirement is suﬃcient to prevent a law with bad state from
gathering the required signatures. To see this, consider the case that  = fg; bg where g 2 + and
b < +. Let m () be the minimum meeting probability that satisfies  (m (); n) > .29
As seen in section 3.4, to prevent a law with bad state from gathering the required signatures, we
need set  to satisfy
C(mb())   C(mg ()) > (1   p) :
Section 3.4 shows that the optimal signature requirement is lower when the gap in the number of
signatures is large. This also holds for the costly interaction model. To see this, we consider two sets
of states  = fg; bg;0 = fg0; b0g such that g (m; h) > g0 (m; h) > mH (0) > b0 (m; h) > b(m; h)
for each m; h. Then, it easy to show that mg () 6 mg0 () 6 m

b0 () 6 m

b(). Thus,
C(mb0 ())   C(mg0 ()) > C(mb())   C(mg ()) > (1   p) :
This implies that the minimum signature-requirement to prevent the law with bad state from gathering
the required signatures is lower for  than for 0.
Now, it is a question of when is the gap in the number of gathered signatures large. The following
28Note that in the signing stage, there might be multiple equilibria. In this case, the cutoﬀ point may not be continuous
in m. One may think that if the cutoﬀ point is upper semicontinuous in m, the payoﬀ function is upper semicontinuous in
m and it has the maximum. However, this may not be right. Note that while for each  2 +,   ( ) is increasing in ,
for each  < +,   ( ) is decreasing in  (see the proof of Lemma 3.3). This is because the payoﬀ function is increasing
in   ( ) for not only  2 + but also  < +. Then, the upper semicontinuity of the payoﬀ function is not guaranteed.
29 Since the set of choosable m is finite, it is well defined.
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propositions provide suﬃcient conditions.
Proposition 3.4. Assume assumptions of Lemma 3.3. Suppose that the cost of signing c = cs   cr is
written as c = kc for some k > 0, where c is distributed by H . Suppose also that v = v for some
 > 0, where v is distributed by V when  2  is realized. Then, as p() for each  2 + increases,
k decreases or  increases,
1. For each  2 +,  (m; h) increases.
2. For each  2  ,  (m; h) decreases.
In this proposition, k represents the relative size of cost and  represents the importance, that is,
with higher , the benefit (loss if v < 0) from enacting the law is large.
To see a more specific property, we consider the case that a = fg(a); b(a)g. We assume that
V 0g(a) (v) = V
0
b(a) ( v) = '(v; a) for each v . Let (v; a) be the function that satisfies @@v (v; a) = '(v; a)
for each v; a. We further assume that for each a > a0, (v; a) first-order stochastically dominates
(v; a0). The size of a represents the importance of enacting the law. With larger a, the diﬀerence from
the expected social welfare of enacting the law is large. Related to this, we can show the following.
Proposition 3.5. Assume the Assumptions of Lemma 3.3. Then, g is increasing in a, while b is
decreasing in a.
To summarize, based on the above discussions, we can state that when the law with  2  , it
is more likely to gather the required signatures; that is, a higher signature requirement is needed.
Consider the following cases: (1) large , (2) large k, (3) low
P
2+ p(), (4) small , and (5) small a.
The first case is trivial. The cause of the remaining cases is attributable to the citizens’ behavior.
Large k implies that the diﬀerence between the cost of signing and refusing a signature is large. With
large k, citizens are less sensitive to their valuation for the law as writing and refusing a signature are
more costly. With low
P
2+ p(), citizens are also less sensitive to their valuation as the possibility
that the law is enacted is low. This is similar to the cases of small  and a. Small  and a imply that
the law is less important. As discussed above, for such laws, a higher requirement is optimal. On the
contrary, for more important laws, a lower requirement is optimal.
Our results suggest another policy to prevent the law from gathering the required signatures when
 2   without raising the requirement: reducing the cost k. As shown above, by reducing the costs,
the number of gathered signatures when  2 + increases while the number of gathered signatures
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when  2   decreases. As a result, it increases the probability that good laws are enacted without
increasing the probability that the bad laws gather the required signatures.
3.6.4 Numerical example
Example 3.1. Let  = fg; bg. We consider the following two types of distributions:
1. Density is given by
dVg (v ) =
8>><>>:
1
2(a+2) v +
1
(a+2) if v 2 ( 2; a)
  12( a+2) v + 1( a+2) if v 2 [a; 2):
v¯g = a=3, 1   Vg (0) = 12 a .
2. Density is given by
dVb(v ) =
8>><>>:
1
2( a+2) v +
1
( a+2) if v 2 ( 2; a)
  12(a+2) v + 1(a+2) if v 2 [ a; 2):
v¯b =  a=3, 1   Vb(0) = 12+a .
We assume that H is a uniform distribution on ( c; c) for some c > 0. The signature-requirement
 = 0:08 and the population n = 100; 000.
Figure 3.1 shows  g (Gm()) and  b(Gm()). As each citizen cares only if  = g, the equilibrium
probability that a given citizen signs satisfies g =  g (Gm(g)) and b =  b(Gm(

g)). In each
figure, the solid line shows  g (Gm()), the dotted line shows  b(Gm()), and dashed line shows the
45-degree line. The intersection of the solid and dashed lines shows the fixed point g. If there are
two or more fixed points in the maximum equilibrium, we employ the largest one as g.
Figure 3.1a shows the case for a = 1 and m = 0:121, which is the minimal value of m that the
campaigner gathers the requirement when  = g. In this case, there are multiple equilibria.
Figure 3.1b shows the case for a = 1 and m = 0:168, which is the minimal value of m for satisfying
the requirement even when  = b.
Figures 3.1c and 3.1d consider the case for a = 0:1. Each figure, respectively, shows the case for
m = 0:153 and m = 0:167, which are the minimal requirements for gathering the required signatures,
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Figure 3.1: Graphs of  m (Gm (); ) in Example 1.
respectively, for  = g and  = b. Through these figures, we can see that with small a, the gap in the
minimum requirement of m between  = g and  = b is small.
3.7 Discussion
3.7.1 Asymmetric cost distribution
In the case of costly interaction with campaigner, we assume that H0 is symmetric at 0. This section
considers a case that the assumption is violated. To see the case, we consider the following distribution.
H0(a) =
8>><>>:
 (a) if a > 0
(1   ) ( ja j) if a 6 0;
where
R 1
0  (a) = 1. Smaller  implies that cost of refusing a signature is more likely to be the
greater issue for citizens than the cost of signing. When  = 1=2, H0 is symmetric at 0. Assume the
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assumptions of Lemma 3.5. Then, as in Lemma 3.5, we define
  ( ; ) = m
Z 1
0
[	( v ) + (1   )]V (v ) dv + m
Z 0
(1   )[1   	( v )]V (v) dv:
In an equilibrium of the signing stage, the following equations hold:
a = Ga ( a) = p
 
n   1
h   1
!
[g ( a)]h 1[1   g ( a)]n h;
g ( a) =  g ( ; a) = m
Z
H
 
v

'(v; a) dv;
b( a) =  b( ; a) = m
Z
H
 
v

'( v; a) dv:
We see the eﬀect of an increase in . Diﬀerentiating   by  yields the following.
@ g ( ; )
@
= m
Z 1
0
[	( v )   1]'(v; a) dv + m
Z 0
[	( v )   1]'(v; a) dv
= m
Z 1
0
[	( v )   1]['(v; a) + '( v; a)] dv < 0:
In the same way, we can show that @ g ( ;)@ =
@ b ( ;)
@ .
Second, we consider the indirect eﬀect via cutoﬀ point , which is given by
@ g ( ; )
@ 
= m
Z 1
0
 ( v )v'(v ) dv + (1   )m
Z 0
 ( v )v'(v) dv:
When  = 1=2, @ g ( ;)@  > 0. In the same way, we can show that
@ b ( ;)
@  < 0 when  = 1=2. We now
see the eﬀect on gathered signatures. If  = 1=2, the derivatives are given by
dg
d
=
@ g=@
1   @ g@  G0( )
;
db
d
=
@ g
@   2
@ g
@ G
0( ) @ g@ 
1   @ g@  G0( )
:
Then dgd >
db
d if and only if G
0( ) < 0. We can easily to show that G0( ) < 0 if and only if
g > (h  1)=(n  1). This condition is satisfied when the campaigner gathers the required signatures
for the law with good state, which is always the case when the campaigner campaigns. Therefore, in
equilibrium, 0 > dgd >
db
d holds. Thus, if  > 1=2 and is it suﬃciently close to 1=2, the gap between
g and b increases. Conversely if  < 1=2, the gap between g and b decreases. Therefore,
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 < 1=2 is a more problematic case to force the campaigner to take the first best action.
3.8 Conclusion
To summarize, this study has examined an initiative process based on a signature-gathering campaign
and explored the optimal signature requirements. As a benchmark case, we considered the situation in
which the law has two states, namely good and bad. In this case, the optimal requirement is high when
the gap in the popularity between good and bad states is large, which may imply that for countries
where uncertainty in preferences of citizens is large, the optimal requirement is low. This result partly
holds for the case in which there are uncountable states.
On the other hand, if signing and refusing a signature are costly and the population is infinite,
which are common in the real world, the diﬀerences in the gathered signatures between laws vanish,
which implies that the signature requirement does not make sense. Therefore, reducing costs of both
signing and refusing a signature is needed. As an example of such policy, establishing an online
signature-gathering system is considered. In addition, with an online signature-gathering campaign,
the campaigning cost may also reduce, which will need higher requirement.
When the population is finite with small costs, unlike the above case, the result for the benchmark
case holds even when both signing and not signing are costly. In addition, we show that in the case of
costly interaction with the campaigner, a low requirement is optimal for more important laws.
This study has several shortcomings. One is that in our costly interaction model, the case of
continuum states is not analyzed. Our discussion also depends on costless voting in the referendum
stage. If the voting is costly, a somewhat diﬀerent outcome is obtained.30 Moreover, since the signing
stage reveals the preference distribution of citizens, it may also aﬀect the voting behavior.31 This
study also ignored the type of law campaigned, which may be an issue of interest in the spatial voting
theory. These shortcomings are left to future research to address.
30 See Ledyard (1984); Krishna and Morgan (2015).
31 Taylor and Yildirim (2010) verify that information about citizens’ preference distribution aﬀects the voting behavior,
and they show that much information may reduce the social welfare.
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3.A Omitted proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. (1) We show the first part of the lemma. Note that U (m(); ) is decreasing
in , since with larger , it needs larger m to gather the required signatures. Moreover, since U is
continuous in m and , by the maximum theorem,U (m(); ) is continuous in .
Note also by Assumption 3.2, U (m(); ) > 0 for some . If  = 1, even when m = 1, the
probability that the required signatures are gathered is zero. Therefore,U (m(1); 1) =  C(1) < 0.
These facts imply that there exists ¯ 2 (0; 1), such that for each  > ¯, U (m(); ) 6 0, and for
each  < ¯,U (m(); ) > 0. Then, m() = 0 for each  > ¯, and m() > 0 for each  < ¯.
(2) We now prove the second part of the lemma. Since the objective function of the campaigner
may not be (quasi or pseudo) concave, it may have several local optimal m. Let M () be the set of
locally optimal meeting probabilities m that can be the m() that is the chosen candidate except for
0. Note that by the first-order condition, for each m 2 M (), it satisfies one of the following:32
(vC + )p0(=m)=m2 = C0(m) if  < m < 2;
p0(=m)=m2 = C0(m) if 2 < m;
m = 2;
m = :
Step 1. For eachm() 2 M () that satisfies the first-order condition, that is, (vC+)p0(=m)=m2 =
C0(m) or p0(=m)=m2 = C0(m), =m() is increasing in .
Let m 2 M (). (a) First consider the case that there exists " > 0 such that m is the unique local
optimum in (m   ";m + "). Consider the case that =m < 1=2 and write m = mb(). By the implicit
32Note that m = 1 is excluded by the assumption. Note also that m 6  is dominated by m = 0.
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function theorem, mb() is continuously diﬀerentiable at . By the definition, the derivative of mb is
given by

1
(mb )2
"(
p00
 

mb
!

mb
+ p0
 

mb
!)
 
(
p00
 

mb
!

mb
+ 2p0
 

mb
!)
m0
b
mb
#
= C 00(mb )m0b : (A1)
For the local optimum, the second-order condition
0 < 
(
p00
 

mb
!

mb
+ 2p0
 

mb
!)

(mb)3
+ C00(mb) (A2)
must be satisfied. We have two cases.
(a-1) Consider the case that p00


mb


mb
+ p0


mb

> 0. By equation (A1) and the second-order
condition, we can show that m0b =
@mb ()
@ > 0. By (A1) and since p
0 > 0, we also have

"
p00
 

mb
!

mb
+ 2p0
 

mb
!#
1
(mb)2
 
1   m
0
b
mb
!
> C00(mb)m0b > 0;
and thus mb > m0b. This implies that =mb() is increasing in .
(a-2) Consider the case that p00


mb


mb
+ p0


mb

6 0. Then, by (A1), we have m0b() 6 0, and
thus =mb() is increasing in .
Proof for the case of =m > 1=2 is completely parallel.
(b) Consider the case that m is not a unique local optimum in (m   ";m + ") for each " > 0. Then,
since the utility function is continuous in m > 0, there is a continuum of local maximum points. Let
the supremum of such point be m¯b(). By Assumption 3.1, it is a candidate of the chosen meeting
probability. Since m = 1 is not optimal, m¯b() < 1. Thus, for each m > m¯b(), the first-order
condition does not hold. This implies that the second-order condition (A2) holds at mb = m¯b().
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, m¯b() is continuously diﬀerentiable, and =m¯b() is also
increasing in .
Step 2. =m() is increasing in .
We now prove that =m() is increasing in . Note that M() is divided into a finite set of
closed intervals, M(). For each I 2 M(), let mI () = sup I. Then, for each I; I0 2 M(),
there exists " > 0 such that jmI ()   mI 0 () j > ". Let m() = mI () for some I 2 M().
(a) Consider the case that U (m(); ) > U (mI ; ) for each I 2 M()=fIg. By the continuity
of U , for each " > 0, there exists  > 0 such that for each 0 2 (   ;  + ), m(0) 2 (m()  
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";m() + "). Therefore, as shown in the above, @(=m())=@ > 0.
(b) Consider the case that U (m(); ) = U (mI (); ) for some I 2 M()=I. Let mI () be
the minimum one that satisfies the above equality. By the assumption, m() > mI (). To simplify
the notation, let m = m() and m0 = mI ().
(b-1) Assume that =m0 > =m > 1=2. Then, by the first-order condition,
(vC + )p0(=m)=m = mC0(m) > m0C0(m0) = (vC + )p0(=m0)=m0;
and thus (vC + )p0(=m)(1=m) > (vC + )p0(=m0)(1=m0):
Note that by the envelope theorem, dU (m();)d =  (vC + )p0(=m)(1=m). Therefore, for each 0 > 
that is suﬃciently near , U (m0; 0) > U (m; 0). Thus, m(0) is in neighborhood of m0 = mI ().
Since m() > mI (), =m
() is also increasing at . For the case of =m0 > 1=2 > =m and
1=2 > =m0 > =m, the proof is parallel.
(b-2) Consider the case that =m0 = 1=2 > =m. In this case, we write m = mb(). By this
condition,U (m0; )  U (m; ) = 0, that is,
C(mb())   C(2)   
Z 1=2
=mb ()
dp() = 0:
We show that the diﬀerence U (m0; )   U (mb(); ) is increasing in . To show this, we note that
by the envelope theorem and the first-order condition, @U (mb ();)@ =  p0(=mb())(1=mb()) =
 mb()=C0(mb()). Since mb() > 2 and dU (m0;)d = dU (2;)d = 2C0(2) , dU (m
0;)
d >
dU (mb ();)
d
Therefore, for each 0 >  such that mb() exists, U (m0; 0)  U (mb(0); 0) > 0. Thus, 0=m0 =
1=2 > 0=mb(0) > =mb().
(b-3) Consider the case that =m0 > 1=2 = =m. For the case that =m = 1=2, dU (2;)d =  2C0(2).
On the other hand, by the envelope theorem and the first-order condition, dU (m
0();)
d =  (vC +
)p0(=m0)(1=m0) =  m0=C0(m0). Since m0 < 2, dU (m0();)d >  2C0(m0) >  2C0(2) = dU (2;)d .
Therefore, for 0 > , m0 that satisfies 0=m0 > 1=2 is optimal. Thus, we can conclude that as 
increases, =m() increases.
(b-4) Consider the case that m0 = . Then,U (m0; ) =  C(). Note that dU (;)d =  C0().
(b-4-1) =m > 1=2. Then, as in case (b-3), dU (m
0;)
d   dU (m;)d > 0.
(b-4-2) =m = 1=2. Then, since U (m0; )   U (m; ) = C(2)   C(), by the convexity of C,
dU (m0;)
d   dU (m;)d > 0.
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(b-4-3) =m < 1=2. As in case (b-2), dU (m
0;)
d   dU (m;)d > 0.
The above discussion concludes the proof of Step 2. By (1) and Step 2, we conclude that =m()
is increasing in . 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. For the proof, we provide the following claim.
Claim 3.1. Under Assumption 3.4, the number of m that satisfies the first-order condition is at most
one, and the second-order condition is always satisfied.
Proof of Claim 3.1. By the assumption, p0(=m)=m2 is weakly decreasing in m. Therefore, since
C0(m) is strictly increasing, the number of m that satisfies the first-order condition is at most one.
Since p0 > 0, we can easily check the second-order condition under the assumption. 
Suppose by contradiction that there is no K . We first show that there is  such that (vC +
)p0(K )K = =KC0(=K ). Suppose not. Consider the case that (vC+)p0(K )K > =KC0(=K )
for some . Note that as  ! K , C0(=K ) ! 1. Then, there exists  that satisfies the first-
order condition, which is a contradiction. Then, (vC + )p0(K )K < =KC0(=K ) for each
. By  ! 0, the left-hand side goes to 0, a contradiction. Therefore, there exists  such that
(vC + )p0(K )K = =KC0(=K ). Then, in this case, as no other m except for m = =K satisfies
the first-order condition, m() = =K or m() = 2. By assumption, the latter case holds.
Note that by Assumption 3.4, p0(=m)=m is decreasing. Furthermore, since mC0(m) is increasing,
(vC + )p0(1=2)(1=2) < 2C0(2). This implies that m = 2 is not local optimum as reducing m
improves the campaigner’s utility, which is a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Let m and Dm be the optimal meeting probability except for 0. We can
easily show that =m() 6 K and D=Dm() 6 K . Therefore, we have the following four cases.
(1) =m() = D=Dm() = K . Then,
(vC + )p0(K )K = m()C0(m());
(vC + )Dp0(K )K = Dm(D)C0(Dm(D)):
Since K 2 (1;D)  (1; 2), p0(K ) > Dp0(k ). Therefore,m()C0(m()) > Dm(D)C0(Dm(D)),
and thus m() > Dm(D). Since =m() = D=Dm(D) = K ,  > D.
(2) =m() < D and D=Dm() < D. Then, U (m(); ) = DU (Dm(D); D) = 0, where DU is
the expected utility of the campaigner when the probability measure is Dp.
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If D=Dm(D) > 1=2, the expected utility is given by
U (m; ) = (vC + )
Z 1
=m
dp()   C(m);
DU (m; ) = (vC + ) Z 1
=m
dDp()   C(m):
Since D=Dm(D) < D, 1   p(D=Dm(D)) > 1   Dp(D=Dm(D)). Therefore, U (m(D); D) >
U (Dm(D); D) > DU (Dm(D); ). Since U (m(); ) = 0 and U (m(); ) is decreasing in ,
 > D.
Consider the case that D=Dm(D) < 1=2. Then, the expected utility is given by
U (m; ) = (vC + )
Z 1
1=2
dp() + 
Z 1=2
=m
dp()   C(m);
DU (m; ) = (vC + ) Z 1
1=2
dDp() +  Z 1=2
=m
dDp()   C(m):
Since D > 1=2, we also haveU (Dm(D); D) > DU (Dm(D); D). Thus, we can show that  > D.
(3) =m() > D and D=Dm() > D. Since p(=m()) > Dp(=m()), as the same logic
in case (2), we can show that  6 D. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. (1) Consider the case that U (m(k ); 

k ) > U (2

k; 

k ). Then, m
(k ) is
the interior solution, and thus it satisfies the first-order condition. Furthermore, since k=m
(k ) < K ,
U (m(k ); 

k ) = 0. We consider the case that 

k=m
(k ) < 1=2 (The following discussion also holds
in the case of k=m
(k ) > 1=2). Therefore, there exists " > 0, and for each k 2 (k   "; k + ") and
each  2 (   ";  + "),
(vC + )P + 
Z 1=2

k
=m
k
(
k
)
dp()   kC(mk (k )) = 0; (A3)
p0(=mk ())

(mk ())2
= kC0(mk ()): (A4)
Note that k is determined by (A3) and m

k () is determined by (A4). With a small change in k, the
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same condition is maintained. Thus, by diﬀerentiating both sides of (A3) by k and (A4),
 p0(k=m(k )) *.,
@
k
@k
m(k )
  

k
(m(k ))2
d[mk (

k )]
dk
+/-
= C(mk (

k )) + kC
0(mk (

k ))
d[mk (

k )]
dk
(A5)
mk (k ) =  
@k
@k
p0(k=m
(k ))
1
C(mk (

k ))
; (A6)
where
d[mk (

k )]
dk
=
@mk
@k
(k ) +
@mk
@
(k )
dk
dk
:
Note that by equation (A4) and Assumption 3.1, @m

k
@k () < 0 for each . Substituting (A6) into (A4)
yields
@k
@k
kC0(mk (

k )) =  
k
mk (

k )
C(mk (

k )):
Abusing a notation, we write p00 = p00(k=m

k (

k )), p
0 = p0(k=m

k (

k )), m

k (

k ) = m

k , C =
C(mk (

k )), C
0 = C0(mk (

k )), and C
00 = C00(mk (

k )).
Then by the above equations and calculating @m

k
@k and
@m
k
@ using the first-order condition,
C(mk (

k )) + kC
0(mk (

k ))
d[mk (

k )]
dk
=
2666641  
k (C0)2=C + [p00k=m

k + p
0]k=(m

k )
3
kC00 + [p00k=m

k + 2p0]

k=(m

k )
3
377775 C
=
2666641  
k (C0)2=C   kC0=mk + [p00k=mk + 2p0]k=(mk )3
kC00 + [p00k=m

k + 2p0]

k=(m

k )
3
377775 C:
The second equality follows from the first-order condition. By this equation, since m < 1, p0 > 0, and
C00 > 0, the following equation
C(mk (

k )) + kC
0(mk (

k ))
d[mk (

k )]
dk
is positive if and only if C00 > (C0)2=C   C0=mk .
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Then, by this and equation (A5), we have
dk=m

k (

k )
dk
=
*.,
@
k
@k
mk (

k )
  

k
(mk (

k ))
2
@mk ()
@k
+/- < 0;
if and only if C00 > (C0)2=C   C0=mk . This inequality is equivalent to
f
C 0(m)
C(m)=m
g0
> 0 at m = mk .
(2) Consider the case that U (m; k ) < U (2

k; 

k ) for each m , 

k . Then, m = 

k is unique
optimal. Let M be the set of m that satisfies the first-order condition. As shown in Claim 3.1, M is
single, and thus it is continuous at the parameters. Let mk (

k ) be the unique element of M . Then,
U (mk (

k ); 

k ) < U (2

k; 

k ). Therefore, with a small change in k and 

k , m = 2

k is unique
optimal. Thus, k=m

k (

k ) = 1=2 for a small change in k, and, consequently,
d
k
=m
k
(
k
)
dk = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. In each equilibrium,
 (n) = m
Z
H
 
Dn(vi)
 
n   1
h   1
!
( (n))h 1(1    (n))n h 1vi
!
dV (vi):
Since for each v 2 R, H (

n 1
h 1

( (n))h 1(1  (n))n h 1v ) ! H (0) pointwisely, as n ! 1, and H
is bounded above, the bounded convergence theorem implies
lim
n!1 (n) = limn!1m
Z
H
 
Dn(vi)
 
n   1
h   1
!
( (n))h 1(1    (n))n h 1vi
!
dV (vi)
= m
Z
lim
n!1H
 
Dn(vi)
 
n   1
h   1
!
( (n))h 1(1    (n))n h 1vi
!
dV (vi)
= mH (0):

Proof of Lemma 3.3. We first note that for each H ,   (0;m) = mH (0). The derivative of   ( ;m) is
given by
@ 
@ 
( ;m) = m
Z
H0( vi)vi dV (vi):
First note that @ @  (0;m) = H
0(0)
R
v dV (v).
Consider the case that  2 +. We show that @ @  ( ;m) > 0 for each ;m. Since H0 is symmetric
at 0, H0( vi)vi =  H0( vi)vi for each vi > 0. Then, by Assumption 3.5, there exists a 0-symmetric
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distribution  such that V 0 (v)=0(v ) is monotone. Since 1   V (0) > 1=2 = 1   (0), V 0 (v)=0(v)
is nondecreasing. If not, by the monotonicity condition, V 0 (v )=0(v ) is nonincreasing, which implies
that  first-order stochastically dominates V. Then, 1   V (0) 6 1   (0) = 1=2, which is a
contradiction. Therefore, for each v > 0,
V 0 (v )
0(v )
>
V 0 ( v )
0( v) :
Since is symmetric at 0,0(v) = 0( v), which implies thatV 0 (v ) > V 0 ( v ). Then, @ m@  ( ; ) > 0,
which implies that  m( ; ) > mH (0) for each  > 0. Thus, in equilibrium,  > mH (0). In the
same way, we can show that if  2  ,  < mH (0). 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Let  be the equilibrium, where  is some parameter. Then, it satisfies
 = G ( ) :=
X
02+
"
p(0)
 
n   1
h   1
!
[0 ( )]h 1[1   0 ( )]n h
#
:
 ( ) =   ( ;m) = m
Z
H
 
vi=k

dV (vi):
Since G is a continuous self-map, it admits a fixed point. Moreover, since G is continuous, the set
of fixed points is closed and thus compact. Therefore, the maximum fixed point exists. 
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We first consider the case that for each  2 +, p() increases. Then,
G ( ) also increases for each . Therefore, the maximum fixed point also increases. If  2 +,
as see in the proof of Lemma 3.3,  ( ) also increases, while if  2  ,  ( ) decreases.
Second, we consider the case that k increases.
(1) Suppose that dGk ((  ( k;m)) )d < 1. We first show that k is continuously diﬀerentiable at k. By
an abuse of notation, we write Gk ( ) = Gk ((  ( ;m))). By the implicit function theorem, there
exists  > 0 such that for each k0 2 (k   ; k + ), the solution to Gk 0 ( ) =  is uniquely determined.
Let D(k0) be the solution. Note that k 0 is the maximum  that satisfies Gk 0 ( ) = . Note also that
Gk 0 is continuous in k0. Since we consider the maximum equilibrium, for each  > k , Gk ( ) < .
Then, by letting k0 ! k, k 0 can be arbitrarily close to k , since if not, there is  that satisfies
Gk ( ) =  and  > k . Therefore, k 0 = D(k0) for each k0 2 (k   ; k + ). The implicit function
theorem also implies that k is continuously diﬀerentiable by k at k .
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Diﬀerentiating  by k yields the following:
d ( )
dk
=  m
Z
H0( v=k)
v
k
dV (v)
"
1
k
   ddk
#
d
dk
=
X
02+
X0
@0 ( )
@k
;
where
X0 =
"
p(0)
 
n   1
h   1
!
[h   1   (n   1)0 ( )][0 ( )]h 2[1   0 ( )]n h 1
#
:
Let A = m
R
H0( v=k) vk dV (v ). By calculating the derivative,
d
dk =
 P02+ X0A0
1 P02+ X0A0 1k .
Note that
dGk ((  ( k; )))
d
=
X
02+
A0X0 < 1:
We have two cases. Consider the case that
P
02+ A0X0 > 0. Since  
P
02+ A0X0 >  1,
@ 
@k < 0, and thus
1
k    @ @k > 0.
Next, consider the case that
P
02+ A0X0 6 0. Then,
@ 
@k <   1k . Therefore, 1k    @ @k > 0.
Note that as seen in the proof of Lemma 3.3, A < 0 if and only if  2 +. Thus, in each case,
@ (  )
@k > 0 if and only if  2  .
(2) Consider the case that dGk ((  ( k;)) )d > 1. Since for each  2 +, m
R
H ( v ) dV (v) is
increasing in , m
R
H (( =k)v) dV (v ) > m
R
H (( 0=k0)v) dV (v) if and only if =k > 0=k0.
Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show that k=k is decreasing at k.
Note that
@ 
@k
( ; ) =  m
Z
H0( v=k)
v
k2
dV (v) =   k A :
Thus, since
P
02+ A0X0 > 1,
@Gk
@k
=  
X
02+

k
A0X0 < 0:
Note that since we consider the maximum equilibrium, Gk ( ) <  for each  > k . Therefore, for
each k0 > k and each  > k , Gk 0 ( ) < . Thus, k 0 < k . On the other hand, since for each
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k < k0, Gk 0 ( k ) > k , there exists  such that Gk 0 ( ) =  and  > k . Since we consider the
maximum equilibrium, k 0 > k , which concludes the proof.
The proof of the case for the eﬀect of  is omitted since it is completely symmetric to the case of
the eﬀect of k.

Proof of Proposition 3.5. Note that
a = Ga ( a) = p
 
n   1
h   1
!
[g ( a)]h 1[1   g ( a)]n h;
g ( a) =  g ( ; a) = m
Z
H
 
v

'(v; a) dv;
b( a) =  b( ; a) = m
Z
H
 
v

'( v; a) dv:
By the assumption, for each ,  g ( ; a) is increasing in a while  b( ; a) is decreasing in a.
Suppose that dGa ( g ( a;a))d < 1. Then, as in the proof of Proposition 3.4,  and  are diﬀerentiable
at a. Diﬀerentiating  by a yields the following:
d
da
=
@  ( ; a)
@a
+
@  ( ; a)
@ 
@ 
@a
;
d
da
= p
 
n   1
h   1
!
[h   1   (n   1)g ( )][g ( )]h 2[1   g ( )]n h 1 @g
@a
:
Consider the case of  = g. Let A = @  ( ;a)@a , B =
@  ( ;a)
@  and
X = p
 
n   1
h   1
!
[h   1   (n   1)g ( )][g ( )]h 2[1   g ( )]n h 1:
Then, @g@a =
Ag
1 BgX . Note that Ag > 0. Note also that
dGa ( g ( a;a))
d = BgX < 1. Therefore,
@g
@a > 0.
Next, consider the case of  = b. Then, @b@a = Ab + Bb
AgX
1 BgX . Note that Ab < 0. Note also that
since H0 is symmetric at 0,
Bg = m
Z
H0( v )v'(v; a) dv
=  m
Z
H0( ( v))( v )'(v; a) dv
=  m
Z
H0( (v ))(v )'( v; a) dv =  Bb:
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Therefore, @b@a = Ab  
AgBgX
1 BgX . If BgX > 0, since Ag > 0,
@b
@a < 0.
Consider the case that BgX < 0. By integration by parts, we have
Ag = m
Z
H ( v )
@'(v; a)
@a
dv
= m
"
H ( v )
@(v; a)
@a
#1
 1
  m
Z
H0( v ) 
@(v; a)
@a
dv
=  m
Z
H0( v ) 
@(v; a)
@a
dv:
On the other hand,
Ab = m
Z
H ( v )
@'( v; a)
@a
dv = m
Z
H ( v ) @'(v; a)
@a
dv
= m
"
H ( v )
@(v; a)
@a
#1
 1
+ m
Z
H0( v ) @(v; a)
@a
dv
= m
Z
H0( v ) 
@(v; a)
@a
dv =  Ag :
Therefore, @b@a = Ab
1
1 BgX < 0.
Suppose that dGa ( g ( a;a))d > 1. Since
@ g
@a ( ; a) > 0, as in the proof of Proposition 3.4, we can
show that a is increasing at a. By this fact and the facts that  g ( ; a) is increasing and  b( ; a) is
decreasing ; a, the statement of the proposition immediately follows. 
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4 Concealments of Problems: An Incentive
of Reducing the Responsibility1
4.1 Introduction
Firms sometime have problems for their products and management systems. If these problems are
ignored, they would cause accidents that harm consumers. Some of problems are growing over time
and harm from the accidents gets larger as time proceeds.
As an example case, consider a mass food poisoning that caused by a Japanese dairy company, Snow
Brand Milk Products Co. in 2000. It left 14,780 people ill. The direct cause was that toxic material
that produced when a production line stopped by power outage sent to the next level of production
line. As an organizational cause, it is considered that their crisis management has some problems.
For example, no policy is placed to prevent toxic material from being mixed when a production line
is stopped.2 In this case, as time proceeds, the harm form such an accidents could get larger. This is
because as the scale of plants gets larger, the harm from such a food poisoning also gets larger.
To prevent such accidents, such problems should be solved in their early. To do so, workers should
report them as soon as they notice the problems. Then, do workers report them to their superior? In
the above example case, failure in the crisis management are not resolved until the accident occurs.
It is suspected that no one made an issue of it. However, it is also doubtful that no one noticed the
failure. Indeed, workers at the plant told that the plant’s manual had been ignored for years.3 Thus, it
1 The author is deeply grateful to Eiich Miyagawa, Takashi Shimizu, and Yoshikatsu Tatamitani. The author also
thanks Masazumi Hattori, Chiaki Moriguchi, Shuhei Morimoto, Yuji Muramatsu, Takeshi Murooka, Hajime Tomura,
Kohei Yamagata and seminar and conference participants at the 96th meeting of OEIO, Kyoto University, Okayama
University, Hitotsubashi University, GAMES 2016, AMES 2016 and CTW for their valuable comments. Remaining
errors are the author’s responsibility. The author also acknowledges the financial support from the Japan Society for the
Promotion of Science (14J05350).
2 Failure Knowledge Database, http://www.sozogaku.com/fkd/en/cfen/CA1000622.html.
3 “Snow Brand pays the price”, The Japan Times, July 12, 2000.
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Period t Period t + 1 Period t + 2
Player t
Player t + 1
Subordinate Manager
Subordinate Manager
report
conceal
To the next subordinate.
solve
ignore
conceal
solve or ignore
The problem disappears.
Figure 4.1: Timing of the game
is also suspected that workers have noticed the failure but not reported.
Let us consider the workers’ incentive to conceal such problem even when they detect it. If they
report the problems, it is possible that the reported problems are ignored. In that case, if one of
the workers promotes to be a manager, he would be in charge of dealing with the reported problem.
Moreover, if the reported problem remains unsolved, it is considered as a systematic illegal action,
which causes harsh criticism for the firm and the manager when accident occurs. Then, workers may
think that they want to avoid such trouble, which may incite a worker to conceal the problem. This
paper formalizes this idea.
We consider an overlapping-generation organization that consists of two kinds of workers: a
subordinate and a manager. Each worker lives for two periods: he works as a subordinate in his first
period and works as a manager in his second period. In each period, the subordinate is in charge of
investigating whether there is a problem and reporting it to the manager when detect it. Reporting the
problem is assumed to be costless. The manager is in charge of solving the reported problem, which
is costly for the manager. The cost of solving the problem depends on the manager’s ability. Figure
4.1 illustrates the timing of the game.
An unsolved problem may cause accidents and in which case, only the worker in that period may
be punished. If the manager does not solved the reported problem and the unsolved problem causes
accidents,4 he is exposed to harsh criticism. On the other hand, the problem have not reported when
it causes accidents, criticism for the manager is softened but the subordinate is also punished for not
reporting or detecting. The sizes of punishments (criticism) and the cost of solving the problem are
4 In other case, the problem is detected by an outsider, which also causes blames for the workers.
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determined by the scale of the problem. We assume that the sizes of punishments and the cost of
solving a problem are proportional to the scale. The scale varies over time. For instance, consider the
mass food poisoning case that we present in the beginning of this section. In this case, solving the
problem corresponds to introducing a guidelines that prevent such accidents and educating workers.
Such acts are more costly when the scale of plants is larger. The size of harm also depends on the
scale of plants. Sizes of punishments are also larger as the size of harm gets larger. Therefore, sizes
of punishments are larger when the scale of plants is larger.
We now consider the motivation of not reporting the problem in this model. Note that even if
the subordinate reports the problem, when the manager’s ability is too low, he ignores the reported
problem. If the reported problem remains unsolved in the next period, the subordinate is responsible
for solving it in the next period as a manager, which is costly for him. On the contrary, if he does
not report the problem, the next subordinate is in charge of detecting and reporting the problem. The
next subordinate may fail to detect the unreported problem or conceal it. Then, the manager in the
next period is free from the responsibility for solving. This possibility of successful reduction of the
responsibility is the motivation of concealment.
The motivation of reducing responsibility has some interesting features. First, each of reporting and
concealing has complementarity, that is a subordinate is more likely to report when others report. This
is because, since if the next subordinate reports, even when the subordinate conceals, the problem is
reported in the next period. Then, the responsibility is not reduced. Therefore, incentive to conceal is
reduced. This property suggests that the possibility of multiple equilibria. That is, both of the strategy
profiles where all subordinates report and all subordinates conceal can be equilibria with the same
parameter. In this case, as Kreps (1990) discusses, corporate culture has important role to determine
which equilibrium is realized. That is, if “reporting” is a culture of the firm, each player believes
that the others report and thus “reporting” is an equilibrium. The culture “reporting” is realized as an
equilibrium. In the same way, the culture “concealment” is also realized as an equilibrium.
We can also say that if the scale of problem is increasing, concealments are more likely to occur. To
see this, note that the benefit of reporting is reducing the punishment of not reporting in the present
period, while the cost of reporting is the responsibility of solving the problem in the next period. If
the scale is increasing, the responsibility in the next period is heavier, which implies that the cost of
reporting is higher.
We see the relation between the incentive to reduce the responsibility and the size of punishment.
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Note that the cost of reporting is the responsibility of solving the reported problem. Then, increasing
in the size of punishment has two kinds of eﬀects. One is increasing in the probability that the manager
solves the problem. This decreases the cost of reporting. The other is decreasing in the expected
utility when the reported problem remains unsolved. This increases the cost of reporting the problem
since the motivation of concealment comes from reducing the future responsibility. Therefore, if the
first eﬀect is small while the second eﬀect is large, increasing in the size of punishment makes the
incentive of concealment be larger.
Increasing in the punishment does not always increase the incentive of concealment. If the punish-
ment is suﬃciently severe, an increasing in the size of punishment makes the incentive of concealment
decrease. The intuition is as follows. If the punishment is suﬃciently severe, the probability that the
present manager solves the problem is high. If the probability is high enough, even if the responsibility
in the next period becomes heavier, since the possibility of facing the unsolved reported problem is
low, the eﬀect on the cost of reporting, that is, the reported manager’s expected utility is also low.
In ourmodel, the incentive of concealment comes from themotivation of reducing the responsibility.
Why do players want to reduce the responsibility? This is because dealing with the problem is costly
and thus each player wants not to be responsible for solving the problem. Thus, one may consider that
if there is a suﬃcient reward for solving the problem, this incentive would disappear. We consider
introducing a reward to managers for solving problems. As long as the expected utility of the manager
facing a reported problem is negative, there remains an incentive to reduce the responsibility and
thus, the equilibria have the same features in the previous analysis. However, if the expected utility of
managers of facing the reported problem is positive, while the incentive for reducing the responsibility
disappears, another incentive of concealment arises: the subordinate has an incentive to seek the
reward for solving the problem. To obtain the reward, the subordinate conceals the problem in the
present period and solves it when he is a manager. In this case, the problem is more likely to be solved,
but the solution is delayed.
The previous analyses assume that the manager can solve the problem certainly. However, in the
real world, they may fail to solve the problem. In this case, even if the manager tries to solve problem,
it is possible that the reported problem remains unsolved and the subordinate faces it as the manager in
the next period. In our basic model, if the punishment is suﬃciently severe, severer punishment makes
the incentive of concealment small. However, in this case, we show that if the solving probability is
suﬃciently small, the incentive of concealment increases as punishment becomes severer.
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The previous analyses also assume that the retired manager is not blamed. However, in the real
world, if a player have ignored the problem when he is a manager and his negligence is detected later,
even if he is retired, he would be punished. Considering this, if the scale growing rate is higher,
the future punishment is heavier. Thus, if the scale is increasing and the growth rate is suﬃciently
high, the incentive of concealment is small. On the other hand, as in the basic model, if the scale
is decreasing and the shrinkage rate is suﬃciently high, since it implies the future responsibility gets
smaller, the incentive of concealment is also small. Therefore, concealments are most likely to happen
when scale growing rate is modest.
The remainder of this study consists of the following sections. The next subsection reviews the
related researches. Section 4.2 describes our basic model. Section 4.3 summarizes the behaviors of
players. Section 4.4 characterizes perfect Bayesian equilibria and section 4.5 performs comparative
statics. Section 4.6 extends our basic model. Subsection 4.6.1 considers the case of introducing
the rewards for managers. Subsection 4.6.2 considers the case when managers’ managements of the
problems may fail to solve the problem. Subsection 4.6.3 considers the case when retired managers
may also be punished. All omitted proofs are delegated to the appendix.
4.1.1 Related Literature
As a research of concealment, Kerton and Bodell (1995) study firms’ concealment of information
about bad property of their products. In their setting, the motivation of concealment is profiting from
asymmetric information between the firm and consumers by hiding the information about the products.
Ourmodel is diﬀerent from inspection games (Dresher, 1962;Maschler, 1966). Themajor diﬀerence
between the standard inspection game and ours is that detectors may also be responsible for solving
the reported problem. In the standard inspection game, inspector’s responsibility is only detecting the
problem.
Our study deals with workers’ incentive to report problems. As a similar situation, whistleblowing
is considered. In the literature of corporate governance, many papers study the motivation of whistle-
blowing and its consequence (For example, see a survey of literature, Dasgupta and Kesharwani, 2010
and empirical works, Bowen et al., 2010; Dyck et al., 2010).
As costs of whistleblowing, many papers consider reputational eﬀect, revenge from the company,
etc. For example, in the literature of corruption, a corrupting agent can threaten the monitor with
retaliating and it motivates the monitor not to report the corruption. Chassang and Padró i Miquel
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(2014) consider such situation and explore anti-corruption mechanisms. Unlike these motivations, in
this paper, we assume that reporting brings no direct cost mentioned above. One of our contributions is
showing that even when reporting itself is not costly and brings no such friction between the company,
workers may conceal the detected problem.
Another incentive of not reporting arises when the report is non-verifiable. Consider a situation
that a principal tries to make an agent eﬀort. In case of not detecting of the agent’s negligence is
rewarded, since the principal cannot observes whether the agent eﬀorts, the monitor has an incentive
to misreport. Rahman (2012) proposes a contract to motivating the monitor to report truthfully.
Our study relates to the researches of crime economics (Becker, 1968). In the literature of crime
economics, increasing in punishment is less costly than that in probability of conviction. However,
in our model, since punishment for managers distorts subordinates’ incentive of reporting, heavier
punishment may cause concealment of problems. Therefore, it may increase the probability of
accidents.
Our model is also relate a problem of dynamic contribution to a single public good. This is because,
solving and reporting a problem is considered as kinds of contributions to a public good. As examples
of such study, Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984) and Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) consider such problem
with continuous time and simultaneous decision making. The models of Bolle (2011) and Bergstrom
(2012) consider private provision of a public good with sequential decision making. In Bolle’s setting,
in each period t, only player t can contribute to the public good with discrete time. Bergstrom assumes
that contribution can be done by random arriving players in continuous time.
In our model, unlike these papers, to provide a public good (solving the problem), two steps of
contributions are needed: reporting and solving. In the standard model of private provision of a
public good, the motivation of not contributing comes from free-riding incentives: a player does not
contribute since others would do. In our model, each subordinate conceals since the manager does
not solve.
4.2 Model
There are two players in each period. Player t 2 Z lives for two periods; period t and t + 1. In period
t, player t works as a subordinate and is promoted to a manager in period t + 1. We assume that a
problem arises at some period. No other problems are caused after the period. We assume that until
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Figure 4.1: Flow of decisions in each period
a player detects or is reported the problem, he does not know that there is a problem. If a player
knows the problem, he learns the period that the problem arises. The period that the problem arises is
normalized to be 0. We assume that once the problem is reported, each player knows that the problem
is reported.
In the beginning of each period, the subordinate detects the problem with probability qS 2 [0; 1]
and the manager detects the problem with probability qM 2 [0; 1]. If the manager has detected the
problem, he decides whether to solve the problem. If the subordinate detects the problem which has
not solved, he decides whether to report the problem. If the problem is reported, the manager decides
whether to solve the problem. That is, the flow of decisions at each period is
1. If the manager has detected the problem (as a manager or when he is a subordinate), he decides
whether to solve the problem.
2. If the problem has not solved and not reported, the subordinate who detects the problem decides
whether to report the problem.
3. If the problem is reported, the manager decides whether to solve the problem.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the decision flow. When the problem is reported or solved, they are known to
each player. Once the problem is reported, stage 1 and 2 are skipped. Once the problem is solved,
since no problem occurs after, each player has nothing to do.
Let the scale of the problem at period t be denoted by st . If a subordinate detects a problem, he
knows the sequence of the scales of the problem. We assume that the sequence of scales (st )t2N is
exogenously given. The reward for solving the problem to the manager is denoted by bM st and that
of reporting the problem for the subordinate is denoted by bSst . The cost of solving the problem for
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the manager in period t is ct st , where ct is private information of the manager. Each player learns the
parameter ct after he promotes to a manager at period t. For each t, ct follows a distribution function
F independently. We assume that the support of F is an interval in R++.
If the problem is unsolved, the problem causes an accident with probability p 2 (0; 1).5 If the
problem causes an accident at period t, only the players in period t are blamed and the manger is
forced to solve the problem. If the problem is unreported, the punishment incurs disutility dM;U st
for the manager and dSst for the subordinate. If the problem is reported in the past and the manager
does not solved, the subordinate is not punished. On the other hand, the manager is punished and
the disutility from the punishment for the reported manager is dM;Rst . We assume that dM;R > dM;U .
We also assume that even if the unsolved problem that has been reported in period  < t causes an
accident at period t, the manager at period t is punished. Finally, let  2 (0; 1) denote the common
discount factor.
4.3 Behavior of managers and subordinates
This section considers the behaviors of managers and subordinates, and summarizes their best re-
sponses.
4.3.1 Managers’ behavior
We consider the manager’s problem. Suppose that the problem is reported. The expected utility of
solving the problem is bM st   ct st , while the expected utility of ignoring the problem is  p(dM;Rst +
ct st ). Therefore, the manager solves the reported problem if and only if
bM + pdM;R
1   p > ct :
Suppose that the manager detects (or detected in the previous period but did not report) the problem.
Then, before the decision of the subordinate, the manager decides whether to solve the problem. Let
rt be the probability that the subordinate in period t reports the problem when he detects the problem.
5 In other case, the problem is detected by an outsider with a probability, which also causes blames for the subordinate
and the manager in the period.
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Then, the expected utility of ignoring the problem is
 (1   qSrt )p(dM;U st + ct st ) + qSrt maxfbM st   ct st; p(dM;Rst + ct st )g:
Therefore, the manager solves the problem if and only if
bM + pdM;U
1   p > ct :
Since we have assumed that dM;R > dM;U , the manager is more likely to solve the problem when the
problem is reported.
4.3.2 Subordinates’ behavior
Since we have characterized the behaviors of managers, we consider the behaviors of subordinates.
If the problem has been reported or the subordinate fails to detect the problem, he has nothing to do.
Suppose that the subordinate detects the unreported problem.
We first consider the belief of the subordinate about his manager’s cost. Let I (rt 1) be the updated
subordinate’s belief about that the manager ignores the reported problem when the subordinate detects
an unreported problem. If the problem has been solved or reported, the subordinate learns it and
he has nothing to do. Therefore, when the subordinate decides whether to report, he learns that the
manager does not solve the problem in the first stage of the period. This implies that the manager
detected and ignores the problem or the manager does not detect it. Then, I is defined as
I (rt 1) :=
(qS (1   rt 1) + (1   qS))

1   F

bM+pdM;R
1 p

(qS (1   rt 1) + (1   qS)qM )
f
1   F
 bM+pdM;U
1 p
g
+ (1   qS)(1   qM )
Since the problem happens in period 0, manager 0 cannot know the problemwhen hewas a subordinate.
Therefore, if the manager knows the problem, he found it after he proceeds to a manager. Therefore
the belief of subordinate 0 about his manager is
I0 :=
1   F

bM+pdM;R
1 p

qM
f
1   F
 bM+pdM;U
1 p
g
+ (1   qM )
:
Note that I0 = I0(1). Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that r 1 = 1.
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Next, we consider the subordinate’s expected utility of being promoted to be a manager. Let DR
and DU satisfy
DR := Ec
f
maxf p(dM;R + c); bM   cg
g
; DU := Ec
f
maxf p(dM;U + c); bM   cg
g
:
Then, DRst+1 is the expected utility of the manager in the next period when the problem is reported,
while DU st+1 is that when the problem is unreported.
Summing up these elements, the expected utility of reporting the problem is
(1   p)I (rt 1)DRst+1 + bSst :
On the other hand, the expected utility of not reporting the problem is
(1   p)
f
(1   qSrt+1)DU st+1 + qSrt+1DRst+1
g
  pdSst :
Then, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for reporting the problem is characterized as
Lemma 4.1. The subordinate in period t > 0 reports the problem if and only if
'rt 1;rt+1 (t) := (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR)
g st+1
st
+ bS + pdS > 0:
Intuitively, 'rt 1;rt+1 is the net payoﬀ of reporting the problem. First, pdS is the cost of not reporting
in the present period. The other terms are the net payoﬀ of reporting. Consider a gain from reporting.
Suppose that reward bM is suﬃciently low so that DR < 0. If the subordinate reports and the manager
solves, the problem disappears. Then, the utility of facing a reported problem, DR disappears. Note
that 1  I (rt 1) is the probability that the manager solves when the subordinate reports. Then, the gain
from reporting is  (1   I (rt 1))DR. There is also a loss from reporting. If the subordinate reports
but the manager ignores, the subordinate will face a reported problem and obtain utility DR. On the
other hand, if the subordinate conceals and the next subordinate does not report, the subordinate will
obtain DU . Note that DU > DR. Reporting changes DU into DR. If the next subordinate does not
report, by concealing, the subordinate can earn DU   DR, which is called a gain form reducing the
responsibility. Note also that 1   qSrt+1 is the probability that the next subordinate does not report.
Thus, (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR) is the expected loss from reporting.
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We concentrate on the case that st+1=st is monotone in t. To guarantee the monotonicity of
st+1=st , we prepare some suﬃcient conditions. At first, suppose that st has a continuous extension
s : R+ ! R+. If s(t) is log-concave (resp. log-convex) function of t, st+1=st is decreasing (resp.
increasing) in t. For example, the density function of a normal distribution function is log-concave.
The following fact shows other suﬃcient conditions.
Fact 4.1. Consider an increasing function G such that G(0) = 0. Suppose that st+1 = G(st ) for each
t 2 N. Then, if G is (strictly) concave, G(s)=s is (strictly) decreasing and if G is (strictly) convex,
G(s)=s is (strictly) increasing in s. Thus, if G(s) > s for each s and G is strictly concave, st+1=st is
strictly decreasing.
4.4 Equilibrium of the basic model
This section characterizes on pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria For notational simplicity,
“subordinate reports” implies that the subordinate takes the strategy where he reports the problem
when he detects it. In the same way, “subordinate does not report” and “subordinate conceals” imply
that the subordinate takes the strategy where he does not report the problem even if he detects it.
As a basic model, we assume that bM = 0. This implies that DR < 0 and DU < 0. We first
investigate the property of incentive to report. Recall that DR < 0, DU > DR and I (rt 1) is decreasing
in rt 1. The following lemma shows the property of '. Although the proof of this lemma is obvious
from these facts and the definition of ', it has an insight about subordinates’ incentive.
Lemma 4.2 (Complementarity of reporting). Suppose that DR < 0. Then, for each t 2 N, 'r;r 0 (t) is
increasing in r 2 [0; 1] and r0 2 [0; 1].
This lemma implies that a subordinate tends to report when the others report, that is, reporting
(and thus concealing) are complementary. By Lemma 4.1 and 4.2, we obtain two equilibria and the
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for their existences.
Lemma 4.3. There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the subordinate in each period reports if
and only if for each t 2 N, '1;1(t) > 0.
Lemma 4.4. There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where the subordinate in each period does not
report if and only if for each t > 1, '0;0(t) 6 0 and '1;0(0) 6 0.
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' = 0 t
'1;0
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Figure 4.1:Multiple equilibria
Remark 4.1 (Multiple equilibria). Note that existence conditions for the above equilibria are not
exclusive each other. Thus there can be multiple equilibria with the same parameter. Figure 4.1
illustrates an example. If '1;1(t) > 0, '0;0(t) 6 0 for each t 2 N, and '1;0(0) 6 0 are hold, both of the
strategy profile where all subordinates report and that where all subordinates conceal are equilibria. In
this case, if each player believes that others report, he reports and if he believes that others conceal, he
conceals. This suggest that corporate culture plays a role to determine which equilibrium is realized
(Kreps, 1990). For example, consider a firm that has a culture such that even when a subordinate
detects a problem, he conceals it. A subordinate in a firm believes that others conceal and thus he
conceals. As a result, each subordinate conceals and the culture is realized as an equilibrium. On the
other hand, if “reporting” is a culture, it is also realized as an equilibrium.
Note that if qS = 1, while '1;1 > 0 and '0;1 > 0, '0;0 and '1;0 could be negative. Therefore, if qS is
large, multiple equilibria are likely to occur. 4
We now explore the other equilibria. We focus on the case that the scale growth rate st+1=st is
monotone.
First, we consider the case that st+1=st is nondecreasing in t, that is scale growth rate is nondecreasing
over time. Let t1;0 2 N be the time such that '1;0(t1;0) > 0 > '1;0(t1;0 + 1). Since '1;0 is monotone,
if t1;0 exists, it is determined uniquely. In this case, in addition to the equilibria that appeared in
Lemmata 4.3 and 4.4, the following strategy profile is an equilibrium.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose that bM = 0, and st+1=st is nondecreasing in t. Suppose also that t1;0 exists.
Then, there is a PBE such that for each t 6 t1;0, subordinate at period t reports and for each t > t1;0,
subordinate at period t conceals the problem.
We have shown that there can be three PBEs with pure strategy. The following theorem shows that
no other pure strategy PBE.
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Theorem 4.1. Suppose that bM = 0, st+1=st is nondecreasing in t. Suppose also that there is no t 2 N
such that '1;0(t) = 0. Then, there is no pure strategy PBE other than the following strategy profiles.
1. The subordinate in each period reports the problem.
2. The subordinate in each period conceals the problem.
3. For each t 6 t1;0, subordinate at period t reports and for each t > t1;0, subordinate at period t
conceals the problem.
When st+1=st is nonincreasing, the equilibria are characterized as in the previous case.
Corollary 4.1. Suppose that bM = 0. Suppose also that st+1=st is nonincreasing in t and there is no
t 2 N such that '0;1(t) = 0. Let t0;1 2 N be the time such that '0;1(t0;1) < 0 < '0;1(t0;1 + 1). Then,
there are at most three PBEs with pure strategy:
1. The subordinate in each period reports the problem.
2. The subordinate in each period conceals the problem.
3. For each t 6 t0;1, the subordinate in period t conceals and for each t > t0;1, the subordinate in
period t reports the problem.
In either case, the equilibrium results in a tragedy. Consider the case of increasing scales. When
the scale growth rate is nondecreasing, if the problem is not detected until the threshold period, the
problem will never be reported. Thus, the problem grows until the accidents occurs, which causes
greater accidents. When the scale growth rate is nonincreasing, until the threshold period, the problem
remains unreported. This results in higher probability of accidents, greater harm for consumers and
higher solving costs.
4.4.1 Welfare
In this section, we compute the welfare. Let LR(s)(resp. LU (s)) be the total loss of citizens other
than the personnels of the firm when the problem is reported (resp. unreported), an accident occurs
and the scale is s. Both of LR(s) and LU (s) include compensation for the accident by the firm. The
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amount of LR(s) and LU (s) can diﬀer, which represents that the amount of compensation can diﬀer
when the problem is reported or not. To simplify the notation,
c¯R =
Z pdM;R
1 p
cdF (c)st; c¯U =
Z pdM;U
1 p
cdF (c)st; c¯ =
Z
cdF (c)st
FR = F
 
pdM;R
1   p
!
; FU = F
 
pdM;U
1   p
!
:
Consider an equilibrium where each subordinate before (including) period t1;0 reports and each
subordinate after the period conceals. In this case, the social welfare SWRCt1;0 is calculated as
SWRCt1;0 =  
t1;0X
t=0
f
(1   p)(1   qS)(1   qMFU )
g t "
qSSWR(t) + (1   qS)HBt#
 
f
(1   p)(1   qS)(1   qMFU )
g t1;0+1 "HBt1;0+1
+ (1   p)(1   qMFU )
1X
=t1;0+2
[(1   p)(1   qMFU )] t1;0 2B
#
;
where
SWR(t) =
1X
=t
[(1   FR)(1   p)] tA
A = (1   p)c¯Rs + p(1   FR)

L(s);+dM;Rs

+ pc¯st;HB = qM (1   p)c¯U s + p(1   qMFU )((dM;U + dS)s + L(st )) + pc¯s;
B = q(1   p)c¯U s + p(1   qFU )((dM;U + dS)s + L(st )) + pc¯s;
q = 1   (1   qM )(1   qS):
We consider the eﬀect of a delay in t1;0, that is, compare the welfare when t1;0 = t and t1;0 = t + 1.
Then, by calculation,
SWRCt+1 > SWRCt ()
qSHBt+1 + (1   qMFU )(1   p)(Bt+2   (1   qS)HBt+2)
+ qS[(1   qMFU )(1   p)]2
X
=t+3
[(1   qFU )(1   p)] t 3B   qSSWR(t + 1) > 0:
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Observing this, since dM;R appears only in SWR(t + 1), suﬃciently large dM;R may induce that
SWRCt+1 < SWRCt . However, in reality, such punishment would be prohibited. The total amount of
punishment would be no more than the loss of the citizens by the accidents. To represent such idea,
we assume that
Assumption 4.1. 1. For each s, LR(s) + dM;Rs = LU (s) + (dM;U + dS)s = SD(s) > 0.
2. For each s, LR(s) > 0 and LU (s) > 0.
The term SD(s) represents the social damage from the accidents with scale s. The first condition
implies that either the problem is reported or not, the social damage from the accidents keeps constant.
If the punishment is only compensation for the accidents, this condition is satisfied. The second
condition implies that citizens cannot benefit from the accidents. If they are negative, the firm
compensate too much for the accidents.
Under the assumption, we can show that
Proposition 4.1. Under Assumption 4.1, SWRCt+1 > SWRCt .
Therefore, such type of equilibrium is ineﬃcient. As in the same way, we can show that one time
concealment reduces the social welfare. Therefore, no concealment is socially optimal.
4.5 Comparative statics
In this section, we assume that st+1=st is nondecreasing in t. We focus on strategy profile 3 of
Theorem 4.1, that is there exists t such that subordinate t < t1;0 reports and subordinate t > t1;0
conceals the detected problem. As Theorem 4.1 shows, '1;0 characterizes the equilibrium. Note that
'1;0(t) = (1   p)
f
I (1)DR   DU
g st+1
st
+ bS + pdS : (4.1)
If '1;0(t) increases for each t, t1;0 also increases, which decreases concealments.
4.5.1 Discount factor
Consider the eﬀect of discount factor . If I (1)DR DU > 0, '1;0(t) > 0. Therefore, no one conceals.
Thus, if someone conceals, I (1)DR   DU < 0. In this case, increasing in  decreases '1;0, and thus,
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increasing concealments. This suggests that more farsighted subordinate is more likely to conceal the
problem. In another interpretation, consider  as the probability that the subordinate promotes to be
a manager. Then, it also suggests that subordinate who is more likely to promote is more likely to
conceal.
4.5.2 Punishment and reward for subordinates
We consider increasings in punishment and reward for subordinates. Since they appear only in the
last two terms in (4.1), their increasings directly increase '1;0. That is, increasings in punishment and
reward for subordinates decrease concealment.
4.5.3 Punishment for reported managers
Consider an increasing in punishment for the manager when he does not solve the reported problem,
i.e., dM;R. Since dM;R appears in DR and I (1), the eﬀect is not obvious. Diﬀerentiating '1;0 by dM;R
gives
@'1;0(t)
@dM;R
= (1   p)
"
@I (1)
@dM;R
DR + I (1)
@DR
@dM;R
#
st+1
st
;
where
@I (1)
@dM;R
=   p
1   p
26666664
f

pdM;R
1 p

qM
f
1   F
 pdM;U
1 p
g
+ (1   qM )
37777775 < 0;
@DR
@dM;R
=  p[1   F (pdM;R=(1   p))] < 0:
Since DR < 0, we have the following observation.
Observation 4.1. Suppose that f (pdM;R=(1   p)) is suﬃciently small but 1   F (dM;R=(1   p)) is not
so small. Then, then an increase in punishment for managers decreases '1;0(s).
Recall that I is the probability that the manager ignores the problem. Intuitively, if f (pdM;R=(1 p))
is suﬃciently small, the decrease in I that caused by an increase in dM;R, is small. On the other hand,
suppose that I itself is not small. Since the manager is likely to ignore the reported problem, if the
subordinate reports the problem, he is likely to face the problem when he is the manager. The increase
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in punishment for reported manager decreases the reported manager’s expected utility. Therefore, it
increases the incentive to conceal the problem.
Remark 4.2. The conditions in observation that '1;0 is decreasing in the size of punishment may not
hold when dM;R is suﬃciently large. To see this, note that
@2DR
@(dM;R)2
= p f (pdM;R=(1   p))] > 0:
Suppose that f is nondecreasing. Then, the second order derivative of '1;0 is
@2'1;0(t)
@(dM;R)2
= (1   p)
"
@2I (1)
@dM;R
DR + 2
@I (1)
@dM;R
@DR
@dM;R
+
@2DR
@(dM;R)2
I (1)
#
st+1
st
> 0:
Thus, '1;0(t) is a convex function of dM;R for each t. This implies that even if '1;0 is decreasing
when dM;R is small, if dM;R is suﬃciently large, '1;0(t) is increasing in dM;R. This is because, since
manager can solve the problem with probability 1, when dM;R is suﬃciently large, the probability that
the reported problem is solved is 1. This result depends on the assumption that each manager is able
to solve the problem with probability 1. We revisit this problem in section 4.6.2. 4
Example 4.1. Suppose that parameter c is distributed uniformly on (0; c¯). Then,
@I (1)
@dM;R
DR + I (1)
@DR
@dM;R
=
8>>><>>>:
3p2dM;R
(1 p)c¯

1   12 pd
M;R
(1 p)c¯

  p
 1 2p
1 p

if pd
M;R
1 p 6 c¯
0 otherwise:
Therefore, if p > 1=2, '1;0 is increasing. If p < 1=2, when dM;R = 0,
@'1;0(t)
@sM < 0 and when
pdM;R=(1   p) = c¯, @'1;0(s)
@sM > 0. Since the uniform distribution has nondecreasing density, '1;0 is
convex function of dM;R. Therefore, there exists d¯ such that for each dM;R < d¯, '1;0 is decreasing and
for each dM;R > d¯, '1;0 is increasing in dM;R. 4
4.5.4 Punishment for unreported managers
We consider an increasing in dM;U , that is punishment for managers when the problem is unreported.
Recall that the net benefit of reporting, ' is given by
'rt 1;rt+1 (t) = (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR)
g st+1
st
+ bS + pdS :
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Recall also that we have assumed that dM;U < dM;R. By increasing dM;U , gain from reducing the
responsibility, DU   DR gets close to 0, which implies that if dM;U = dM;R,
'rt 1;rt+1 (t) = (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR
g st+1
st
+ bS + pdS :
Since DR < 0, 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) > 0 and therefore no concealment occurs. The intuition is as follows. The
incentive for concealment comes from transferring the responsibility to the next subordinate. That is,
if the problem is unreported, the responsibility of the manager is reduced. However, if dM;R = dM;U ,
whether the problem is reported or not, the manager receives the same punishment. Subordinates
cannot reduce the responsibility.
4.5.5 Scale growth rate
We consider two problems P; P0 that are identified by the sequences of scales. That is, P = (st ); P0 =
(s0t ). Suppose that no other parameters diﬀer. Note that corresponding ' and '0 are given by
'rt 1;rt+1 (t) = (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR)
g st+1
st
+ bS + pdS;
'0rt 1;rt+1 (t) = (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR)
g s0t+1
s0t
+ bS + pdS :
Assume that fst g is a strictly increasing sequence and fs0t g is a strictly decreasing sequence. Then, we
have st+1=st > 1 > s0t 0+1=s
0
t 0 for each t; t
0 2 N. Assume that the coeﬃcient of st+1=st is negative. Then,
in this case, '0rt 1;rt+1 (t) > 'rt 0 1;rt 0+1 (t
0) for each t; t0 2 N. Consider the case that for problem P, there
is no PBE such that each player does not report the problem. This and Proposition 4.4 imply that for
some t0 2 N, '0;0(t0) > 0. Then, '00;0(t) > 0 for each t 2 N. Since '0rt 1;rt+1 (t0) > '00;0(t) > 0 for each
t; t0 2 N, the unique equilibrium is the strategy profile such that each player reports. This shows
Theorem 4.2. Consider two problems P; P0. Suppose that problem P has increasing scales and
P0 has decreasing scales. Then, if there is no equilibrium such that no one reports in problem P,
then, in problem P0, the unique equilibrium is the strategy profile such that each player reports.
Conversely, there is no equilibrium such that no one conceal in problem P0, then in problem P, the
unique equilibrium is the strategy profile such that no one reports the problem.
This proposition implies that concealment happens more likely in problems with increasing scales.
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The intuition is as follows. If the scale is increasing, punishment in the next period is heavier than that
in the present period. If subordinate conceals the problem, he is likely to be punished in the present
period as a subordinate, but not in the next period. On the other hand, if he reports the problem, he
is likely to be punished in the next period as a manager. If the scale is decreasing, punishment in the
next period is less greater in the present period. Therefore, the motive for reducing the punishment
for manager is more greater in problems with increasing scale.
4.6 Extensions
4.6.1 Introducing rewards for the managers
In the later sections, without mentions, we assume that st+1=st is strictly increasing. We consider the
case that DR < 0. Then, since the relation '0;0 < 'r;r 0 < '1;1 still holds, equilibrium is characterized
as Theorem 4.1.
We consider the case that DR > 0. Then, the motivation of concealing the problem is diﬀerent
from the case for DR < 0. If a subordinate reports the problem, since solving the problem brings
high reward, the problem would be solved. On the other hand, if he conceals the problem and solves
it by himself in the next period, he could earn the reward. This incentive for the seeking the reward
is another motivation of concealment for the case that DR > 0. We consider the features of this
motivation.
Equilibria
First, we characterize equilibria. Recall that 'rt 1;rt+1 is written as
'rt 1;rt+1 (t) = (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR)
g st+1
st
+ bS + pdS
Then, 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) is increasing in I. Note that I (rt 1) is decreasing in rt 1. Thus, 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) is
decreasing in rt 1. This implies that '0;1(t) > '0;rt+1 (t) > 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) > '1;0(t) for each rt 1; rt+1 2
[0; 1] and t 2 N. Note that DU > DR and 1 > I (r). Thus, the net gain from the future responsibility
by reporitng is negative.
When DR > 0 , we have the following two cases: '0;0(t) 6 '1;1(t) and '0;0(t) > '1;1(t).
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Case 1. Consider the case that '0;0(t) 6 '1;1(t) for each t 2 N. Then, the equilibria has the
following feature.
Lemma 4.6. Suppose that '1;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N. Then, in any pure strategy PBE, for each t 2 N
such that '0;0(st ) < 0, subordinate t conceals the problem.
In some case, we can characterize pure strategy PBE.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that '1;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N and there is no t0 2 N such that '1;0(t0) = 0.
If jft : '1;0(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)gj 6 1, the unique pure strategy PBE is the following strategy: subordinate
t reports if '1;0(t) > 0 and subordinate t conceals the problem if '1;0(t) < 0.
On the other hand, in general, there is no pure strategy PBE.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that '0;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N and there is no t0 2 N such that '1;0(t0) = 0.
Suppose also that jft : '1;0(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)gj > 2. Then, there is no pure strategy PBE.
However, in the range of mixed strategy, we have an equilibrium.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that '0;0(t) 6 '1;1(t). Suppose that '1;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N and there is
no t 2 N such that '1;0(t) = 0. Then, there exists a PBE such that for each t such that '0;0(t) < 0,
subordinate t conceals the problem.
Case 2. Suppose that '0;0(t) > '1;1(t). In this case, the equilibria have the following features.
Lemma 4.7. Suppose that '0;0(t) > '1;1(t). Also suppose that '0;0(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N. Then, in
PBE with pure strategy,
1. for each t such that '0;0(t) < 0, subordinate t conceals the problem.
2. Suppose that jft : '0;0(t) > 0 > '1;1(t)gj > 2. Then, for each t0; t0   1 2 ft : '0;0(t) > 0 >
'1;1(t)g, if subordinate t0 reports, subordinate t0   1 conceals the problem. If subordinate t0
conceals, subordinate t0   1 reports the problem.
The feature 1 is common to the previous case, but feature 2 is specific in the present case. The
following proposition shows the existence of equilibrium that has these features.
Theorem 4.4 (Existence of alternate generations equilibrium). Suppose that '0;0(t) > '1;1(t) and
'0;0(t) < 0 for some t 2 N. Also suppose that jft : '0;0(st ) > 0 > '1;1(t)gj > 2.
Then, there is a PBE with pure strategy that satisfies
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1. for each t such that '0;0(t) < 0, subordinate t conceals the problem.
2. Suppose that jft : '0;0(t) > 0 > '1;1(t)gj > 2. Then, for each t0; t0   1 2 ft : '0;0(t) > 0 >
'1;1(t)g, if subordinate t0 reports, subordinate t0   1 conceals the problem. If subordinate t0
conceals, subordinate t0   1 reports the problem.
The reason for the alternation of action plans of subordinates is as follows. Since DR > 0, the
subordinate seeks the reward for solving the problem. Therefore, the subordinate wants to conceal the
problem when the manager is likely to solve the problem. If his manager takes the strategy that he
conceals the problem when he is a subordinate, the probability that he knows the problem is higher
than if he takes the strategy that he reports the problem when he detects it. This implies that the
manager’s c is high enough since he knows the problem but does not solve it. Therefore, the incentive
for concealment is weaker when the manager conceals than that when the manager reports. This
implies that the strength of the incentive for concealment alternates in each generation.
Remark 4.3. Note that since there is at most one problem, the actual actions, reporting and not
reporting do not alternate. 4
Comparative statics
In each case, '0;0 plays an important role to determine the start timing of concealment. Recall that the
function '0;0 is written as
'0;0(t) = (1   p)(I (0)DR   DU ) st+1st + b
S + pdS :
We consider the eﬀect of increasing punishment and reward. The following proposition shows the
eﬀect of the punishment for the managers’ neglect.
Proposition 4.4. If DR > 0, increasing in dM;R decreases '0;0(t).
The intuition is as follows. Consider DR > 0. In this case, if the manager ignores the problem, the
subordinate can earn award by solving the problem. Then, he wants not the manager to solve it when
the subordinate reports it. On the other hand, by concealing the problem, the subordinate can solve
it as a manager in the next period. Note that an increasing in dM;R increases the probability that the
manager solves the problem. This encourages the subordinate to conceal the problem.
Consider the eﬀect of increasing in reward for managers, bM .
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of Example 4.2
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that f (x)=(1   F (x)) is increasing in x. Let wR = (bM + pdM;R)=(1   p)
and wU = (bM + pdM;U )=(1   p). Then,
(1) If F (wU ) > 1=2 and DR > 0, increasing in bM decreases '0;0(t) for each t.
(2) If F (wR)(1   F (wR)) > F (wU ) and DR < 0, increasing in bM increases '0;0(t) for each t.
Note that if bM is suﬃciently high, the conditions F (wU ) > 1=2 and DR > 0 are satisfied. Thus,
when bM is suﬃciently high, '0;0(t) is decreasing in bM . The intuition is straightforward. With
suﬃciently large bM , the benefit from solving a problem is large enough, which also implies that
low probability of facing the problem. Since the benefit is large, the incentive for seeking rewards
is also large. Both of the eﬀects strengthen the incentive to conceal. On the other hand, if DR < 0,
subordinates want not to face the problem. Therefore, the eﬀect of reducing the probability of facing
the problem reduces the incentive to conceal.
We also perform a comparative static for the scale of a problem. As in the benchmark model,
if DR < 0, since the relation '0;0 < 'r;r 0 < '1;1 for each r; r0 2 [0; 1] still holds, the statement of
Proposition 4.2 also holds. However, if DR > 0, the relation '0;0 < 'r;r 0 < '1;1 is violated, but if
'0;0 6 '1;1, the statement of Theorem 4.2 still holds in the range of pure strategy.
Theorem 4.5. Consider two problems P = (st )1t=0; P0 = (s0t )1t=0 that satisfy st+1 > st and s0t+1 < s0t
for each t 2 N. Suppose also that '0;0 6 '1;1. Then, if there is no PBE such that no one reports in
problem P, then, in problem P0, the unique pure strategy PBE is the strategy profile such that each
player reports. Conversely, there is no PBE such that no one conceals in problem P0, then in problem
P, the unique pure strategy PBE is the strategy profile such that no one reports the problem.
If '0;0 > '1;1, a statement like Theorem 4.5 may be violated. Example 4.2 shows the case.
Example 4.2. Consider ', (st )1t=0; and (s
0
t )
1
t=0 that are drawn in figure 4.1. Suppose that there is
an increasing function G such that (st )1t=0; and (s
0
t )
1
t=0 are generated by G, that is st+1 = G(st ) and
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s0t+1 = G(s
0
t ). Function G is drawn in figure 4.2. Assume that there exists s such that G(s) = s (see
figure 4.2). In this example, if the initial value s00 < s
, the scale is decreasing, while if s0 > s, the
scale is increasing. In this case, not that since ' is written as
'rt 1;rt+1 (t) := (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR)
g G(st )
st
+ bS + pdS;
'rt 1;rt+1 (t) is depend only on st . Therefore, consider 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) as a function of scales, that is
'rt 1;rt+1 (s) := (1   p)
f
 (1   I (rt 1))DR   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR)
g G(s)
s
+ bS + pdS :
Then, problems (st )1t=0; and (s
0
t )
1
t=0 have the same 'rt 1;rt+1 .
Figure 4.1 shows a PBE. The term R indicates that the subordinate at the point reports in PBE and
C indicates that the subordinate at the point conceals. We show that the action profiles are PBEs.
Consider fst g. Note that for each t > 2, since 'r;r 0 (st ) < 0, concealing is the dominant strategy.
Consider t = 0. As seen early in this section, since subordinate 0 is the first person who can detect
the problem, the manager 0 does not detect the problem when he is a subordinate. Thus, this situation
is the same one that subordinate  1 takes a strategy that reports the problem when he detects. Since
'1;r (s0) < 0, the best response of subordinate 0 is concealing the problem. Then, since r0 = r2 = 0
and '0;0(s1) > 0, r1 = 1.
Consider problem (s0t )1t=0. Since for each t > 3, 'r;r 0 (s
0
t ) > 0, reporting the problem is the dominant
strategy. Consider t = 0. As shown in above, since '1;r (s00) < 0, the best response of subordinate 0 is
concealing. Since r0 = 0 and '0;r (s01) > 0, r1 = 1. Since r1 = r3 = 1 and '1;1(s
0
2) < 0, r2 = 0.
Obviously, the PBE in increasing scale is not “all conceal”. However, in decreasing scale, this PBE
is not “all report”. 4
4.6.2 Possibility of failure in solving the problem
In the previous section, we assume that managers who facing the reported problem have only two
choices; solve or ignore. This section assumes that managers can chooses the probability that the
problem is solved. To simplifies discussion, we assume that if the manager fails to solve the problem,
the problem is inherited the next manager. In this case, his eﬀort of trying to solve the problem has no
influence on the cost function of the next manager. We also assume that even if the problem causes
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st+1
st
G
s
s
Figure 4.2: Illustration of function G in Example 4.2.
accidents, the manager in the period is not forced to solve the problem.
Let  be the probability that the problem is solved, which managers can choose. Manager t’s cost
function to achieve  is given by ct ()s, where ct is private information of the manager. Suppose that
ct is independently and identically distributed by a cumulative distribution function F on (0; c¯), where
c¯ 2 R+. As in the basic model, we assume that each player learns c after he promotes to a manager.
The function  : [0; ¯) ! R+ is a strictly convex, diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and satisfies
(0) = 0 and lim! ¯ () = lim! ¯ 0() = 1. The term ¯ 6 1 is the supremum of achievable
probability. By this assumption, 0 is strictly increasing and thus, has the strictly increasing inverse
function.
We assume that if the manager tries to solve the problem, that is he chooses  > 0, it is known to the
firm’s personnel that the manager knows the problem, but the level of  is unverifiable to any others.
We assume that punishment for the manager is irrelevant to the level of . Let HDR be the reported
manager’s expected utility, HDU be the unreported manager’s utility and HI be the probability that the
reported manager ignores.6 Then, as in the basic model, we show
Lemma 4.8. There exist a function HI : [0; 1]! [0; 1] and constants HDU and HDR such that subordinate
t reports if and only if
H'rt 1;rt+1 (t) :=  f(HI (rt 1)   1)HDR   (1   p)(1   qSrt+1)(HDU   HDR)g st+1st
+ bS + pdS > 0:
6 For the detail definition, see appendix.
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In this case, the shape of function ' has the same characteristics of that in the previous sections 4.4.
The major diﬀerences arise in the eﬀects of increasing in the sizes of punishments and rewards for
managers.
We consider the eﬀect of dM;R. As in the basic model, we consider H'1;0, which determines the
equilibrium when HDR < 0. In our basic model, as shown in example 4.1, we have the case that if dM;R
is suﬃciently small, H'1;0(s) is decreasing in dM;R, while when dM;R is large, it is increasing. However,
in this model, the latter may not hold. Indeed, we show
Theorem 4.6. Suppose that the support of F is (0; c¯). (1) Suppose that the supremum of the solving
probability ¯ < 1   p. Then, there exists d¯ such that for each dM;R > d¯, H'1;0(t) is decreasing in dM;R.
(2) Suppose that the supremum of the solving probability ¯ > 1   p. Then, there exists d¯ such that
for each dM;R > d¯, '1;0(t) is increasing in dM;R.
The intuition is as follows. Note that
H'1;0(t) :=  f (1   HI (1))HDR   (1   p)(HDU   HDR)g st+1st + bS + pdS > 0:
Note also that 1 HI (1) is the probability that the manager solves the problem, which converges to ¯ as
dM;R goes to infinity. By increasing in dM;R, which implies decreasing in HDR, it increasing the merit of
reporting if the manager solves the problem. Therefore, the benefit increases by ¯. On the other hand,
if the subordinate does not report, with probability 1   p, the problem is unreported. Recall that if
the problem remains unreported, the subordinate can obtain the gain from reducing the responsibilityHDU   HDR. Thus, by increasing in dM;R, it increases the gain from reducing the responsibility by
1   p. Therefore, if ¯ < 1   p, the increasing in the net benefit of reporting is negative, and thus, H'1;0
decreases.
Under some additional conditions, we can also say that H'1;0 is decreasing.
Proposition 4.6. Suppose that qM = dM;U = 0 and HDR < 0. Suppose also that () = =( ¯   ).
Then, if ¯ < 1   p, H'1;0 is decreasing in dM;R.
4.6.3 After retirement blames
In our basic model, we assume that managers are not punished after their retirement. This section
relaxes this assumption. Suppose that each player lives at most three periods. He works as subordinate
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in his first period, works as manager in his second period and retires in his third period. We assume
that the retired manager lives at most one period. The probability that the manager lives after his
retirement is . We also suppose that the support of F is (0; c¯) and F has diﬀerentiable density. If he
ignores a problem, his negligence is detected when the problem causes accidents. When his negligence
is detected, he is punished. Let dRst be the disutility of punishment for the living retired manager in
period t. We assume that the scale st is determined by a transition function G, that is st = G(st 1) for
each t 2 N. Let DR be the reported manager’s utility, DU be the unreported manager’s utility and DI
be the probability that the reported manager ignores.7 Then, as in the basic model, we can define the
incentive to report, D'. However, since each manager considers his retired period, whether to solve the
problem is aﬀected by the scale in his retired period. Thus, the expected utility of facing a reported
problem, DR and the probability that manager ignores the reported problem, DI is a function of the
scale.8 Then, we show
Lemma 4.9. Suppose that G(s)=s and f are well defined on R+ and sups2R+ G(s)=s < 1. Then,
there exists functions DI : [0; 1]  R ! R and DR : R ! R, and a constant DU such that subordinate
in period t reports the problem if and only if D'rt 1;rt+1 (t) > 0, where
D'rt 1;rt+1 (t) = (1   p) f f1   DI (rt 1; st )gDR(st )   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR(st ))g G(st )st
+ bS + pdS :
In this case, since D'rt 1;rt+1 (t) is written as a function of st , we write D'rt 1;rt+1 as a function of s, that
is D'rt 1;rt+1 (st ) = D'rt 1;rt+1 (t). Obviously, an increase of dR has the same eﬀect of an increase of dM;R.
Moreover, if G(s)=s is increasing, this is the same for the case that dM;R increases in each period.
Since the eﬀect of increase in dM;R depends on the size of dM;R and distribution function, it is not
easy to determine the shape of D'. In this case, it is not clear the relation between the problem with
increasing scales and that with decreasing scales.
To simplify the analysis, we consider the case that G(s) = s,  2 R++. Thus, if  > 1, the scales
are increasing. Then, D', D, and DI are constant across the periods since G(s)=s = G2(s)=G(s) = .
Thus, we write these variable as a function of .
7 For the detail definitions, see appendix.
8 For the detail, see the proof of the lemma.
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We also have that the possible equilibria with pure strategy are all conceal and all reports since D'
is constant. Thus, we consider D'0;0 and D'1;1. For simplicity, we consider the case that DU < 0 (and
thus DR < 0 for each ). Consider the eﬀect of . Recall Remark 4.2. We have shown that if f
is nondecreasing, D' is a convex function of punishment. Since an increasing in scale has the similar
eﬀect of an increasing in punishment, D' would also be high when  is large enough and small enough.
In fact, we show
Proposition 4.7. Suppose that DR < 0. Then, there exists ¯ such that for each  > ¯, D'rt 1;rt+1 > 0
and D'rt 1;rt+1 is increasing in .
Proposition 4.8. Suppose that DR < 0 and F is a uniform distribution on (0; c¯). Suppose also that p,
bM and dM;U are suﬃciently small, qS < 1 and c¯ is suﬃciently large. Then, there exists ¯ such that
for each  < ¯, D'rt 1;rt+1 is decreasing in .
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies the subordinates’ motivation of concealment of problems. We show that the main
cause of concealment is incentive to reduce the future responsibility. Increasing in punishment for
manager for a reported problem is considered as an easy way to decrease negligences of the managers.
However, in our model, heavier punishment makes the responsibility heavier and in turn, it may
strengthen the incentive to conceal the problem.
Comparative statics also shows that concealment is likely to occur when the scale is increasing. If
scale is increasing, the harm would also be increasing. Therefore, such problem should be solved in
their early stage, but in equilibrium, they will not be reported and thus, resolution of a problem tend
to delay or a problem remains unsolved until an accident occurs. This is the trouble. We need to
overcome this trouble by controlling punishments and rewards considering social welfare.
This paper assumes that there is only one subordinate in each period and he is sure to be a manager.
One may wonder that if there are many subordinates, since a few of them are promoted managers, the
incentive to reduce the responsibility may not work.
However, in such case, since there are many subordinates, the responsibility of reporting a problem
to a manager is also small for each subordinate. Thus, it is natural to assume that the responsibility of
subordinates decreasing in the number of subordinates. Since the present matter is such responsibility,
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even when the possibility of being a manager is small, the incentive to reduce the responsibility still
may work.
We leave some questions for future researches. The first question is optimizing punishment and
reward to maximize social welfare. In this paper, we omit the discussion about social welfare, but
it is important to determine public policy. The second question is generalizing our model to include
many players. In our model, only two players in the firm, but it is not realistic. The last question is
generalizing our model to allow nonlinear relation between costs, punishment, reward and scales. In
each generalization, the incentive to reduce responsibility also works, but it is a question that what
properties hold in equilibria.
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4.A Omitted Proofs
4.A.1 Proof in Section 4.3
Proof of Fact 4.1. Diﬀerentiating G(s)=s gives
 
G(s)
s
!0
=
G0(s)s   G(s)
s2
=
s2
2 G
00(s)   G(0)
s2
:
The second equality is by the Taylor expansion of G, that is, G(0) = G(s)   sG0(s) + s22 G00(s) for
some  2 (0; 1). Since G(0) = 0, then G(s)=s is increasing if G is convex and is decreasing if G is
concave. 
4.A.2 Proofs in Section 4.4
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Note that I (rt 1) is decreasing in rt 1. Since DR < 0, 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) > 'r 0t 1;rt+1 (t)
for each rt 1 > r0t 1. Since D
R < DU , 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) > 'rt 1;r 0t+1 (t) for each rt+1 > r
0
t+1. Therefore, for
each rt 1; rt+1 2 [0; 1], '1;1(s) > 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) > '0;0(t). 
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Suppose that for each t, '1;1(t) > 0. Consider the behavior of subordinate at
period t. Suppose that the other player takes the action such that he reports the problem when he
detects it. Then, rt 1 = rt+1 = 1 and thus, reporting the problem is one of his best response.
Suppose that '1;1(t) < 0 for some t 2 N. Then, since 'r;r 0 (t) is increasing in r; r0, 'r;r 0 (t) 6
'1;1(t) < 0 for each r; r0 2 [0; 1] . Therefore, for the subordinate t, concealing the problem is a strict
dominant strategy. Therefore, reporting for each period is not an equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Suppose that for each t, '0;0(t) 6 0 and '1;0(0) 6 0. Then, for each subordinate
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t > 0, as in the proof of Lemma 4.3, we can show that concealing is the best response. Then, since
subordinate 1 conceals, r 1 = 1, and '1;0(0) 6 0, for subordinate 0, concealing is the best response.
To prove contraposition, suppose that '0;0(t) > 0 for some t or '1;0(0) > 0. If '0;0(t) > 0 for some
t, since '0;0(t) < 'r;r 0 (t) for each r; r0 2 [0; 1], for subordinate t, reporting is a strict dominant strategy.
Consider the latter case, '1;0(0) > 0. Then, since subordinate 1 conceals and r 1 = 1, reporting
is the best response. In each case, the strategy profile where each subordinate reports is not an
equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Suppose that t1;0 exists. Therefore, for some t, '1;0(t) < 0. Then, since
bS + pdS > 0 and st > 0, (1   p)[I (1)DR   DU] < 0. Since st+1=st is increasing over time t, '1;0(t)
is decreasing in t.
Consider the behavior of subordinate t 2 N. Suppose that subordinate in each t , t follows the
strategy of the statement. Suppose also that t1;0 > 0.
Consider the case that t > t1;0. We show that subordinate t conceals. Note that each subordinate
t > t conceals. Thus, rt+1 = 0. Since st+1=st is increasing in t, '1;0(t) < 0. Then, since 'rt 1;rt+1 is
increasing in rt 1, 'rt 1;0(t) < 0. Therefore, for subordinate t, concealing is the best response.
Consider the case that t 6 t1;0. We show that subordinate t reports. Note that each subordinate
t < t reports. Thus, rt 1 = 1. Since st+1=st is increasing in t, '1;0(t) > 0. Then, 'rt 1;rt+1
is increasing in rt+1, since and '1;rt+1 (t) > 0. Therefore, for subordinate t, reporting is the best
response.
Suppose that t = 0. Then, since r 1 = 1 and 0 6 t1;0, as in shown in above, reporting is the best
response. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. By Lemma 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, each of the strategies in the statement is a PBE
under some condition.
Consider a pure strategy equilibrium except for strategy profile 1 and 2. We show that this is
equivalent to strategy profile 3. Then, there exists tR 2 N such that the subordinate in period tR reports
the problem if he detects it and there also exists tC such that the subordinate in period tC does not
report the problem even if he detects it.
To show the proposition, we prove
Claim 4.1. Suppose that the hypothesis of Proposition 4.1 holds. Let tR be a period at which the
subordinate reports and tC a period at which the subordinate conceals. Then,
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(i) In each PBE, for each t 6 tR, the subordinate in period t > 0 reports the problem.
(ii) In each PBE, for each t > tC , the subordinate in period t > 0 does not report the problem.
Proof of Claim 4.1. We first show the first part of the claim. Let t 6 tR.
Suppose by contradiction that t does not report the problem. Then, there is t 2 ft; t + 1; : : : ; tR   1g
such that subordinate t does not report and subordinate t + 1 reports.
Then, since subordinate t does not report at an equilibrium and rt+1 = 1, 'rt 1;1(t) < 0. Since
'rt 1;1 is increasing in rt 1 and there is no t such that '0;1(t) = 0, '0;1(t) < 0. Thus, in '0;1, the
coeﬃcient of st+1=st is negative. Note that st+1=st is nondecreasing in t and thus, '0;1(t + 1) < 0.
Since '0;rt+1 (t + 1) is increasing in rt+1, '0;rt+1 (t + 1) < 0. Therefore, for subordinate t + 1, not
reporting is the unique best response, which is a contradiction the fact that subordinate t + 1 report
at an equilibrium.
As in the same way, we can show that in equilibrium, for each t > tC , the subordinate in period t
does not report the problem even if he detects it. 
By Claim 4.1, there existsDt such that for each t >Dt, rt = 0 and for each t <Dt, rt = 1.
Suppose that '1;0(Dt) > 0. Then, since rDt+1 = 0 and rDt 1 = 1, reporting is the best response, is a
contradiction. Therefore, '1;0(Dt) < 0. Suppose that '1;0(Dt   1) < 0. Then, since rDt = 0 and rDt 2 = 1,
not reporting is the best response, is a contradiction. Therefore, '1;0(Dt   1) > 0 > '1;0(Dt). Thus,Dt   1 = t1;0. 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. (1) Suppose that there is no equilibrium such that no one reports in problem
P. Then, by Proposition 4.4, '0;0(t) > 0 for some t 2 N or '1;0(0) > 0.
Case 1. Suppose that '0;0(t) > 0 for some t 2 N. Then, we first show that '00;0(t) > 0 for each
t 2 N. Consider the case that I (0)DR   DU > 0. Then '00;0(t) > 0 for each t 2 N.
Consider the case that I (0)DR   DU < 0. Then, we have H'0;0(t) > '0;0(t). This implies thatH'0;0(t0) > 0 for each t0 2 N.
Since '0rt 1;rt+1 (t
0) > '00;0(t
0) > 0 for each t0 2 N. Then, reporting is the dominant strategy for each
subordinate t. Therefore, the unique PBE is the strategy that each player reports the problem P0.
Case 2. Suppose that '1;0(0) > 0. Then, as in the previous case, we have that '01;0(t) > 0 for
each t 2 N. Then, for subordinate 0, reporting is strict dominant strategy. Since '01;0(s01) > 0 and
'01;0(t) < '
0
1;r (t) for each r , for subordinate 1 reporting is the unique best response. Continuing this
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process, reporting is the best response for each subordinate t.
(2) Suppose that there is no equilibrium such that no one conceals in problem P0. Then, by
Proposition 4.3, '01;1(t) < 0 for some t. This implies that  (1   I (1))DR   (1   q)(DU   DR) < 0.
Therefore, we have '01;1 > '1;1, which implies that '1;1(t) < 0 for each t 2 N. Then, 'rt 1;rt+1 (t0) < 0
for each t0 2 N; rt 1; rt+1 2 [0; 1]. This implies that not reporting is the dominant strategy, and thus,
unique equilibrium is the strategy such that each player does not report the problem P. 
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Under Assumption 4.1, first note that for each t, Bt > At and Bt > (1  
qS)HBt + qSAt . This is because B   A is calculated as
B   A = (1   p)(c¯Uq   c¯R) + p(FR   qFU )SD(st ):
When q = 1,
B   A = (1   p)(c¯U   c¯R)st + p(FR   FU )SD(st ) > 0;
since SD(st ) > dM;Rst and c¯R   c¯U =
R pdM;R
1 p
pdM;U
1 p
cdF (c). When q = 0, as in the same way,
B   A =  (1   p)(c¯R) + pFRSD(st ) > 0:
Since B   A is a linear function of q, B   A > 0.
As in the same way,
Bt   qSAt   (1   qS)HBt = (1   p)qS[HcU   c¯R]st + pSD(st )qS (FR   FU ) > 0:
Then, since 1   qFU > 1   FR, SWRCt+1   SWRCt > 0. 
4.A.3 Proofs in Section 4.6.1
Proof of Lemma 4.6. Let (rt )t2N 2 f0; 1gN be the profile of probability of report in an equilibrium. By
the assumption, there exists t such that '1;1(t) < 0. Suppose that rt = 1. Then, since '1;1(t + 1) < 0
and '1;0(t + 1) < 0, we have rt+1 = 0. On the other hand, since '1;0(t) < 0 and '0;0(t) < 0, rt = 0, a
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contradiction. Therefore, rt = 0. Let t = minft : '1;1(t) < 0g. Since '1;1(t) is decreasing in t, for
each t > t, rt = 0.
Let T = ft < t : '0;0(t) < 0g. If T = ?, we are done. Suppose that T , ?. Let t = maxT .
Then, since '0;0 < '1;1, t = t   1. Since '1;0(t) < 0, '0;0(t) < 0 and rt = 0, rt = 0. Note that
'1;0(t) < 0, '0;0(t) < 0 for each t 2 T . Therefore, rt 1 = 0 if t   1 2 T . Continuing this process,
rt = 0 for each t 2 T . 
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Note that if '1;0(t) > 0, reporting is strict dominant strategy. Thus, in
equilibrium, rt = 1. By lemma 4.6, for each t such that '0;0(t) < 0, subordinate t does not report. For
each t, such that '0;0(t) < 0, since '1;0(t) < 0, no one has an incentive to deviate.
If jft : '1;0(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)gj = 0, we are done. Consider the case that jft : '1;0(t) < 0 <
'0;0(t)gj = 1. Let t be the element. Then, rt 1 = 1 and rt+1 = 0. Since '1;0(t) < 0, not reporting is
the best response, which concludes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let t := maxft : '1;0(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)g. By lemma 4.6, rt+1 = 0.
Suppose that rt = 0. Then, since '0;0(t) > 0, rt 1 = 1. Since jft : '1;0(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)gj > 2,
t   1 2 ft : '1;0(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)g. Then, it must be rt 2 = 0 since '1;0(t   1) < 0. However,
since '0;1(t   2) > 0 and '1;1(t   2) > 0, the best response for subordinate t   2 is reporting, a
contradiction. Suppose that rt = 1. Then, since '1;0(t) < 0, rt 1 = 0. However, since '1;1(t   1) >
0 and '0;1(t   1), reporting is the best response for subordinate t   1, a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Let (rt )t2N be the probability of report in an equilibrium. Suppose that '0;0(t) 6
0 for some t 2 N. Let t := minft : '0;0(t) < 0g. Suppose that rt = 1. Then, since for each t > t,
'1;1(t) < 0 and '1;0(t) < 0, rt+1 = 0. Suppose that rt+2 = 1. then, in turn, rt+3 = 0. However, since
'0;0(t + 2) < 0 this implies that rt+2 = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, rt+2 = 0. As in the same way,
we can show that rt+ j = 0 for each j > 0.
Then, suppose that rt 1 = 1. Since '1;0(t) < 0, it is a contradiction. Then, suppose that rt 1 = 0.
Then, since '0;0(t) < 0, it is also a contradiction. Therefore, rt = 0. As in the same fashion, we can
show that rt+ j = 0 for each j > 0.
Let T = ft : '1;1(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)g. Suppose that jT j > 2. Let t = maxT . We now show that if
rt  j = 1, rt  j 1 = 0 and if rt  j = 0, rt  j 1 = 1. for each j = 0; 1; : : : ; jT j   1.
We consider the case for j = 0. Suppose by contradiction that rt = 1 and rt 1 = 1. Then, since
'1;0(t) < 0 and rt+1 = 0, rt = 0 is the best response, a contradiction.
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Suppose by contradiction that rt = 0 and rt 1 = 0. Then, since '0;0(t) > 0 and rt+1 = 0, rt = 1
is the best response, a contradiction.
Suppose that when j = k, the statement is true and consider the case for j = k + 1. Suppose
by contradiction that rt  j = 1, rt  j 1 = 1. By induction assumption, since rt  j+1 = 0 and
'1;0(t   j   1) < 0, rt  j = 0 is the best response, a contradiction.
Suppose by contradiction that rt  j = 0, rt  j 1 = 0. By induction assumption, since rt  j+1 = 1
and '0;1(t   j   1) > 0, rt  j = 1 is the best response, a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Consider the behavior of subordinate t such that '0;0(t) < 0. Since '1;0(t) < 0,
if players after period t take the strategy that not reporting the problem, for subordinate t, not reporting
is the best response. Since st is increasing in t and thus, '0;0(t) is decreasing in t, for each t > t0,
'1;0(t0) 6 '0;0(t0) < 0. Therefore, for each subordinate t0, not reporting is the best response.
Consider the following strategy profile:
1. subordinate t 6 t reports
2. subordinate t+2k+1 reports and subordinate t+2k does not report for each 0 6 k 6 [t t]=2.
3. subordinate t > t does not report the problem.
As in the proof of lemma 4.7, for each t except for t; t, this strategy profile is the best response of
itself. Consider subordinate t. Since '1;1(t) > 0 and subordinate t   1 and t + 1 reports, reporting
is the best response.
For subordinate t, we have the following two cases:
Case 1. Suppose that jft : '0;0(t) > 0 > '1;1(t)gj is an even number. Note that '1;0(t) < 0. Since
jft : '0;0(t) > 0 > '1;1(t)gj is an even number , subordinate t   1 reports and subordinate t + 1 does
not report. Then, not reporting is the best response for subordinate t.
Case 2. Suppose that jft : '0;0(t) > 0 > '1;1(t)gj is an odd number. Note that '0;0(t) > 0. Since
jft : '0;0(t) > 0 > '1;1(t)gj is an odd number, subordinate t   1 does not reports and subordinate
t + 1 does not report. Then, reporting is the best response for subordinate t .
Therefore, this strategy profile is a PBE. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. Note that
@I (0)
@dM;R
=
  p1 p f

wR

(qS + (1   qS)qM ) 1   F  wU  + (1   qS)(1   qM )
@DR
@dM;R
=  p
Z
wR
dF (c) < 0;
where wR = (bM + pdM;R)=(1   p) and wU = (bM + pdM;U )=(1   p). In this case, since DR > 0,
@'0;0(s)
@dM;R < 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Diﬀerentiating '0;0 by bM yields
@'0;0(t)
@bM
= (1   p)
 
@I (0)
@bM
DR +
@DR
@BM
I (0)   @D
U
@bM
!
st+1
st
:
Note that
@I (0)
@bM
=   1
1   p
f

wR
 f
Q
f
1   F

wU
g
+Q0
g
 Q f

wU
 f
1   F

wR
g
Q

1   F  wU  +Q0
@DR
@bM
= F

wR

;
@DU
@bM
= F

wU

;
whereQ = (qS + (1  qS)qM ) andQ0 = (1  qS)(1  qM ). Note that the probability I (0) is maximized
when qS = 1 and minimized when qS = qM = 0. Then, we have
@I (0)
@bM
DR +
@DR
@BM
I (0)   @D
U
@bM
<
@I (0)
@bM
DR + F (wR)
1   F (wR)
1   F (wU )   F (w
U ); and
@I (0)
@bM
DR +
@DR
@BM
I (0)   @D
U
@bM
>
@I (0)
@bM
DR + F (wR)(1   F (wR))   F (wU ):
Since f (x)=(1   F (x)) is increasing in x and wR > wU , @I (0)
@bM is negative. Then, if D
R > 0 and
F (wR)(1   F (wR)) < F (wU )(1   F (wU )), @'0;0(s)
@bM < 0. Conversely, if D
R < 0 and F (wR)(1  
F (wR)) > F (wU ), @'0;0(s)
@bM > 0. 
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Suppose that there is no PBE such that no one reports in problem P. Thus,
some subordinate reports. If the subordinate is subordinate 0, '1;0(0) > 0. Consider the case that
'1;0(0) < 0. We now show that for some t 2 N, '0;0(t) > 0. Suppose by contradiction that for each t,
'0;0(t) < 0. Then, since subordinate 0 conceals, there is a PBE such that each subordinate t conceals,
a contradiction.
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Therefore, for some t 2 N, '0;0(t) > 0 or '1;0(0) > 0.
Case 1. Suppose that for some t 2 N, '0;0(t) > 0. Then, as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, for each
t, '00;0(t) > 0. Then, we have '
0
0;1(t) > 0 for each t since '
0
0;1 > '
0
0;0. Since '0;0 6 '1;1, '
0
1;1(t) > 0.
Since '01;1(t) > 0, the strategy profile that each player reports the problem is a PBE.
Suppose by contradiction that there is a pure strategy PBE such that someone conceals the problem.
Let such player be subordinate t. Then, it must be '01;0(t) < 0. Let the equilibrium strategy profile of
subordinates denote by r . Suppose that rt+1 = 1. Then, since '00;1(t) > 0 and '
0
1;1(t) > 0, the best
response is rt = 1, a contradiction. Suppose that rt+1 = 0. Consider the case that rt+2 = 1. Then, as
in the same way, we have a contradiction. Therefore, we consider the case that rt+2 = 0. However, in
this case, since '00;0(t) > 0 for each s, '
0
0;0(t + 1) > 0. Thus, the best response for subordinate t + 1 is
rt+1 = 1, a contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose that '1;0(0) > 0. Then, since '01;0(t) < '01;r (t) for each r > 0, as in the proof of
Theorem 4.2, each subordinate reports the problem in PBE.
The latter case is shown in the same way. 
Equilibrium with mixed strategy
In this subsection, we consider equilibria with mixed strategy. We first prove Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Let T10;00 = ft : '1;0(t) < 0 < '0;0(t)g. We show the case for jT10;00 j 6 1 in
the main text. We first consider the case that jT10;00 j = 2. Let T10;00 = ft; t + 1g. Then, let rt; rt+1
be the numbers that satisfy '1;rt (t) = 0, 'rt+1;0(t + 1) = 0. Let rt = 1 for each t < t and rt = 0 for
each t > t + 1. Then, r is an equilibrium.
As an induction assumption, we suppose that there is an equilibrium when jT10;00 j = k. Consider
the case that jT10;00 j = k + 1.
Suppose by contradiction that there is no equilibria when jT10;00 j = k +1. Let t = minT10;00. Since
jT10;00nftgj = k, if rt = 1, an equilibrium exists. LetM be the set of equilibrium strategywhen rt = 1
is fixed. Therefore, rt = 1 is not the best response for subordinate t, which implies that '1;rt+1 (t) < 0
for each r 2 M . Since '1;1(t) > 0, rt+1 < 1. Suppose that rt+1 = 0. Then, since '0;0(t) > 0 and
'0;1(t) > 0 for each t 2 T10;00, rt+2 = 1 is the best response for subordinate t + 1’s action.9 On
the other hand, since '1;1(t) > 0 (and '0;1(t) > 0), rt+1 = 1 is the best response for subordinate
9 Since k > 2, t + 2 2 T10;00.
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t + 2’s action, a contradiction. Therefore, rt+1 2 (0; 1). This implies that '1;rt+2 (t + 1) = 0. Since
'1;0(t + 1) < 0 < '1;1(t + 1), rt+2 2 (0; 1). This also implies that 'rt+1;rt+3 (t + 2) = 0.
Note that t + k   1 2 T10;00 but t + k < T10;00. Note also that rt+k = 0.
Case 1. Suppose that rt+k 1 = 1. Then, since 'r 0;1(t) > 0 for each t 2 T10;00, rt+k 2 = 1. However,
since '1;0(t + k   1) < 0, the best response is rt+k 1 = 0, a contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose that rt+k 1 = 0. Suppose also that rt+k 2 = 0, then, since '0;0(t + k   1) > 0,
the best response is rt+k 1 = 1, a contradiction. Therefore, we have rt+k 2 2 (0; 1), that is,
'rt+k 3;rt+k 1 (t + k   2) = 0. Therefore, rt+k 3 2 (0; 1) since there is no t 2 T10;00 such that
'1;0(t) = 0, '0;0(t) = 0, '1;1(t) = 0, or '0;1(t) = 0.
Case 2-1. Suppose that rt+k 4 = 1, then, for each j < k   3, if rt+ j = 1, r is an equilibrium, a
contradiction.
Case 2-2. Suppose that rt+k 4 = 0, then, since '0;r 0 (t) > 0 for each r0 2 [0; 1] and t 2 T10;00,
rt+k 3 = 1 is the best response, a contradiction.
Therefore, we have rt+k 4 2 (0; 1). Continuing this process, rt+ j 2 (0; 1) for each j = 1; : : : ; k  2.
Case 3. Suppose that rt+k 1 2 (0; 1), then, since 'rt+k 2;0(t + k   1) = 0, rt+k 2 2 (0; 1) and as
in the case 2, we have rt+ j 2 (0; 1) for each j = 1; : : : ; k   1.
By cases 1,2 and 3, we have, 'rt+ j 1;rt+ j+1 (t + j) = 0 for each j = 1; : : : ; k   2. We also have that
'rt+k 2;rt+k (st+k 1) = 0.
Now letDrt+1 be the number that satisfies '1;Drt+1 (t) = 0. Then,Drt+1 > rt+1, 'Drt+1;rt+3 (t + 2) < 0.
Then, there is Drt+3 > rt+3 such that 'Drt+1;Drt+3 (t) = 0. In turn, 'Drt+3;rt+5 (t + 4) < 0. Let k be the
largest even number less than k   1. Continuing this process, for each j = 2; 4; : : : ; k there existsDrt+1;Drt+3; : : : ;Drt+k+1 such that 'Drt+ j 1;Drt+ j+1 (t + j) = 0.
Consider the case that k   1 is an even number. Then, k = k   3. Then, let Drk 1 = rk 1. Note
that 'rt+k 2;rt+k (t + k   1)rt+k 1 = 0. Suppose that rt+k 1 > 0. Then, 'rt+k 2;0(t + k   1) = 0,
and thus, 'Drt+k 2;0(t + k   1) < 0. Then, let Drt+k 1 = 0. Since 'rt+k 3;rt+k 1 (t + k   2) = 0,
'rt+k 3;0(t + k   2) < 0. Then there exists Drt+k 3 < rt+k 3 such that 'Drt+k 3;0(t + k   2) = 0.
Then, in turn, 'rt+k 5;Drt+k 3 (t + k   4) < 0. Continuing this process, there exists rt; rt+2; : : : ; rt+k 1
for each j = 2; 4; : : : ; k   1, 'Drt+ j 2;Drt+ j (t + j + 1) = 0. Then,Dr satisfies equilibrium condition.
Suppose that rt+k 1 = 0. Then, since 'rt+k 2;0(t + k   1) < 0, 'Drt+k 2;0(t + k   1) < 0. For
each j = 2; 4; : : : ; k   1, let Drt+ j = rt+ j . Then, since 'rt+ j 1;rt+ j+1 (t + j) = 0, we also have
'Drt+ j 1;Drt+ j+1 (t + j) = 0. Then,Dr satisfies equilibrium condition.
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Note that in either case, Drt+k 1 = 0 when k is odd number. Thus, there is an equilibrium such thatDrt+k 1 = 0 when k is odd.
Consider the case that k 1 is odd. Then, k = k 2. Aswe shown above, rt+k 1 = 0 for some r 2 M .
Then, since 'rt+k 2;0(t + k   1) < 0, there is Drt+k 2 < rt+k 2 such that 'Drt+k 2;0(t + k   1) = 0.
Then, in turn, 'rt+k 4;Drt+k 2 (t + k   3) < 0. Continuing this process, there exists rt; rt+2; : : : ; rt+k 2
for each j = 2; 4; : : : ; k   1, 'Drt+ j 2;Drt+ j (t + j + 1) = 0. Then,Dr satisfies equilibrium condition.
Thus, in each case, we can construct an equilibrium strategy, a contradiction. 
The following propositions show the properties of equilibria with mixed strategy. Combining
Theorem 4.3 and the following proposition, if '0;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N,10 we can characterize the
equilibrium with mixed strategy.
Proposition 4.9. Suppose that '0;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N. Then, in each equilibrium, for each t such
that '0;0(t) < 0, subordinate t conceals the problem.
Proof of Proposition 4.9. Suppose that '0;1(t) = 0 for some t 2 N. Then, there exists t such that
'0;1(t) < 0. Then, for each r; r0, 'r;r 0 (t) < 0. Thus, for the subordinate in period t, not reporting
is strict dominant strategy. Since '0;1(t) is decreasing in t, for each t0 > t, subordinate in period t0
conceals in equilibrium.
Let T := ft0 : '0;1(t0) > 0 and '0;0(t0) < 0g. If T = ?, we are done. Suppose that T , ?. Consider
t := maxT . Then, we have '0;1(t + 1) < 0. Thus, rt+1 = 0. Since '0;0(t) > '1;0(t), '1;0(t) < 0.
Therefore, not reporting is best response for the subordinate in period t. Thus, we have rt = 0.
Continuing this process, we have that for each t 2 T , subordinate t does not report in equilibrium. 
The above proposition needs the assumption that '0;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N. If it fails to hold, the
equilibrium has the following properties.
Proposition 4.10. Suppose that '1;1(t) 6 0 for some t 2 N and '0;1(t) > 0 for each t 2 N. Let
t := minft : '1;1(t) < 0g. Then, in each equilibrium, the following statements hold. (1) Suppose that
rt = 0. Then, for each t < t such that '0;0(t) < 0, subordinate t conceals the problem.
(2) Suppose that rt , 0. Then, for each t such that '1;1(t) < 0, subordinate t completely mixes
reporting and concealing.
10Note that '0;1(t) 6 0 implies that '1;1(t) 6 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4.10. (1) This is same for the Proposition 4.9.
(2) Let t := minft : '1;1(t) < 0g. Suppose that the subordinate in period t reports. Then,
since '1;1(t) < 0, for each r and t0 > t, '1;r (t0) < 0. Therefore, rt+1 = 0. On the other hand,
since '0;0(t) < 0, 'r;0(t) < 0 for each r 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, not reporting is the best response, a
contradiction.
Suppose that the subordinate in period t reports with probability rt < 1. This implies that
'rt 1;rt+1 (t
) = 0. If rt+1 = 0, 'rt 1;rt+1 (t) < 0, a contradiction. If rt 1 = 1, it also contradicts.
Therefore, rt+1 > 0 and rt 1 < 1. We consider the following three cases:
1. rt+1 = 1 and rt 1 = 0,
2. rt+1 = 1 and rt 1 > 0,
3. rt+1 < 1.
Case 1. Suppose that rt+1 = 1 and rt 1 = 0, then, since '0;1(t) > 0 for each t 2 N, a contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose that rt+1 = 1 and rt 1 > 0. Then, 'rt;rt+2 (t + 1) > 0. Since rt+1 = 1 and
'1;r (t + 2) < 0, rt+2 = 0. Thus, since '0;0(t + 1) < 0 and '1;0(t + 1) < 0, not reporting is the best
response for subordinate t + 1 , a contradiction.
Case 3. Suppose that rt+1 < 1. Since rt+1 > 0, 'rt;rt+2 (t + 1) = 0. Then, rt+2 > 0 since
'rt;0(t
 + 1) < 0. If rt+2 = 1, as in case 2, we have a contradiction. Continuing this process, for each
t0 > t, 'rt 0 1;rt 0+1 (t
0) = 0. 
4.A.4 Proofs in Section 4.6.2
Proof of Lemma 4.8. When the problem is reported, the manager in period t’s objective is
max

bM st + (1   )( pdM;R)st   c ()st;
equivalently
max

bM + (1   )( pdM;R)   c (): (4.2)
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By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, the optimal probability (c) satisfies
bM + pdM;R   0((c))c +  = 0;  (c) = 0;
for some nonnegative real number . Since 0 1 is increasing, if bM + pdM;R < 0(0)c, it must be
 > 0. Therefore, (c) = 0. On the other hand, if bM + pdM;R > 0(0)c,  = 0. Thus, problem
(4.2) has the interior solution. Therefore,
(c) =
8>><>>:
0 if bM + pdM;R < 0(0)c;
0 1((bM + pdM;R)=c) if bM + pdM;R > 0(0)c:
Since 0 1 is increasing, (c) is decreasing in c. Then, the expected utility of facing the reported
problem as a manager is
HDR = Z [(c)bM + (1   (c))( pdM;R)   c ((c))] dF (c):
Consider the manager’s problemwhen the manager knows the problem before the subordinate’s report.
If he ignores the problem and the problem is unreported, the expected utility is  pdM;U . If he ignores
the problem and the problem is reported, the expected utility is (c)bM + (1   (c))( pdM;R)  
((c))c. Let r be the probability that the subordinate reports the problem. Then, the expected
utility of ignoring the problem is
r[(c)bM + (1   (c))( pdM;R)   c ((c))] + (1   r)[ pdM;U]:
On the other hand, if he does not ignore the problem, that is,  > 0 the expected utility is (c)bM +
(1   (c))( pdM;R)   ((c))c. Thus, the manager ignores the problem if and only if (c)bM +
(1   (c))( pdM;R)   ((c))c <  pdM;U .
As in the previous section, let HDU be the expected utility of facing the unreported problem, that is,
HDU = Z [maxf(c)bM + (1   (c))( pdM;R)   ((c))c; pdM;U g] dF (c):
It is easy to show that HDU > HDR. Let c be the number that solves (c)bM + (1  (c))( pdM;R) 
((c))c =  pdM;U . Note that (c)bM + (1   (c))( pdM;R)   ((c))c is decreasing in
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c. This is because, by the envelope theorem, diﬀerentiating the above function by c yields that
 ((c)) < 0. Then, HDU is written as
HDU = Z c[(c)bM + (1   (c))( pdM;R)   ((c))c] dF (c)
 pdM;U (1   F (c)):
Therefore, the probability that the reported problem remains unsolved in the next period, which is
denoted by HI (rt 1) is
HI (rt 1) :=  (qS (1   rt 1) + (1   qS)qM ) Z
c
(1   (c)) dF (c)
+ (1   qS)(1   qM )
 Z
(1   (c)) dF (c)
!!


(qS (1   rt 1) + (1   qS)qM )(1   F (c)) + (1   qS)(1   qM )
 1
Consider the subordinate’s behavior. The expected utility of reporting is
HI (rt 1)HDRst+1 + bSst :
The expected utility of not reporting is
 pdSst + 
f
pHDRst+1 + (1   p)(qSrt+1HDRst+1 + (1   qSrt+1)HDU st+1)g :
Then, calculating the diﬀerence of these equation yields H'rt 1;rt+1 . 
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Recall that
H'1;0(t) := (1   p) f(HI (rt 1)   1)HDR   (1   p)(HDU   HDR)g st+1st + bS + dS :
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Then,
@H'1;0(t)
@dM;R
= (1   p)
266664 @
HI (1)
@dM;R
HDR + (HI (1)   p) @HDR
@dM;R
  @HDU
@dM;R
377775 st+1st :
Consider the case that dM;R ! 1. Then, for suﬃciently large dM;R, for each c 2 (0; c¯), [bM +
pdM;R]=c > 0(0). Therefore, the maximization problem (4.2) has an interior solution. Therefore by
the first order condition, we have 0((c)) = [bM + pdM;R]=c. Then, since lim! ¯ 0() = 1, as
dM;R ! 1, (c) ! ¯. This implies that ((c)) ! 1. Then, we have that for each c > 0, as
dM;R ! 1, (c)bM + (1   (c))( pdM;R)   ((c))c ! 1. Then, for suﬃciently large dM;R,
c < 0. This implies that for suﬃciently large dM;R, since c < 0 is not in the support of F, f (c) = 0.
Therefore, for suﬃciently large dM;R,
@HI (r)
@dM;R
=  
Z
@(c)
@dM;R
dF (c):
This also implies that @HDU=@dM;U = 0 for suﬃciently large dM;R. Therefore, to determine the sign of
@H'1;0(s)
@dM;R , we consider only
@HI (1)
@dM;R
HDR + (I (1)   p) @HDR
@dM;R
:
(1) We consider the case that ¯ < 1. We write HDR as a function of dM;R explicitly, that isHDR(dM;R). Since @HDR (dM;R )
@dM;R =  p
R
(1   (c)) dF (c) <  p, jHDR(dM;R)   HDR(0) j < pdM;R.
Therefore, jHDR(dM;R) j < pdM;R + jHDR(0) j.
To verify limdM;R!1
@HI (1)
@dM;R
HDR(dM;R), we consider @(c)=@dM;R. Note that @(c)
@dM;R > 0. To
show this, recall that (c) = 0 1([bM + pdM;R]=c). Since 0 1 is increasing, @
(c)
@dM;R > 0. We
also write (c) as a function of dM;R, (c; dM;R). Note that (c; dM;R)   (c; dM;R=2) =R dM;R
dM;R=2(@
(c; d0)=@d0) dd0 > mind2[dM;R=2;dM;R] dM;R(@(c; d)=@dM;R)=2. Since (c; dM;R) ! ¯
for each c as dM;R ! 1, (c; dM;R)   (c; dM;R=2) ! 0 as dM;R ! 1. Therefore,
lim
dM;R!1
min
d2[dM;R=2;dM;R]
dM;R
2
@(c; d)
@dM;R
= 0:
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Since
 @
HI (1)
@dM;R
HDR(dM;R) < maxc @
(c; d)
@dM;R
(pdM;R + jHDR(0) j);
the RHS converges to 0 as dM;R ! 1.
Consider HI (1) @HDR
@dM;R . Since c
 < 0 for suﬃciently large dM;R, HI (1) = R (1   (c)) dF (c). Then,
(HI (1)   p) @HDR
@dM;R
=  p
"Z
(1   (c; dM;R)) dF (c)   p
# "Z
(1   (c; dM;R)) dF (c)
#
:
Therefore, if ¯ < 1   p, since for each c, (c) ! ¯, (HI (1)   p) @HDR
@dM;R < 0 and thus,
@H'1;0
@dM;R < 0. On
the other hand, if ¯ > 1   p, (HI (1)   p) @HDR
@dM;R > 0 and thus,
@H'1;0
@dM;R > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.6. Under the assumption, HDU = 0. Note that if qM = 0, HI (1) = R (1  
(c)) dF (c). Then,
H'1;0(t) = (HI (1)   p)HDR st+1st + bS + pdS :
Note that since () = =( ¯   ), by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition,
(c) = max
(
¯  
r
¯
c
bM + pdM;R
; 0
)
:
The first order derivative is

266664(HI (1)   p) @
HDR
@dM;R
+
@HI (1)
@dM;R
HDR377775 st+1st :
Consider (HI (1)   p) @HDR
@dM;R +
@HI (1)
@dM;R
HDR. This is calculated as
(HI (1)   p) @HDR
@dM;R
+
@HI (1)
@dM;R
HDR
=  p(1   ¯)(1   ¯   p)   pp ¯A  ¯
2
+
A2
2
+ 1   2 ¯   p + 1   pd
M;R
2(bM + pdM;R)
!
;
where A = 1=(bM + pdM;R)1=2,  =
R ¯=A2 p
c dF (c) and  =
R ¯=A2
c dF (c). Then, if 1   p > ¯, the
first order derivative is negative. 
117
4 Concealments of Problems: An Incentive of Reducing the Responsibility
4.A.5 Proof in Section 4.6.3
Proof of Lemma 4.9. Consider a manager in period t who is reported a problem. Let  (s) be the
probability that the manager t + 1 ignores the problem. Then, the manager’s expected utility of
ignoring the problem is
 p(dM;Rst + cst )   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st ):
The manager in period t solves the problem if and only if
bM + pdM;R + (1   p)p (st )(1   )dR[G(st )=st]
1   p > c
Therefore, the probability that a manager ignores,  satisfies
 (s) = H ()(s) :=
26666641   F
*.,
bM + pdM;R + (1   p) (G(s))(1   )dR G2 (s)G(s)
1   p
+/-
3777775 : (4.3)
Then, if there is a  that satisfies the above condition, the managers’ behavior is determined.
Claim 4.2. Suppose that G(s)=s and f are well defined on R+ and sups2R+ G(s)=s < 1. Then, there
exists a function  : R+ ! [0; 1] that satisfies (4.3).
Proof of Claim 4.2. To show the existence of  that satisfies (4.3), we show the existence of a fixed
point of H .
Since each [0; 1] is a nonempty convex compact set, [0; 1]R+ is a convex set and by the Tychonoﬀ
theorem, [0; 1]R+ is a compact set under the product topology. Let O be the product topology of RR+ .
To show the existence of a fixed point of H , we use
Fact 4.2 (Aliprantis and Border 2006, p.206). (RR+;O) is locally convex Hausdorﬀ space.
Fact 4.3 (Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoﬀ’s fixed point theorem, Aliprantis and Border 2006, p.583). Let
C be a nonempty compact convex subset of locally convex Hausdorﬀ space, and let f : C ! C be a
continuous function. Then f has a fixed point.
Therefore, we only to show that H is continuous on [0; 1]R+ . To show this, let ; 0 2 [0; 1]R+ . Note
that the product topology is generated by the family of seminorm ( jh(s) j)s2R+ for each h 2 [0; 1]R+ .
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Note also that by the mean value theorem, there exists H 2 [0; 1] such that
jH ()(s)   H (0)(s) j
= p(1   )dRG
2(s)
G(s)
f *.,
bM + pdM;R + (1   p)pH (1   )dR G2(s)G(s)
1   p
+/-
 j (G(s))   0(G(s)) j:
Then, since G(s)=s is bounded above, when 0(s) !  (s) for each s, H (0)(s) ! H ()(s) for each
s. Therefore, H is continuous. Then H has a fixed point, . 
If the problem is unreported, the expected utility of ignoring the problem is
(1   r)( pdM;U st + cst ) + r max

bM st   dM;Rst;
  p(dM;Rst + cst )   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st )

;
where r is the probability that the problem is reported in the next period. Therefore, the manager
solves if and only if
bM st   cst >  (1   r)p(dM;U + c)st + r max

bM st   cst;
 pdM;Rst   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st )

If bM st   cst >  pdM;Rst   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st ), the condition is
bM st   cst >  p(dM;U + c)st :
If bM st   cst <  p(dM;R + c)st   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st ), the condition is
bM st   cst >  (1   r)p(dM;U + c)st   r (pdM;Rst   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st )):
However, since dM;R > dM;U ,  pdM;Rst   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st ) <  pdM;U . Therefore,
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if bM st   cst <  p(dM;R + c)st   (1   p)p (st )(1   )dRG(st ), the above condition must not be
satisfied. Therefore, the manager solves if and only if b
M+pdM;U
1 p > c: Thus, the probability that the
manager ignores problem is
DI (rt 1; s) = (qS (1   rt 1) + qM (1   qS )) (s)
[qS (1   rt 1) + qM (1   qS )]

1   F

bM+pdM;U
1 p

+ (1   qS )(1   qM )
:
Let DU := E fmax (bM   c; p(dM;U + c))g , and
DR(s) := E "max (bM   c; p(dM;R + c)   (1   p)p (G(s))(1   )dRG2(s)
G(s)
)#
:
Then as in the basic model, we can define D'r;r 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Note that when st+1 = st , DR,  and DI are no longer depend on s but on
. Therefore, we write these variables as functions of .
Note also that since  is independent of s,  is uniquely determined. This is because, (4.3) is written
as
 () = H ( ()) :=
"
1   F
 
bM + pdM;R + (1   p)p ()(1   )dR
1   p
!#
: (4.4)
Then, since H () is decreasing in , for each ,  () is uniquely determined.
Let E() := [ f1   DI (rt 1; )gDR()   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR())]. The proof consists of the
following six steps.
Step 1:  () is decreasing in . First note the derivative of . By the implicit function theorem,
 (G) is diﬀerentiable and by (4.4), the derivative is given by
0() =   A
1 + A
 () < 0;
where
A = p(1   )dR f
 
bM + pdM;R + (1   p)p ()(1   )dR
1   p
!
:
Therefore,  () is decreasing in . 
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Step 2:  () is increasing in . By step 1,  () is decreasing in . On the other hand, the RHS
of (4.4) is a decreasing function of  (). Therefore,  () is increasing in . 
Step 3:  () converges to a real number as  ! 1. Suppose by contradiction that  () does
not converge. By step 2, since  () is increasing,  () ! 1. Then, there exists ¯ such that for
each  > ¯,
bM + pdM;R + (1   p)p ()(1   )dR
1   p > c¯:
Then, since the support of f is (0; c¯),  () = 0, which implies that  () = 0, a contradiction. 
Step 4: lim!1 E() > 0. By step 3, since  () converges as  ! 1,  () ! 0. This implies
that DI (r; ) ! 0. Then, since DR() < 0 and DU < 0,
lim
!1 E() =  q
Srt+1DR()   (1   qSrt+1)DU > 0:

Step 5: limG!1 @E()@  > 0. The derivative of E() is given by
@E()
@
=
@DI (rt 1; )
@
DR() + (DI (rt 1; )   qSrt+1) @DR()
@
;
where
@DI (rt 1; )
@
=
(1   qSrt 1)0()
[qS (1   rt 1) + qM (1   qS)]
f
1   F
 bM+pdM;U
1 p
g
+ (1   qS)(1   qM )
< 0;
@DR()
@
=  (1   p)p(1   )dR( ())0 () < 0:
Note that since  () ! 0, 0() ! 0. Therefore, @DI (rt 1;)@ ! 0 and @DR ()@ ! 0. If rt+1 > 0, sinceDI (rt 1; ) ! 0 as  ! 1, @E()@ > 0 for suﬃciently large . 
Step 6: Completing the proof. Consider the case that rt+1 = 0. Then, since  () is bounded
above, DI (rt 1; ) is bounded above. Since @DR ()@ ! 0, (DI (rt 1; ) qSrt+1) @DR ()@ ! 0. Thus, since
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DR() < 0 and @DI (rt 1;)@ < 0, lim!1 @E()@  > 0.
Note that D'rt 1;rt+1 () = (1   p)E() + bS + pdS. Then, if E() > 0, D'rt 1;rt+1 () > 0. Thus, by
step 5, lim!1 D'rt 1;rt+1 () > 0.
Note also that @D'rt 1;rt+1 ()=@ = (1   p) @E()@  + (1   p)E(). Then by steps 4 and 5,
@D'rt 1;rt+1 ()=@ > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4.8. As in the proof of Proposition 4.7, let
E() = [ f1   DI (rt 1; )gDR()   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR())]
Since @D'rt 1;rt+1 ()=@ = (1  p) @E()@ + (1  p)E(), it is suﬃciently to show that @E(0)@ < 0 and
E(0) < 0 for suﬃciently large c¯. Note that
 (0) = 1   F
 
bM + pdM;R
1   p
!
= 1   b
M + pdM;R
(1   p)c¯ :
Then, we can write DI (rt 1; 0) = A(c¯) (0). Note that A(c¯) > 1 and limc¯!1 A(c¯) = 1. On the other
hand,
DR(0) = bM bM + pdM;R
(1   p)c¯  
 
bM + pdM;R
(1   p)c¯
!2 1
c¯
  pdM;R
 
1   b
M + pdM;R
(1   p)c¯
!
+
p
c¯
 
bM + pdM;R
(1   p)c¯
!2
  pc¯
DU = bM bM + pdM;U
(1   p)c¯  
 
bM + pdM;U
(1   p)c¯
!2 1
c¯
  pdM;U
 
1   b
M + pdM;U
(1   p)c¯
!
+
p
c¯
 
bM + pdM;U
(1   p)c¯
!2
  pc¯
Then, since DR(0) < 0,
E(0) = [ f1   I (rt 1; 0)gDR(0)   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR(0))]
<  DR(0) bM + pdM;R
1   p   (1   q
Srt+1)(DU   DR(0)):
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Letting c¯ ! 1 yields that
lim
c¯!1 DR(0) bM + pdM;R1   p   (1   qSrt+1)(DU   DR(0))
= p
bM + pdM;R
1   p   (1   q
Srt+1)p(dM;R   dM;U ):
Therefore, if the following condition holds, limc¯!1 E(0) < 0.
p <
(1   qSrt+1)(dM;R   dM;U )   bM
dM;R   (1   qSrt+1)(dM;R   dM;U ) :
The above condition holds when p, bM and dM;U are suﬃciently small.
Next, we consider @E()@ , which is written as
@E()
@
=
@I (rt 1; )
@
DR() + (DI (rt 1; )   qSrt+1) @DR()
@
:
Note that
0(0) =  A (0) =  p(1   )d
R
c¯
 (0);
@DR(0)
@
=  (1   p)(1   )dR( (0))2:
Therefore,
lim
c¯!1
@E(0)
@
= p2(1   )dR   (1   qSrt+1)(1   p)(1   )dR
= (1   )dR(p2   (1   qSrt+1)(1   p)):
Thus, if qS < 1 and p is suﬃciently small, limc¯!1 @E(0)@ < 0. 
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